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## Near East/South Asia Report

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19 October 1984

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## ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

### 'PRO-ARMENIAN' STEPS ASCRIBED TO GREECE, FRANCE, ARGENTINA

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 11 Aug 84 p 1

[Article: "New Games at the UN Concerning the Armenian Question: Seeking a Mention of the 'Armenian Massacre' in Official Report"]

[Text] While Turkey is once again offering an olive branch to Greece and extending a hand in friendship toward France, the French and Greek delegations, making an issue of the Armenian Question, are attempting to use new ploys at the UN at the expense of Turkey.

It is reported that the Greek, French, and Argentine delegations to the meetings of the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva are seeking to have the current official report modified in order to bring it into conformity with the demands of the day. Their actual intention is to add a clause stating that the "Turks murdered Armenians in 1915."

Last year a like effort was undertaken by the Greeks. Addressing the Committee on Human Rights, they asked that a number of articles in the official report be modified. The Greek delegation, to bolster its request, mentioned the massacre which was perpetrated in Lebanon by Israel against the Palestinians. By citing this massacre, the Greek delegation sought once again to place the Armenian Question on the agenda. Last year's attempt was unsuccessful. Again this year the Greek delegates insist that "in order to ensure that massacres similar to the events brought about by the Turks in 1915 not be repeated, and in order that a lesson be learned from them, the Armenian Genocide must be mentioned in the official report." The Argentine delegates also support these Greek demands.

The position taken by the Argentine delegation is explained by the fact that 100,000 Armenians are today residing in Argentina.

If these delegates succeed in adding to the official report the statement that "the Turks massacred the Armenians in 1915," it will be possible to raise this question before the United Nations. A high official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara stated that this is a ploy the Armenians have been attempting for many years. The plan is to get the UN to accept the fact of a massacre, and after that to put pressure on Turkey."



Ankara is taking the necessary steps to thward such plays. Knowledgeable sources state that Turkey could be placed in a difficult situation if such a clause were to be inserted into the official report. A spokesman stated: "This undertaking has failed in the past. The current official report does not contain such a statement. These latest machinations show that the Armenians are continuing in their persistent effort. Their aim is to force these unfounded demands on the UN, and subsequently to exert pressure on Turkey."

8817

CSO: 4605/93



## ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

### TURKISH PAPER CRITICIZES FRENCH WEEKLY'S 'PRO-ARMENIAN' ARTICLE

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 15 Aug 84 p 1

[Article: "The Periodical LE POINT About Armenians"]

[Text] Today's issue of MILLIYET contains the following article under the title "Materials to Arouse Sympathy Toward the Armenians."

On the eve of a meeting between the Turkish Armenian Patriarch Archbishop Galustian and Soviet Armenia's highest officer of the church, Catholicos Vazken I, the French newspaper LE POINT carries an article which states that "there are Armenians who do not carry bombs." This newspaper publishes "material arousing compassion" for the Armenians.

The author of the article notes that Soviet Armenians express their nationalistic feelings not only vis-a-vis the Turks and states that the top Soviet Armenian church leaders, Catholicos Vazken I and others, are "appeasers toward the regime."

The LE POINT article states that the Armenian Church, in total contrast to the situation in Poland, supports not the Armenian community in the Soviet Union but rather the Soviet regime. The article states: "Catholicos Vazken I is an appeaser toward the regime. And Karen Demirchian, a high official of the church, has risen to the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia."

The article elaborates on the difficult economic straits of Armenians residing in Soviet Armenia and cites sympathy-arousing examples of the difficult conditions under which the Soviet Armenians are living.

The French periodical praises the Armenians for always holding high their nationalist feelings against the Turks. The article describes the anti-Turkish demonstration which took place on Lenin Square in the Armenian capital of Yerevan on 27 April 1965. The article stresses that in that year 150,000 Armenian demonstrators took to the streets chanting the slogan: "We want our lands back from Turkey."

The newspaper LE POINT, which publishes "material to arouse compassion" for the Armenians, presents photographs of elderly Armenians, claiming that "they were saved from the Turkish Genocide."

8817

CSO: 4605/92

OFFICIALS ASKED TO TACKLE PROBLEMS OF ARMENIAN COMMUNITY

Tehran ALIK in Armenian 9 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] The Prelate of the Armenian Diocese of Tehran, Archbishop Ardak Manugian, has sent separate letters to Prime Minister Mir Hosein Musavi-Khamenei and Minister of the Interior Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri in connection with the difficulties created with regard to Armenian schools, the problems arising from the implementation of cultural work and the cancellation of the intra-Armenian athletic games. The translation of the two letters are provided below:

[Date] 5 September 1984; [Reference] 1761-311.

His Eminence Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the Honorable Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

In the name of God,

We respectfully draw your attention to the fact that while only a few days remain before the beginning of the new school year the problems of the Armenian schools, far from being resolved, have been compounded and aggravated by the closure and dissolution of nearly half of the Armenian schools. Although we learn from news items in the press that an effort has been launched, at your behest, to examine and resolve the difficulties and the problems of the Armenian schools, no tangible results have been obtained so far, and Armenian students and schools continue to remain in a state of uncertainty.

It is obvious, in view of the importance of the issue, that members of the Iranian-Armenian community are concerned about the future of their children's education. As a result, parents of Armenian students have, on several occasions, appealed to me and the Diocesan Council demanding that the situation of the Armenian schools and the future of their children's education be clarified.

As is recalled, at the request of government authorities, I, as well as the Diocesan Council, submitted proposals in the past to resolve these difficulties without violating the laws of the Armenian Church. Today, too, we are prepared to cooperate with the said effort or any official body that you appoint. We kindly request that the necessary steps be taken in these few days before the start of the school year to resolve outstanding difficulties and to enable

Armenian schools to open their doors and to proceed with their work without any impediments during the new school year.

We pray to the Supreme Lord to bless your cabinet with success and our fighters with victory.

Prayfully, Archbishop Ardak Manugian, Prelate of the Armenian Diocese of Tehran.

[Date] 5 September 1984; [Reference] 1760-312.

His Eminence **Hojjat ol-Eslam Nateq-Nuri**, the Honorable Minister of the Interior of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

In the name of God,

We recently learned with grief that, in spite of a previous agreement reached with the Physical Education Organization, the Ministry of the Interior has banned the intra-Armenian athletic games in which the Iranian-Armenian youth and teenagers have taken part for the past 20 years.

As is recalled, the Ministry of the Interior also banned the activities planned and organized for the Armenian Culture Week in October last year.

Thus, within the period of one year, this ministry has prevented the Armenian community twice from proceeding with its cultural and athletic programs, and it continues to impose practical restrictions on the implementation of Iranian-Armenian cultural and social programs.

Beside causing pain, this problem, which has no past precedent, reinforces the concerns of the Armenian community. The continuing impasse over the problems of Armenian schools coupled with practical restrictions imposed on Armenian cultural and social programs have disrupted the Armenian public life and have caused concern and uncertainty in the Armenian community. The latest restrictions have also caused despair among the Armenian athletes who have been training for a long time to participate in the games.

In view of the problems mentioned above, we kindly request that the necessary steps be taken to insure that a more accomodating stance is taken on similar issues in the future.

Prayfully, Archbishop Ardak Manugian, Prelate of the Armenian Diocese of Tehran.

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CSO: 4605/1

TURKEY SAID TO BE ARMENIAN HOMELAND FOR 2500 YEARS

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 14 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] The ANKA news agency today published significant segments from the resolution passed by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The resolution says that Turkey has been the homeland of the Armenians for 2,500 years. The draft of Resolution 241 reads as follows:

"The Senate wishes that the Armenian genocide be given consideration in the conduct of American foreign policy. Such a posture would prevent the perpetration of other genocides elsewhere in the world. The Armenian genocide occurred in the years 1915-1923 during the Ottoman period and just before the establishment of the Turkish republic. The result was that 1 to 1.5 million Armenians were killed and the Armenians' 2,500-year-old homeland was devastated. Evidence about the Armenian genocide can be found in U.S., Austrian, French, German and British government archives. Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey between 1913 and 1916 wrote persistently at the time protesting the Armenian genocide to American allies.

"On 13 May 1920, the Senate passed a resolution acknowledging that allegations about the Armenian genocide were true. The House of Representatives, by its Resolution 148 has resolved to declare 24 April as a day of commemoration for the Armenian genocide. In a speech on 16 May 1978, former President Jimmy Carter described the Armenian genocide as one of the greatest tragedies of history and said that, as President, he would try not to ever forget that fact.

"In addition to the UN Human Rights Commission and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Commission, President Reagan also talked about the genocide perpetrated against Armenians and Cambodians in a speech on 22 April 1981.

"In the light of all these facts, the Senate asks the President and the Secretary of State to keep this historical event in mind and ensure that it has a place in the U.S. State Department. By recognizing the Armenian genocide, the President and the Secretary of State must prevent other genocides from happening.

"The Senate asks the President and the United Nations to promote the discussion of the issue in international forums and to declare their repugnance against not only the Armenian, but all forms of genocide."

'ALLIANCE OF HATRED' AGAINST TURKEY BY ARMENIANS, GREEKS ELABORATED

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 15 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] In an article entitled "Here is an Alliance of Hatred," HURRIYET correspondent Dogan Ulus writes from New York:

U.S. senators of Greek ancestry are doing all they can in conjunction with the Armenian lobby to have anti-Turkish resolutions ratified. Armenian and Greek lobbies spare no effort in their anti-Turkish activities.

Backed by Armenians who have become millionaires after coming to the United States, the Armenian lobby has become an effective force and has been hatching one plot after another against Turkey. Thus, in a country with a population of hundreds of millions, the Armenian community, numbering only 700,000, is able to influence Congress.

Led by California Governor George Deukmejian, who is also a friend of President Reagan, numerous Armenians with important positions influence Congress' decisions. Billionaires like industrialists Alex Manoogian and Edward Mardikian, Metro Goldwyn Mayer owner Kirk Krikorian--who also owns a chain of hotels in Las Vegas--real estate moguls Hovnanian brothers, businessman Tavit Shahririan, who owns 1,100 department stores, and tycoons like Hagop Chuljian and Nshan Alexanian--who once donated \$100,000--make large financial contributions to members of Congress.

The Armenian Church, which administers 100 churches in the United States, also instigates enmity against Turkey. Meanwhile, the Dashnak party [Armenian Revolutionary Federation], which is one of the organizers of Armenian terrorism, participates in anti-Turkish activities in every sphere of life.

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CSO: 4605/10



OZAL PREDICTS 'IRREMEDIABLE CONSEQUENCES' FOR CONGRESS' RESOLUTION

Istanbul JAMANAK in Armenian 15 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] Ankara--The Office of the Prime Minister yesterday issued a strong statement in connection with the anti-Turkish resolutions passed by the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate and labeled them as "examples of great thoughtlessness."

The statement says:

"We see with grief and anger that the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United States has lately undertaken to endorse resolutions with malicious motives against our country. We see these resolutions, which call upon the President of the United States to use unfounded allegations as a basis for the conduct of foreign policy and to declare so-called 'days of remembrance' aimed at insulting our public, as examples of great thoughtlessness.

"We are surprised and concerned that such an ugly and cheap policy has been adopted simply in order to appease the Armenians during this brief period before the elections. We call the attention of the world public opinion to the fact that these resolutions serve to support international terrorism which has chosen American citizens as targets and, specifically, the criminal acts of ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia] and other similar terrorist organizations.

"If another Turkish diplomat is killed tomorrow by these criminals, one wonders whether those who proposed or voted for these resolutions will not feel responsible for it in their consciences.

"One must think well about who will benefit from the revival, in this manner, of an event whose causes and history are strongly debatable.

"We would not want to remind those who are thoughtlessly trying to play cheap politics with these issue about true and more genocidal events in the history of their own country. We are the successors of a nation which provided peace and security for numerous religious communities within its border in the 14th and 15th centuries when religious persecution was prevalent in today's Western countries and thus set an example for the entire world in this aspect of civilization.



"Our forefathers even gave shelter to a large Jewish community fleeing religious persecution in the 16th century. They thus practically endorsed an important human right that the world has only lately begun to recognize.

"It is a known fact that such acts with short-term political goals can unfortunately cause damages, which are difficult to heal and sometimes irremediable, to friendly relations established between countries through long years of work."

Meanwhile, President Kenan Evren met with Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu in Cankaya at 10:00 am yesterday. Halefoglu briefed the president about the U.S. House of Representatives resolution to declare 24 April a day to commemorate "man's inhumanity to man" and the Senate Foreign Relations Commission's recommendation to take allegations about the Armenian genocide into consideration in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Grand National Assembly President Karaduman also issued a statement deploring the resolutions and said: "The United States has nothing to teach to a nation like Turkey which has gone down in history as a defender of justice and which has provided shelter to minorities fleeing other countries."

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Halefoglu disclosed that a meeting to be attended by the President, Prime Minister Ozal and himself will be held on Monday.

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CSO: 4605/7

LEBANESE PRESIDENT VISITS ARMENIAN CATHOLICOS IN ANTILYAS

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 15 Sep 84 pp 1,4

[Text] On 28 July, the President of the Lebanese Republic, Shaykh Amine Gemayel, paid a private visit to Catholicos Karekin II of the Holy See of Cilicia at the seminary building in Bikfaya where His Holiness has been staying this summer.

On this occasion, the Armenian press of Beirut conducted an interview with His Holiness to keep their readers informed about the contents of the Pontiff's talks with President Gemayel. The text of the interview is reproduced below:

Question: Your Holiness, what was the occasion of President Gemayel's visit to you?

Answer: It was a private and friendly meeting. During our incapacitation, the President kept in touch with us by telephone. He expressed concern about our health and wished us quick recovery. When he heard that we are in Bikfaya during this summer period, he wished to pay a personal visit and to talk about the state of Lebanon and the role of the Catholicate of the Holy See of Cilicia.

Question: What issues did your talks cover?

Answer: Firstly, His Excellency, the President, briefly analyzed the events of the last 1-2 months. He stated clearly that the Lebanese homeland is going through very difficult times. He was pleased that the spirit of national unity has been growing stronger amongst all sides in these last few months. This is the most important source of hope. He also expressed satisfaction about the fact that the security situation has been gradually improving and taking hold in broader areas of Lebanon, starting from Beirut and its environs and eventually spreading throughout the entire territory of Lebanon.

We, in our turn, warmly commended the persistent, patient and broad-minded efforts of the President, the Prime Minister, the government and all responsible personalities. The children of Lebanon are enjoying the fruits of those efforts.

The President, a man of realism and brave spirit, naturally noted that all the difficulties have not yet been resolved. A multitude of tough problems still

await solution. Nevertheless, the President expressed confidence that his and his government's efforts will be crowned with success if the security situation continues to improve, when normal conditions are restored and when people from all sides have the opportunity to meet and talk to each other and work for the general common interests of Lebanon.

Question: Was there any reference in your conversation to the role of the Armenian community?

Answer: Naturally yes, and extensively.

In the course of our intimate meeting, which lasted more than an hour, we once again expounded, on the basis of practical considerations and tangible deeds, about the unshakable loyalty, dedication and work of the Lebanese-Armenian community and the Catholicate of the Holy See of Cilicia for the preservation of Lebanon's unity and the establishment of peace. We underscored the past and present positive participation of the Armenian community in Lebanese life through its wholehearted and unified efforts in communal and religious circles, at the parliamentary deputy level and in political and party affairs. In particular, we briefed the president about our work during the meetings of the leaders of the religious communities and the active participation of Archbishop Aram Keshishian, the Prelate of the Armenian Diocese of Lebanon, in the commission that was born as a result of those meetings.

On this occasion, we reiterated once again to His Excellency that the posture of the Lebanese-Armenian community is not what it was one or two decades ago. Today, we have a young generation which has grown up in Lebanese conditions and with Lebanese ideas and traditions, which is familiar with the country's language and way of life and which is present and a participant in all Lebanese institutions and population centers. We stated that we no longer wish the role and the work of the Armenian community to be referred to as "contribution", but as "participation."

The President was very pleased with the information and clear explanations we conveyed to him. He, in turn, reemphasized that it is his and his government's desire to have the Lebanese-Armenian community participate more extensively in government institutions and play out its important role in the reconstruction of this country and all aspects of future planning, reorganization and restoration, such as the constitutional commission to be formed as well as other government bodies. The President expects able, competent and dedicated young people with university and practical training in modern science and technology to take part at all levels and in all aspects of the state and government machinery.

Question: What other meetings have you had with religious and government officials lately?

Answer: One week before my meeting with the President, on 20 July, we visited the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, His Holiness Cardinal Antonios Khoraysh, and had a one-hour conversation about the general state of the country, cooperation among religious communities--Moslem and Christian--and the services that we can offer to our homeland.

The next day, on 21 July, accompanied by Archbishop Datev and Arshavir Vartabed, we paid a visit in Bikfaya to Minister Shaykh Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Phalangist Party. We wished him quick recovery and we talked about problems related to the current situation in Lebanon and the efforts being made to resolve them.

Question: What message do you have to give to the Armenian community of Lebanon at this stage?

Answer: The children of our nation are already aware of our feelings and thoughts. We have frequently expressed them in church forums and press interviews.

At this stage, when security has begun to take hold in broader areas, all Lebanese-Armenians, without exception, must manifest their irrevocable loyalty to the Lebanese homeland with practical, tangible and self-explanatory deeds.

We find it absolutely essential that, first, all the children of our nation progress in and develop their individual professions, whether they are businessmen, artisans or merchants, in a spirit of honesty and competence and with feelings of hope, faith and confidence.

That, second, they rally around their ecclesiastical and communal institutions, national and political parties, schools, associations, youth clubs and other social organizations so that they can have fulfilled lives, vital and healthy principles and values can prevail and vanity and the passing pleasures of hedonism can be driven into retreat.

And that, third, they participate more extensively at all levels of Lebanese life. The Lebanese-Armenian community is part of the Lebanese nation. This is a fact of life for us. We must manifest more distinctly our participation at all levels of Lebanese national life, including religious, governmental, political, military, administrative, economic, educational, social and cultural areas and, in particular, in intercommunal relations.

/As a community and as citizens, we naturally have rights in Lebanese life. And we must stand up for our rights./ One of the most practical and effective ways of standing up for rights is performing our duties, offering our resources and persistently and positively pursuing our goals.

We are confident that the Armenian children of Lebanon and, in particular, our youth, will do their best for these goals.

9588

CSO: 4605/6

ENERGY PRODUCTION: NO SOONER DOUBLED THAN CONSUMED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 3127, 14 Sep 84 pp 30-31

[Interview with Mahir Abazah, minister of electricity, by Faruq Abazah: "Whenever We Double Energy Production, Consumption Devours All the Increases"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Even though performance at the Ministry of Electricity has exceeded the national plan projection and surpassed plan allocations for the energy production sector, the minister of electricity, Engineer Muhammad Mahir Abazah, is ringing the alarm bell and drawing attention to a dangerous phenomenon which requires pause and all possible exertions to limit it so that our efforts are not lost in vain...

The phenomenon is that no sooner do we double our electrical power production than consumption climbs at a frightening rate, swallowing up every increase to the extent that during the last 6 months our consumption rate in this area has increased by what amounts to 20 percent. Most of this increase is wasted on luxury consumption as a result of rampant misuse in homes, on decorations and on special occasions. This necessitates the arrival at new measures to rationalize consumption in order to limit this phenomenon which will influence all our planning and efforts to make energy, which we will have to double in the coming years, available.

Al-MUSAWWAR has met with the minister of electricity and energy, one of the 30 international specialists selected by the International Edison Organization for their previous record, knowledge and service in the area of energy production and development, not only in their own countries, but world wide.

[Question] I asked Mahir Abazah: The government has finished drawing up the state's general budget. What is the electricity ministry's share of this budget and is what has been budgeted to cover investments for its ambitious energy development plans sufficient?

[Answer] The electricity ministry's share of the new general budget is 690 million pounds. In fact the state is not sparing in funding the electricity sector's needs, aware of the role which energy plans in



development. Here we must also mention that there are many additional loan grants which supplement this funding. Many countries participate in carrying out the ministry's projects, in addition to the Internal Bank. These ambitious projects are for generating, transmitting and distributing electricity for industrial and agricultural purposes. As far as electrifying the countryside is concerned, Egypt's economic situation and the necessity of doubling production in public and private sector factories as well as military production have to be accorded priority in energy supplies and a very great push. We must profitably invest every penny in order to secure Egypt's hard currency needs. In spite of all this, we are also not forgetting the electrification of the countryside for there is a plan to electrify farmsteads, small satellites and hamlets, as long as all this does not overextend the budget. At the same time, we are responsive to the wishes of our citizens.

[Question] There are some who criticize a policy dependent on loans on the grounds that most, when utilized, are not subject to planning, this in addition to the piling up of accrued interest which drains the country's budget. Is it possible that these warnings apply to the electricity ministry loans?

[Answer] In truth the electricity ministry is a production ministry, but it is considered to be amongst the services ministries. It therefore cannot be expected that lenders would treat its projects with the same enthusiasm as those promising quick returns or a high profit margin, like industrial or food projects. The state sets the price of electricity. But who finances electricity projects. Nations do, for we receive large grants from America at a rate of interest which does not exceed 2 percent, from Germany at 0.75 percent, France at 3 percent, Japan at 3.5 percent, and loans from the Eastern Bloc at 4 percent or 5 percent, and Sweden with a zero rate of interest.

In general, loans from these countries are long-term and their easy terms are a strong reflection of our close relationships with these countries and their acknowledgment of the seriousness of purpose behind the achievements of the electricity sector. There are also the International Bank Loans at 9 percent. It is especially significant that the International Bank, which extends its loans after only research, investigations and project viability studies, should extend its loans to us. Once this bank offers its loan for a certain project, other countries rush in to offer more loans. In the course of 6 years we have secured from the International Bank loans worth \$300 million, half of it in goods. God be praised, our loans have also come from China and Japan on very easy terms.

[Question] Let us consider what has been achieved in relation to the 5-year plan. How can one evaluate what has actually been completed during those years of the plan which have already passed, and what is being completed now as far as plan execution is concerned?



[Answer] During the years which have already passed from the period allocated for the plan, the Ministry of Electricity and Energy has managed to overfulfill its mandate by 30 percent. This fact came out in the debate on the government's statement, and in the report of the committee which was set up to respond to it last year. The question as to the reasons behind this accomplishment might be asked, and the answer is that in 1980 the Ministry of Electricity had succeeded in drawing up for itself a general scientific strategy projected up to the year 2000, and is now in possession of a lucid picture through which it can follow up on its various projects, be they plans for thermal or gas generating stations or distribution lines. This will be done in a co-ordinated, perceptible and clear manner, known to every engineer and technician participating in implementation. In addition the ministry's companies have acquired a platform for implementing inter-connected projects which require co-ordination as far as transformers, generators and distribution are concerned. When I, for example, attempt to transmit current over a distance of 1000 km to a home, this is accomplished in seven stages which complement one another. There is the huge generator from which current flows for hundreds of kilometers, then the transformer station which converts it from one voltage to another, then the small transformer which converts the current from 110 to 220 volts. On my desk there is a small control center whose screen enables me to monitor the condition of the projects, their specifications and manner of operation. In addition there are control centers in Talkha, Alexandria and Naja' Hamadi. All control centers are automatically regulated in a unified network that extends over thousands of kilometers, representing the veins of the human body, with the main control center representing the heart. An electrical network, therefore, is something like veins and arteries, and the smallest of those veins are the lines which light up homes and factories.

[Question] What will be the significance for energy supplies of the Shubra al-Khaymah station, which will soon begin operations after being connected to the main grid?

[Answer] The International Bank has participated in equipping this station. The American aid organization has also participated with a grant of 220 million dollars, in addition to what the French, Japanese and Canadian governments have contributed in grants and easy-term loans. The American consulting firm and Egypt's electricity specialists have scored a great success by any standard. The International Bank considers it to be an international project, implemented with all measures of success. Its first unit will enter production at the end of October 1984 with a capacity of 3.3 million kw and if we take into consideration that in 1952 Egypt's entire capacity was at 50,000 kw, we can appreciate this achievement which by itself is six times our electricity production for 1952 [as published].

This new station will begin operations at the end of October 1984 and will be linked to the general grid. In 1985 work will begin on three new units and we have started to negotiate with the American aid organization

for the construction of a fourth unit. The other significant outgrowth of the completion of the Shubra al-Khaymah station is that we have saved ourselves approximately \$110 million in loans, as well as a whole year, since the project was slated for completion in October 1985. An important consideration which we must also mention is that we have profited enormously from American management expertise for completing this station. Egyptians have learnt a great deal from the experience in execution which they have gained, and the truth to tell, we were lacking in this sort of expertise for implementing projects. Within the project itself many diverse international experts are to be found, Koreans, Spaniards, Germans, as well as specialists from France. The project director has to coordinate the various work teams in order to achieve maximum production through good and expert management. God willing, the ratio of Egyptian management will rise to 50 percent for the completion of the next station. It will then increase to 70 percent for the coming projects, and so on until Egyptian management gains ample expertise in the implementation of electricity projects.

[Question] Your answer leads us to another question. Can we exploit these excellent Egyptian talents for implementing electricity projects to aid energy projects in the sisterly Arab states?

[Answer] The electricity ministry has pioneered the formation of the first talent bank, and we took care that it should include a group of electricity and energy scientists, the pick of Egyptians, in order to save the millions of dollars which owners of talent banks demand. I have to mention one fact, and that is that those banks would send us experts whose knowledge and experience in no way exceeded those of employees in our ministry. At the same time and in the most limited way, we do enlist the help of those consulting firms. This means that we have managed to establish an in-house talent bank enjoying all prerequisites for success. We will have a ready pool of experts through which we will be able to implement our projects in the most comprehensive manner and at a lower cost. At the same time the pool of experts which comprises the Egyptian talent section will be able to contribute its knowledge and experience to all energy development projects in the sister Arab states, be it in Oman, Sudan, Kuwait, Libya, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iraq or the Arab Gulf States.

[Question] Let us go back to the electrification of the countryside. Some complain that some of the villages, farmsteads and hamlets have been supplied with electricity, while others have been deprived, especially at election time?

[Answer] I want to stress that we look upon supplying the small villages, farmsteads, hamlets and satellites from a national and not a party point of view, and we will be careful to insure full justice in accordance with a plan in which we have undertaken to supply all farmsteads, hamlets and satellites with electricity. What I would like to say and repeat however is that the aim of bringing electricity to the Egyptian countryside is not only to light up homes, but that this must involve economy in

electricity use and directing it towards production, in a manner that sustains a plan for affluence. The countryside comprises one of the most important pillars for bringing it to fruition.

[Question] And what about nuclear power stations and the steps already undertaken to construct the first al-Dab'ah nuclear power station?

[Answer] A study of offers is now in progress and tender envelopes will be opened in October 84. France, America and Germany have each made their offers and the collective of German companies that participated in the tender has been dispatched to consult its government. The executive steps are proceeding according to plan. The project was preceded by exhaustive studies. The preparation of a human complement of scientists and technicians to oversee implementation and operation is now also in progress.

[Question] What about the initiation of new projects in the electricity sector?

[Answer] During the next 3 years, nine new power stations will be in operation at full capacity so as to add 16 billion kw/h to the unified grid in order to make energy available for manufacturing, industrial and agricultural projects. This includes bringing the Abu Sultan station in Ismailia into operation, in addition to the Suez and Abu'qir stations, the Damanhur steam and gas station, the Wadi Hawf, Kafr al-Dawar stations and the second Aswan hydroelectric station. These projects will increase per capita allocation from 500 kw/h to 700 kw/h after 3 years. Add to that the electrification of all the major villages and satellites that contain a thousand inhabitants, and contracting for the construction of new generating stations each with a capacity of 1200 megawatts, including a coal station at 'Uyun Musa, the Sidi Karir generating station to the west of Alexandria and the generating station at al-Kuraymat near al-Jizah governorate.

12775

CSO: 4504/469

## ELECTION RESULTS ASSESSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 242, 29 Sep-5 Oct 84 pp 30-31

[Article by Talhah Jabril: "Elections in Morocco Continue; Will the Coalition between the Right Wing and the Left Wing Succeed?"]

[Text] Members of Socialist Union of Popular Forces Move from opposition to support for the government.

Will the next government be a coalition between the Constitutional Union and the Socialist Union?

The Moroccan elections have not yet been finally decided. Voters will be going to the polls early in October to vote for 101 representatives who will make up Morocco's third parliament.

The results of the elections that were completed in the middle of this month surprised all observers. No one expected the outcome of the elections to be as surprising as they turned out to be even though pre-election expectations indicated a possibility that the Constitutional Union, which is headed by Mr Maati Bouabid, may win a large number of seats; that the Socialist Union of Popular Forces may advance; and that the Istiqlal Party may lose.

Traditional political parties lost ground for the first time, while parties that were running in the elections for the first time gained. Leaders of traditional parties think that what happened constitutes "a conspiracy against the real parties that are opposing the administration's parties and the parties that are supporting the administration."

It may be difficult to predict the course of democracy in Morocco at the present time in the face of the election results that were announced and the political picture that was created by those results.

### The Socialists Make Progress

The first thing that attracts one's attention in these elections is the progress that's been made by the Socialist Union of Popular Forces. This is what makes it likely that members of the Socialist Union will move from the ranks of the opposition into the ranks of government. Although the Socialist Union had severely



criticized the administration's intervention in the elections on the side of those parties that support the government, and although it had expressed its displeasure with the fact that "voters' wishes have been falsified," it has been noticed that the party has been able to double the number of its seats in the recent elections, compared with the number of seats it won in the 1977 elections. The number of these seats is also expected to rise in the indirect elections which will be held next October 2. The Socialist Union had won a considerable number of seats in municipal and rural elections. It is fitting to note that it is the members of municipal and rural councils and professional associations who will elect one third of the members of parliament. The total number of members of parliament will be 306 representatives.

The participation of the Socialist Union in the next government will mean that the left wing has come to power after more than one quarter of a century. This participation confirms a statement that Ahmed Reda Guedira, an adviser to the Moroccan monarch, had made some time ago. Mr Guedira had stated that the requirements for democracy in Morocco "do not preclude that the right-wing and the left-wing succeed each other in government."

And here some observers would remark that there is noticeable harmony between Mr Bouabid's and Mr Guedira's analytical methodologies despite their political and ideological differences. It is this harmony that is reinforcing predictions that the next government will be a coalition government between the Constitutional Union and the Socialist Union, despite the fact that such a coalition seems to be a contradiction in terms. This is because the premises of the Socialist Union, which follows a political course that aligns it with the left, are certainly different from those of the Constitutional Union, which defends [the principles of] free initiative, a liberal economic policy and strengthening the role of the private sector. However, it is no secret that the godfather of the new party--the party that led the parties in the elections--was Guedira himself who usually works behind the scenes. Therefore it will seem that the actual coalition between Abderrahim Bouabid and Ahmed Reda Guedira will be more than a coalition between the Socialist Union's Bouabid and the Constitutional Union's Bouabid.

#### Support for the Government

According to parliamentary conventions in Morocco, strong parliamentary support for the government is essential so that plans proposed by the government can be passed quietly in the House of Representatives. This means that the National Rally of Independents, which is led by Ahmed Osman, will have to join the expected coalition. The Independents who had played the role of an easy-going opposition in the past 2 years of the term of the previous House of Representatives are aspiring at the present time to return to the ranks of government after winning second place in the recent elections. Also the political situation that has been created by the recent elections makes a coalition government, or perhaps a four-party coalition, inevitable. If the sequence of events follows this view, the Istiqlal Party, which had suffered a severe setback in the recent elections, will return to the ranks of the opposition where it will join two small leftist groups: the Party of Progress and Socialism (two seats) and the Organization of Democratic Popular Action (one seat). These three parties may be joined in the opposition by the National Democratic Party (15 seats).

Although the Party of Progress and Socialism and the Organization of Democratic and Popular Action did attract a noticeable number of supporters in the recent elections, it is still too early to talk about an effective role that the two parties can play in parliament. They are, however, making rapid progress in attracting an activist opposition in the political mainstream.

#### Members of Istiqlal Party Displeased

Members of the Istiqlal Party have expressed severe displeasure with the results of the election, particularly since they fell back to fifth position. This regression is undoubtedly disturbing to a party that considers itself the oldest Moroccan party; it is half a century old. If the Istiqlal Party were to return to the ranks of the opposition, its members will not find it difficult to play that role as members of the National Rally of Independents would since the latter party was founded on the foundation of supporting the government.

The Istiqlal Party has been an opposition party since 1963. That situation lasted till 1977 when the party had eight ministers in the government; they stayed in office until the recent elections were held.

The contradiction that is being observed in the history of Moroccan governments lies in the truth of the equation which states that when the Istiqlal Party is in power, the Socialist Union has to be in the opposition, or vice versa. It seems that the next period will confirm this equation. The two parties never joined each other in the opposition except early in the seventies when they joined together to form one front (the National Bloc). At that time it was necessary that the two parties work together to restore democracy to the country after the state of resignation (the suspension of the constitution) that was declared in 1965. But the two parties soon went their separate ways after parliamentary life was restored in 1976. In addition to this equation, there are those who believe that any agreement between members of the Istiqlal Party and members of the Socialist Union in the opposition will have to mean that a political crisis in the country was imminent. This was true when the two parties joined each other in the opposition and went through a bitter struggle against the tendencies of a period that was known in Morocco as Oufqir's period. This is the period that was marked by the enthusiastic role that Moroccan parties played in political life. It was a period during which leaders of those parties were harrassed, persecuted and arrested.

#### Low Voter Turnout

One matter remains: the most significant consequence of the recent elections, in addition to the upset they created in the country's political picture, is the low turnout at the polls. While some parties attribute that to the administration's intervention in favor of the parties that support it--and that caused voters to lose confidence in the electoral process--Morocco's minister of internal affairs has another opinion on the subject. When asked for his interpretation of the low voter turnout at the recent elections, compared with the 1977



elections (67 percent compared with 82 percent), he replied, "The difference in voter turnout may be explained by a variety of reasons. First, the elections coincided with the holidays. The second reason was evident in the larger cities, like Casablanca, Rabat and Fes, where the lowest voter turnout was reported. There are universities and institutions of higher learning in those cities, and the date on which these elections were held coincided with the university holidays. The third reason for the low voter turnout is that independents did not run in these elections. Considering the social and ethnic makeup of Morocco, there are still individuals who do not belong to any political party and who hold prominent positions in society. Their absence caused a number of their supporters to turn away from the elections."

#### The Distribution of Seats

|  | The Previous<br>Parliament | The Present<br>Parliament |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| National Rally of Independents                 | 82                         | 38                        |
| National Democratic Party                      | 57                         | 15                        |
| Istiqlal Party                                 | 53                         | 23                        |
| Popular Movement                               | 42                         | 31                        |
| Socialist Union of Popular Forces              | 15                         | 34                        |
| Party of Progress and Socialism                | 1                          | 2                         |
| Popular Constitutional and Democratic Movement | 1                          | 0                         |
| Moroccan Labor Federation                      | 1                          | 0                         |
| Organization of Democratic and Popular Action  | did not participate        | 1                         |
| Constitutional Union                           | did not participate        | 55                        |

8592

CSO: 4504/16

BAGHDAD SOURCES LINK RED SEA MINES, GULF WAR

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 71, 18 Aug 84 p 17

[Article by Diyab Nabahan: "Iranian Threats Preceded Mines Planted in Red Sea; Matters Got Tight in Gulf, So Mining of Sea Followed"]

[Text] Baghdad--The acts of mining the Gulf of Suez and Bab el Mandeb are not isolated from the Gulf war, which is approaching the end of its 4th year without any tangible progress being achieved in the numerous international and regional efforts to persuade Iran to abandon military means and resort to political negotiations to achieve a just settlement of the conflict.

Informed political sources in Baghdad believe that even though the mining of the Red Sea seeks directly to obstruct commerce and navigation in this vital waterway, it has more far-reaching objectives connected with all the Arab issues and conditions. The mining is an attempt at creating further complication and intricacy and an endeavor to disperse and float efforts and to drag them somewhere outside the center of current Arab political concerns so that it may seem as if any endeavor or any effort to settle or deal with any of these concerns is tantamount to the impossible.

These sources have noted that the mining of the Red Sea and obstructing the movement of ships and tankers there comes amidst broad Iraqi diplomatic activity at the Arab and international levels aimed at achieving greater understanding of Iraq's positions and policies which respond to the international efforts exerted to end the war and which also respond to the legitimate requirements of defending sovereignty and independence.

Moreover, the mining operation seeks to create a balanced center of interest for Iraqi political activity and for all the political efforts being exerted by some Arab and international circles and parties to crystallize proposals or initiatives to put a stop to the Iraq-Iran war. The other point of special importance is that the mining of the Red Sea has come in the wake of the announcement about building an independent Iraqi [oil] pipeline through Saudi territories to an export center on the Red Sea. When completed, the capacity of this pipeline is estimated at 1.6 million barrels daily. This is in addition to another pipeline through Jordan to transport Iraqi oil to the port of al-'Aqabah and from this port to world markets via the Red Sea. This is being done within the framework of the policy being followed by Iraq to

restore the Iraqi economic situation to what it was prior to the outbreak of the war on 4 September 1980 by creating alternative routes for the export of its oil after the closure of the routes through the Arab Gulf and Syria. Moreover, observers recall the threats made by Iranian officials last June to strike at the interests of the countries helping Iraq or cooperating with it in the Red Sea. The threats came when the Iranians failed to avert the dangers caused by the Iraqi blockade imposed on Kharj Island and on the important Iranian ports on the Gulf--a blockade which has caused Iranian oil exports to drop to less than one-half their daily rates. This is when Iran resorted to escalating the so-called "tanker war" with the aim of creating a situation that exerts pressure on Iraq.

Observers link those threats with Tehran Radio's praise for the Red Sea mining operations and say that Khomeyni's attempt to disavow responsibility for the planting of the mines does not so much mean that there is no Iranian involvement in these operations inasmuch as it is an indication of the state of political confusion and chaos prevailing among the ruling circles in Iran. These observers believe that even though the latest air and sea attacks carried out by the Iraqi air force and naval forces against Iranian naval targets in the prohibited zone blockaded since last February--attacks which have resulted in hitting and destroying seven vessels and oil tankers and in downing three Iranian F-14 aircraft--come within the framework of intensifying the Iraqi blockade of Kharj Island, they also constitute Iraqi retaliation for the Iranian involvement in the Red Sea mining. Moreover, Iraq's determination to strangle Iran economically and Iraq's resolution to carry on with the blockade to its decisive conclusion are intensifying the Iranian crisis in the war. The [Iranian] attempts to obstruct navigation and oil exports through the other waterways are not alleviating the impact of this crisis. On the contrary, these attempts are further intensifying the crisis, considering that the other countries overlooking these waterways find themselves compelled to close them to Iranian navigation and trade.

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CSO: 4404/628

## OIL MINISTER DISCUSSED EXPORTS, TURKISH PIPELINE

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 68, 21 Jul 84 p 57

[Text] "We consider the export of our oil through the Arabian Gulf one of our most thoroughly considered issues, and to do so must be classified as one of Iraq's inalienable rights, which is not susceptible to conditions of any kind." This came in an exclusive interview conducted by AL-TADAMUN with Iraqi Oil Minister Mr Qasim Ahmad Taqi. He dealt with two main topics in the interview: the extent of Iraq's preparedness to export its oil through the Arabian Gulf and the second phase expansions of the Iraqi-Turkish crude oil pipeline. The minister said that Iraq, as many officials have reiterated, has the right to use the waters of the Gulf, in that they are international waters, and that absolutely no state overlooking the Gulf can impose its conditions under the pretext of any circumstances or considerations that violate the laws passed by international organizations and the rules of international relations. Therefore, if Iran continues to prevent Iraq from using the waters of the Arabian Gulf for the purpose of exporting its oil and importing various necessary commodities, it will be entirely legitimate for Iraq to resort to a position of not allowing Iran to use these international waters either. From this premise, Iraq adheres to its balanced policy as represented by its seige of Kharj Island. Whereas Iraq has consented to United Nations and Security Council resolutions calling for freedom of navigation in the Arabian Gulf, Iran has rejected them all. On this basis, Iraq will always be prepared to export its oil through the Arabian Gulf, and will work and make efforts on all levels to exercise its legitimate and inalienable right in this regard.

The Iraqi minister outlined developments concerning implementation of the first and second phase expansions of the Iraqi-Turkish crude oil export pipeline, saying, "In March 1982 we began discussions with the Turkish side concerning expanding the pipeline's capacity from 35-50 million tons annually, or 700,000 barrels per day to 1 million barrels per day. Agreement was reached with the Turkish side to select a consultant to conduct preliminary studies and draw up basic designs to prepare for the project. Also, a joint technical committee has been formed with the Turkish side in addition to a task force to complete the mission in the quickest possible time. At the time, the agreement

included measures for the implementation of the project in two phases. The first phase involved using chemicals to increase the pumping [capacity] of the line to 750,000 barrels per day. Immediate and quickly applicable measures were begun with the Turkish side to implement this phase, which actually was completed in 1983. Concerning the second phase, tender documents and conditions have been prepared with participation of experts from among qualified Iraqi cadres. In addition, engineers and technicians from the oil sector alongside Turkish experts have participated constantly with the consulting firm to draw up the designs and make sure they are consistent with the demands of quickly completing the pipeline expansions. The second phase expansions contract was signed in March 1983 and work was immediately begun to add two new pumping stations on the Iraqi side of the line and three new intermediate stations on the Turkish side of the pipeline, and to extend the part of the line that parallels the border by 70 kilometers at the end of the pipeline to be commensurate with the above-mentioned increase in pumping capacity of the project. Thus, activities are nearly complete on the project and it is hoped that the second phase expansion will become operational this July, giving us the ability to increase the pumping capacity of the project gradually and eliminate the injection of chemicals, especially since the injection of substances imported from abroad is very costly."

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CSO: 4404/625



## BRIEFS

SOVIET LOAN -- The Soviet Union has granted Iraq a \$2 billion loan on extremely easy and soft terms to cover a number of agreements between the two sides that include many Iraqi development projects, an agreement to explore for and export oil, and another to build a dam in norther Iraq located on the Tigris River. The Soviet Union is considered the number one source of weapons for Iraq, followed by France. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the loan agreement also includes weapons deals. Observers have noted that Iraq is again interested in completing its planned development projects. Last February it asked international companies to enter the bidding for the construction of a dam in the north which was said to cost about \$3 billion. Meanwhile, Iraqi officials have recently disclosed their country's intention to construct a new pipeline parallel to the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline that will have a capacity of 900,000 barrels per day. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 388, 28 Jul 84 p 5] 12608

CSO: 4404/625

## HEBRON BUS COMPANY ISSUES REVIEWED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 14 Aug 84 p 8

[Article: "Serious Difficulty in Need of a Fundamental Solution Surrounds the New Hebron Bus Station"]

[Text] The problems of the Hebron National Bus Company are still very much to be reckoned with and in need of a fundamental solution, especially since the company provides vital and important services to all Hebron residents.

AL-FAJR undertook to investigate the situation to learn the facts from the officials themselves, meeting with both the director of the company, Fayiz al-Qawasimi, and Acting Mayor of Hebron Mustafa 'Abd-al-Nabi al-Natshah, who was discharged by the Israeli authorities, in order to give the respected citizens a glimpse of the history of this important company.

Qawasimi said: "This company was initially established under the name Workers' Cooperative Company in 1932. In 1941 it became the Hebron National Bus Company, and in 1946 (during the British mandate) it was registered in the Registry of Companies and continued to operate between Hebron and Jerusalem.

During the Jordanian period the company was registered in 1963 under the name United National Hebron Bus Company, and recently, under the Israeli occupation, it was registered in Ramallah as Number 1063.

"The company now has 36 buses and around 60 employees. Its problems began when settlers took the garage in 1983 after they had taken the Usamah ibn Munqidh School in 1982 following 'Operation al-Dabuya.'"

Fayiz al-Qawasimi said: "The bus station was formerly on a ruin, and in 1950 the municipality moved us to this location, which it rented to us, and we made improvements on the land and constructed some buildings on it. The municipality had rented this piece of land from the Superintendent of Absentee Property and signed an official contract which is unconditionally renewed every year.

"In the year 1967, after the occupation, the municipality undertook to renew the contract with the Superintendent of Absentee Property as the central bus station in Hebron. We consequently undertook to renew the lease with the municipality at the municipality's request, and to renovate the buildings and add concrete reinforcement. In 1983 we began building walls to prevent the entry of private automobiles with the municipality's agreement, but the Israeli army interfered and prevented us from completing the work."

Concerning the question of the ownership of the land used by the company, the director of the company told us: "This land is composed of four components:

"First component: property of the municipality of Hebron.

"Second component: A thin strip on the public street owned by the al-Tamim Endowment.

"Third component: Two pieces of property overlapping onto the site owned by two Jews whose names are not known."

The company's director says concerning the beginning of the difficulty: "In 1983 there was an incident in which a Jewish student was killed in the al-Hasabah area about 600 meters from the bus station. As a result of the incident, they closed the area, reopening all of it after 3 days except for the bus station site. We complained to the officials and the answer was 'This was ordered from higher up!' We then appealed to the Supreme Court, but before a judgment was issued they left the garage and gave it back to us. After 40 days, however, they claimed that there was a bomb in the area and closed it. They reopened it after 3 days except for the bus station area and informed us that it was closed indefinitely. We went for a second time to the Supreme Court, and a verdict was issued in February of 1984 finding that we were entitled to reopen the station. Even the Israeli journalists present in the courtroom congratulated us, although the general military defense counsel asked for a 2 month delay in the order, and during the 2 months they occupied the station's new land. After 15 days they forced us to take this piece of land, which was owned by the Nasir-al-Din family and occupied by the Amir Muhammad Preparatory School.

"It is necessary to mention here that the central bus station had a complete garage and electrical shop that was stolen in its entirety by professionals!"

AL-FAJR also met with Mustafa 'Abd-al-Nabi al-Natshah, acting mayor of Hebron, whom the Israeli authorities have undertaken to remove from office, and who discussed the municipality's views on this subject. He said:

"The Municipality of Hebron has the last word on this matter because it--the bus station--is a facility that occupies a vital and important piece of land to the people, with an area of 4,500 square meters, about 3,400 of which are owned by the municipality, about 300 meters owned by the al-Tamin Endowment, and 800 meters from Jewish property of 1927, which has been leased by the municipality from the Superintendent of Absentee-Owned Lands since 1950."

Al-Natshah continued, saying: "We contacted the Supreme Court along with the bus company to obtain authorization for the buses to return to the company, and at the same time the Supreme Court agreed to the company's return. The military governor removed the fence and returned the land to its owners. After a short time they exploited the stabbing of settler Aharon Gharus, and the authorities undertook to disband the Municipal Council, and the bus station was closed again on the pretext of security. After the appointment of the new Israeli Mayor, he contacted the Supreme Court and withdrew the municipality's petition which we had filed. At this point the company made its own petition."

With regard to the next session of the court, al-Natshah said: "It will meet again on 24 October."

With regard to his own view of the bus station, al-Natshah said: "This new bus station does not serve the community at all, and it is far from the center of town."

After this AL-FAJR contacted the Nasir-al-Din family, owners of the new bus station's land, which has requested a restraining order to prevent the land's appropriation. The court has decided to have three judges rule on the case instead of one. The trial has been postponed, and there has been no decision until now; it is possible that a decision will be issued after the court vacation.

9310

CSO: 4404/650

## BRIEFS

**RICHTER-3.5 EARTH TREMOR**--Lower Galilee, 4 Sep (ITIM)--Early this morning a slight earth tremor was felt at 0233 in the lower Galilee region. The seismological institute has determined that the tremor was 3.5 on the Richter Scale. Its focus was in the region of the Moshav Shitufi [communal farm] Allone Aba, about 5 km northeast of Qiryat Tiv'on. Moshav members who were awakened by the slight tremor telephoned the Seismological Institute in Bet Dagan, which confirmed that there really had been a relatively slight earth tremor. No damage was noted. Dr Avi Shapira, the director of the seismological department of the Ministry of Energy's research institute in Bet Dagan, said today in a talk with the ITIM correspondent that at this stage he could not yet determine whether there was any link whatsoever between the latest earthquake and the previous one, which was 5 on the Richter Scale and noted on 24 August 1984. The focus of that quake was about 20 km from the Haifa Bay. [Text] [Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1615 GMT 4 Sep 84]

**BORDER POLICE IN GAZA**--After a 10-year absence, the border police have returned to the Gaza Strip. A border police unit has participated in operational and security activities over the last 3 weeks and will now operate permanently in the Gaza Strip under the regional military command. The border police unit, equipped with new vehicles and equipment suitable for varied activities according to the needs of the area, has been established from Defense Ministry funds in response to an IDF request. The members of the unit patrol the refugee camps and parts of the Gaza Strip on foot or in vehicles, and carry out special mission under IDF instructions. The return of the Green Berets to the Gaza Strip was received with surprise by the local inhabitants, who at first feared that their return reflects a change in government policy. However, the inhabitants appear to be cooperating with the border police. [Re'uven Shapira] [Excerpt] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Sep 84 p 3]

**AUGUST IMMIGRATION**--Some 1,500 immigrants arrived in Israel in August, about 300 more people than the yearly average so far. Most of the immigrants are from the United States and France. [Excerpts] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 3 Sep 84 TA]

**EGYPTIAN BORDER ROAD**--A new road was inaugurated in the south of the country today, between Nizzana and Har Harif. The 80-km long road runs along the Egyptian border from the Nizzana border crossing to Mizpe Ramon. The road will be used for IDF patrols, but civilian traffic will also be able to use it. [Excerpt] [Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1505 GMT 2 Sep 84 TA]



GREEK RECOGNITION POSSIBLE—Constantine Mitsotakis, the newly elected leader of Greece's conservative opposition New Democracy Party, says he will make it a foreign policy priority to extend full diplomatic recognition to Israel once he is elected to power. The 66-year-old Mitsotakis, a veteran politician and former foreign minister, replaced the less charismatic, 74-year-old former defence minister Evangelos Averoff in a decisive victory for the leadership of Greece's main opposition party on September 1. In an exclusive interview with THE JERUSALEM POST, he said that once his party is elected to power, he will "quickly recognize the State of Israel," adding: The failure to recognize Israel by successive Greek governments is an anomaly which has dragged on for too long. When our party comes to power, I will grant full recognition at the very first opportunity. But this does not mean that we must necessarily neglect our traditionally good ties with the Arab world and Eastern Bloc." [Lee Stokes] [Excerpt] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 23 Sep 84 pp 1, 4]

INCREASE IN EXPORTS—The Central Bureau of Statistics reports that overall exports for the first 8 months of the year have increased by 12.4 percent compared to the same period last year, and totals \$3.5 billion. [Excerpt] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 6 Sep 84 TA]

TRADE DEFICIT DROP--The Central Bureau of Statistics reports that in the first 8 months of the year, Israel's trade deficit decreased by 25 percent. The deficit totals \$1.88 billion. [Excerpt] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 6 Sep 84 TA]

CSO: 4400/5

## PROJECT TO PRESERVE 'AQABAH MARINE LIFE'

Amman THE JERUSALEM STAR in English 16-22 Aug 84 p 5

[Article by Maha Zabaneh]

[Text]

AMMAN — The Director of the Marine Science Station and vice-president of the Aqaba Region Authority (ARA) Dr. Dureid Mahasneh has said that feasibility studies have been completed for the marine reservation in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Speaking to The Star in an interview, he said the project will occupy a seven kilometre stretch of land on the south coast and will include a marine park. The marine reservation project is estimated at \$150,000 and will be partly financed by Programme B in the Red Sea and Aden Gulf which belongs to the Arab Educational Cultural and Scientific Organization. Programme B is an agreement signed by Arab countries bordering the Red Sea to prevent pollution and to finance marine research projects. The remaining cost will be met by the Marine Station and the Aqaba Region Authority.

The President of the ARA Mr. Muhammad Said Abu Nuwar said that the Aqaba Gulf is one of the

richest in the world in terms of marine life, hence the need to construct the reservation.

Dr. Mahasneh pointed out that at the main objective of this reservation will be to protect the marine environment such as fish and coral reefs, and to prevent its manipulation. He said it would provide access to researchers who are studying chemical and biological matters related to the marine environment. Future projects will include an aquarium exhibition and an under water tunnel. There will also be a marine museum for visitors.

Recently the government opened an office to protect the marine environment and prevent beaches and public places in Aqaba from pollution. This office is headed by Dr. Walid Al-Sharif. It includes representatives from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs and the Environment, Military Forces, Ports institutions, Water Authority and the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature and a representative from Industries in the Aqaba region.

CSO: 4400/8

## CONFERENCE ON RED SEA SECURITY CALLED FOR

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 29 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by Musa Keilani: "Red Sea Security--an Arab Point of View"]

[Text]

*THIS IS the first of a twice-weekly column on current political and social issues that analyses the situation in Jordan and the Arab region. Mr. Keilani is a career Jordanian diplomat. He served as ambassador to Bahrain from 1975 to 1980 and to Sudan from 1982-1984. From 1980 until 1982, Ambassador Keilani was director of information at the Foreign Ministry. Prior to his appointment as ambassador, he was director general of Jordan Radio, and before that director general of the Jordanian News Agency, Petra, having started his career as attache at the Foreign Ministry where he served in Cairo and London. Ambassador Keilani has now settled in Amman and is devoting his time to research and writing. His columns will appear in the Jordan Times every Wednesday and Saturday.*

DUE TO the international character of the Red Sea as a trade navigational highway, it is imperative of the Arab littoral states to call for a security conference. Since 85 per cent of its shares are Arab shares, and since its security is integrally related to the Arab-Gulf security, and since the security of both, are organic parts of the total collective Arab security, it is imperative to have an urgent call for such a conference.

The mining and explosions in the Red Sea since July 17th, are bound to have their immediate sinister impact on all littoral states as well as triggering more sinister repercussions by providing a new front for the cold war between the two superpowers.

From this perspective, Jordan is best qualified to call for an Arab conference for the Red Sea security. With the arr-

ival of the Americans and Soviet minesweepers and flotilla, the rivalry by the two superpowers is taking an ominous dimension. All littoral states are directly concerned, but Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are more involved because of the regional situation.

Only Jordan can get the proper respondees for such a call. Cairo cannot get the same expected response because of its Camp David ties. Other Arab calls might encounter a slow-motion mechanism. The vitality and dynamism of Jordan would guarantee an active momentum for such a call because of the positive constituents of Jordan's foreign policy role.

All littoral states — including Ethiopia, Israel and South Yemen — are bound to suffer the pernicious consequences of mining the Red Sea as a vital artery in the world economy. They are bound as

well to suffer the economic, political fall-out in case of either a real confrontation or a stalemate.

It is worthy in this respect to recall that in 1971, the Arab ministers of defence held a conference at which the Red Sea security was tabled on the agenda. In April 1973 an Egyptian military mission went to North Yemen and South Yemen to find out a formula for military coordination. Sudan, in 1974 initialled contacts with Saudi Arabia for some form of military and naval cooperation. But the deteriorating situation now calls for an urgent conference of ministers of defence in Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, on the African horn, and Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and Jordan on the Asian side.

The Arab people in the littoral states have their strategic and economic interests in the Red Sea both as an important trade route as well as a source of immense mineral wealth and other resources.

The Red Sea explosions are both a warning and an indication: a warning to what might happen at a larger scale in case of escalation, and the explosions are an indication to which direction the winds will be blowing from a global perspective.

Therefore, the Arab peoples in those states cannot afford to take an observatory, neutral stance. Some of the points pivotal to the issue are:

— The presence in some Ethiopian islands (Fatma, Walib) of Israeli naval, int-

elligence and early warning units since 1964.

— The privileges and facilities accorded to both the two superpowers in more than three Arab ports on the Red Sea.

— 70 per cent of Gulf oil passes to the United States and Europe through this vital artery.

— Arab Littoral states have the onus of protecting 85 per cent of the Red Sea shores:

|                 |            |               |
|-----------------|------------|---------------|
| a) Saudi Arabia | 1125 miles | 36 per cent   |
| b) Egypt        | 898 "      | 28.8 per cent |
| c) Sudan        | 309 "      | 9.9 per cent  |
| d) Yemen        | 275 "      | 8.8 per cent  |
| e) Djibouti     | 25 "       | 0.8 per cent  |
| f) Jordan       | .5 "       | 0.4 per cent  |

— The integral relationship between the Gulf and the Red Sea transforms any escalation of the Gulf war to be a direct threat to the world's biggest reservoir of oil which is embraced by those two acquatic arms.

— Khomeini's vehement, though unfamiliar, denial of any relationship with the Red Sea explosions is indicative of how serious and fragile the situation is with its potential repercussions on the Arab people both materially and economically.

— If the reports about the Libyan "Ghat" mine-laying vessel are confirmed, then it is high time not to condone or tolerate the childish mood of roguish mischief.

— Finally, there should be a guarantee for limiting the nature of the temporary operations of the flotilla of the two superpowers in the Red Sea.

## DAM PROJECT TO IMPROVE SOUTHERN IRRIGATION

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 23-24 Aug 84 p 3

[Text]

AMMAN (J.T.) — The end of 1984 will witness the completion of the civil works section of a project now underway south of the Dead Sea which will exploit the Mujib River waters to develop a large agricultural area in southern Jordan. Dr. Munther Haddadin, president of the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) which is implementing the multi-million dollar project said that the civil works, that precede the irrigation scheme, will cost \$53.84 million and will be carried out in Ghor Al Safi, Ghor Al Thiraa', Fifa and Khanzireh, all near the Dead Sea.

"The civil works will be the first stage in the huge project, designed to harness the water of the river that had for ages emptied itself uselessly into the Dead Sea," said Dr. Haddadin.

Speaking in a recent interview, he said that the project had not been feasible in the past because it required advanced technology and necessary funds, and also the topographic nature of the land in the region discouraged all planners.

Each part of the two-stage project entails several small schemes, but the final target will be reclaiming and irrigating more than 100,000 dunums of land using pipe networks instead of open canals and substituting the open irrigation method with drip irrigation, Dr. Haddadin said. In this way, he added, water can be saved and used more economically to irrigate vast areas of land.

According to Dr. Haddadin, the first stage of the project entails

building civil works, housing units and other infrastructure works such as workshops for maintaining machinery and equipment, the installation of drip irrigation equipment and the building of a marketing centre. There will be another centre for research and agricultural guidance in addition to administrative buildings, he said.

An Italian firm was awarded a tender for the civil works and completed the task at Ghor Al Safi in 1982, while the civil works for Ghor Thiraa', Haditha, Mazra'aa Fifa, and Khanzireh were awarded in 1982 are due to be completed by February 1985, Dr. Haddadin said.

In order to pave the way for the second stage of the project Dr. Haddadin said that the JVA has contracted Japanese specialists to conduct a feasibility study on developing the underground water found in the southern Jordan Valley. The studies have been completed and the scheme will be carried out, he said.

This second stage of the Mujib project, he said, will cost \$186.2 million and entails developing water resources, building a 48-metre high diversion dam at a point where the Mujib enters Al Hidan valley and another dam called Tannour in the Hassa Valley to store up to 10 million cubic metres of water.

This stage also includes works for exploiting the Mujib river for irrigation purposes, reclaiming land and installing irrigation pipe networks to feed nearly 56,000 dunums of land with water, Dr.



Haddadin said. He explained that the Japanese study revealed that the project is of prime economic value to the region and will definitely yield good results. Dr. Haddadin estimated that the whole project would be completed by 1990.

Regarding the financing of this project, Dr. Haddadin said that both Arab and international funds were approached. These included the Kuwait-based Fund for Arab Economic Development which offered the JVA an eight million Kuwaiti dinar loan, the World Bank which offered to finance the installation of equipment for irrigation, the Saudi Development Fund which offered a 17 million Saudi Riyal loan to finance civil works and the purchase of maintenance equipment at Ghor Fifa and Khanzireh.

Contacts are continuing with Arab and foreign lending institutions to raise funds for the project, work on which is hopefully expected to begin early next year, Dr. Haddadin said. Also Japanese specialists are expected to hand in their designs of the project in the coming month, he added.

CSO: 4400/8

## PHOSPHATE INDUSTRY STARTS EXPANSION PROJECT

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 pp 1, 3

[Article by Rami G. Khouri]

[Text]

•AMMAN — After four consecutive years of flat growth and earnings, the Jordanian phosphate industry has started implementing a major expansion programme that may rely heavily for sales and financing on barter and offsetting deals with its major trading partners in Japan, the United States and Europe.

During 1980-83, Jordan's phosphate exports rose by less than five per cent to reach 3.7 million tons in 1983, generating net revenues of \$160 million. This figure includes the income from another 615,719 tons of phosphate rock sold domestically to the Jordan Fertiliser Industry Company at Aqaba, which processes it into chemical fertilisers for export.

A management change early last year brought in Wasef Azar as general manager, and he has embarked on an aggressive new strategy that includes a combination of cost-cutting and increased production and exports.

The workforce has been cut by some 20 per cent, to 3,300. Other savings in fuel use, spares and operational contracts have combined to give the 90 per cent government owned Jordan Phosphate Mines Company Ltd. (JPMC) a profit of JD 8.2 million last year, compared to 1982 profits of JD 5.1 million.

Mr. Azar credits the cost-cutting measures with maintaining the company's profitability, as it was reaching a point where the cost of producing a ton of phosphate rock was greater than the

international sales price of a ton of rock.

Already concluded sales contracts will see the company finish this year with production of 5.8 million tons, and total sales of at least 5.6 million tons, generating revenues of \$180 million. Expansion plans costing JD 35 million over the next three years will increase production from the three existing mines to over seven million tons per year by 1987. These expansion projects include buying several more of the giant walking dragline excavators used to remove the overburden that covers the phosphate deposits in the ground, upgrading processing plants and material handling systems, and improving storage, maintenance and transport systems.

**Barter deals**

An increasing share of export sales will include barter arrangements by which foreign contractors and manufacturers selling to the JPMC or to other public sector entities will be paid partly or fully in phosphate rock that the company will sell on behalf of the foreign companies in their own countries. The revenues from the sales of this bartered phosphate rock will go to pay for the services and goods purchased from the foreign companies.

The Jordanian state railways hopes soon to clinch a major deal to buy new phosphate wagons from France that will be half paid for in phosphate rock that the

JPMC will sell to French customers. In another deal, Japanese buyers have agreed to take an extra 100,000 tons of rock a year after a Japanese firm won the contract to expand the existing cement factory at Fuheis. This Japanese arrangement will be repeated in the future, as the Jordanian government starts applying more widely its recent decisions to award major contracts to companies from countries that agree to increase their purchases of Jordanian phosphates.

"We are forced to offset our imports from major industrial states with sales of phosphates or other minerals we produce," Mr. Azar said in an interview. "Otherwise we will find ourselves in the future with an enormous balance of payments problem."

### Transport and storage

The JPMC's three minesites (Hasa, Wadi Al Abyad and Russeifeh) and existing transport and storage facilities are capable of producing seven million tons a year at present. Current production makes Jordan the non-communist world's number three phosphate exporter, after Morocco and the United States.

In the first seven months of this year, the company has already produced 3.555 million tons of phosphate, of which 2.311 million tons have been exported. Six to eight trains a day are now carrying phosphate from the Hasa and Wadi Al Abyad minesites in central Jordan to the storage and loading facilities at Aqaba, at an average daily rate of 16,500 tons. This means some 60 per cent of Jordan's exported phosphate is being

carried to Aqaba by train, the rest moving by trucks.

With improvements to the railway line and new wagons, the rail transport capacity should increase to six million tons a year within a few years. Current projections are to produce 5.8 million tons of phosphates this year, 6.2 million tons next year and 6.5-7 million tons in 1986.

### New mine planned

Longer term expansion plans now being prepared will open a major new mine at Shidiya, in southeastern Jordan. It will start producing three million tons per year by the end of this decade, reaching a maximum of nine million tons per year by the late 1990s.

The Shidiya project, being prepared by a consortium led by the French firm Sofremines, may make Jordan the non-communist world's number two phosphate rock exporter in the early years of the next decade. The cost of the Shidiya project, including transport and townsite infrastructure and additional domestic processing facilities to transform the new rock into chemical fertilisers, may cost as much as JD 220 million, over the next decade. Much of this will be paid for in phosphate barter deals, Mr. Azar hopes.

The government's Shidiya Committee has officially approved the Shidiya pre-feasibility study, and a detailed feasibility study is now underway. It will include some pre-engineering work, and will be completed within 20 months. Some of the major factors that will be decided include where to locate the township (at Shidiya or at Ma'an city, to the north),

how to transport the phosphates to Aqaba for export, and where to locate additional processing facilities to transform the raw rock into chemical fertilisers. This could be done either by expanding the fertiliser plant at Aqaba, or building a new facility at Shidiya. Depending on the outcome of these decisions, the entire integrated Shidiya project could cost between JD 40 million and JD 200 million.

### Fertiliser plans

The government is also studying the prospects for producing ammonium nitrate and compound fertilisers, using the output of the phosphate, potash and chemical fertiliser companies. The French Krebs company is currently conducting a study for compound fertiliser production.

The prospects for more barter deals are enhanced by the high quality of the Jordanian rock, both because of its high tricalcium phosphate (TCP) content and its low impurities, making it attractive for industrial and agricultural processors and end users. Jordan expects in the early years of the next decade to be able to produce over 12 million tons of high-grade rock (73-75 per cent TCP) while its main competitors mainly produce slightly lesser grade rock of around 68-70 per cent TCP.

This should augur well for sales to the advanced industrial states of Europe, Japan and North America, which provide Jordan with the bulk of its imports. These have been a relatively small market for Jordan to date, whose main markets are in East Europe, Asia and the Far East.

## BRIEFS

REMITTANCE FROM ABROAD--Amman, AR-RA'Y--Remittances from Jordanian workers abroad rose during the first quarter of this year to 105 million Jordanian dinars. This was an increase of about 15 million Jordanian dinars compared to the same period last year, when remittances stood at 89.76 million Jordanian dinars. A source at the Jordanian Central Bank said that if the current rate is maintained during the period from April to the end of December, remittances will total 420 million Jordanian dinars--8 million Jordanian dinars more than last year. [Excerpt] [Amman AR-RA'Y in Arabic 10 Sep 84 pp 1, 19]

RURAL WATER DEVELOPMENT--AMMAN (Petra)--The Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) announced Sunday that it is conducting a comprehensive survey of villages in Jordan prior to embarking on a scheme to supply all population settlements around them with water. WAJ Director General Mohammad Salch Al Keilani said that at present the authority is building networks of pipes to feed Bani Hamida villages in Madaba district with water and the project is expected to cost JD 350,000. The network, which will supply water to 18 villages entails laying main pipelines in the first stage whilst in the second stage pipes will be laid to take water to internal areas. The whole project will be finished by the end of this year, Mr. Keilani said. He also said that a tender for a sewerage project for Madaba, expected to cost JD 3 million, will be announced early next year. [Text] [Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 27 Aug 84 p 3]

CSO: 4400/8

# IMPORTANT ECONOMIC POSTS REMAIN VACANT

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 61, Jun 84 p 21

[Text] If the Karami government has the chance to turn its attention to the economic and administrative matters that have accumulated for years--those matters remote from the daily security concerns--then the Lebanese government will face the task of filling three fundamental positions in the state's economic structure that have become vacant or will become vacant within the next 3 months. Because of the extreme sensitivity surrounding these positions, the people who will assume them will practically be part of the political reconciliation process.

## 1. Development and Reconstruction Council

The chairman of the Development and Reconstruction Council, Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, submitted his resignation on 11 June, stressing that it was final in the meetings he had previously held with the president of the republic, the prime minister, and the minister of state for the South and reconstruction. It may be premature to ponder the real circumstances surrounding the resignation, but filling the post cannot stand delay since the current organization of the council does not include the post of vice chairman, as it did in its original form, which the president of the republic modified. It would be troublesome to keep the chairmanship of the council vacant because of its domestic and foreign dominance and its nearly daily contacts with sources of financing abroad, beginning with the United Nations, and continuing to the EEC, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and finally Arab monetary funds and organizations.

It can be said that the search for a replacement for 'Atallah cannot practically be separated from the direct and indirect reasons that may have been behind the resignation. It is likely that it did not come for only the "family and personal" reasons that were mentioned, especially since this was not the first resignation. The search for a replacement may at the same time raise the entire situation of the council, in terms of its shape, structure, mechanism and powers. It may also raise the subject of legislation and a definition of the subject of councils that have been formed.



## 2. Governorship of Bank of Lebanon

At the end of this August, the term of Shaykh Michel al-Khuri as governor of the Bank of Lebanon expires.

Perhaps the selection of a replacement to the governor of the Bank of Lebanon will be the most delicate and sensitive decision, especially during the current stage when the Lebanese banking system faces many challenges.

It is well known that the Bank of Lebanon, during the era of Michel al-Khuri, has witnessed a distinguished period. He brought the bank to play an active and influential role in the market. Some fear that the "politicization" of this post is something that will have very negative repercussions in the banking sector. Previous experiences are the cause of the concerns in this regard.

If efforts aimed at extending the term of the current governor fail, the appointment of a new governor will coincide with the appointment of the three deputy governors, whose posts have been vacant for some time. This means that it is necessary to form fiscal leadership that is capable of comprehending Lebanon's financial demands in the coming phase, whether it be a period of stability and prosperity or a period of instability and fluctuation. However, the list of names for the post is short. In fact, the only name proposed up to now is Dr Khitar Shabli (director general of the Ministry of Finance), and he faces some opposition. It is sufficient to name some of the previous governors, from former President Ilyas Sarkis to Shaykh Michel al-Khuri, to know the extent of the present difficulties in finding the appropriate personality for this post.

## 3. Intra Investment Company

The third administrative imperative that appears to be delayed somewhat (perhaps until October) is the chairmanship of the board of the Intra Investment Company. Recent developments witnessed by the company--the conflict between its chairman and the state of Kuwait or the resignation of some members and the boycotting by some others, for example--make it necessary to say that instituting a change in Intra's chairmanship has become likely in the context of necessary moves to restore the company to its natural position. The fact is that the current board is no longer able to convene more than half of its 12 members because of the boycott of the three Arab representatives, the resignation of Mr Robert Sarsaw, the uncertain position of Mr Khaldun Subrah, and the resignation of Mr Fu'ad Bahali, which is likely to soon become final.

Therefore, the position of the company, especially in terms of its Arab dimension, has come to require fundamental treatment.

It is conspicuous that some names as candidates for this post have begun to circulate, the foremost being Mr Pierre De Sa'b. The Kuwaitis have proposed some other names in this regard.

The fate of chairman Tamra remains dependent on a number of regional and local political developments. It also remains dependent on the resolution of many of the unresolved issues inside Intra itself. Whatever happens, the resolution of this matter may not take place before the beginning of next fall.

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CSO: 4404/625

# KARAMI FORCED TO DEAL WITH WEST BEIRUT VIOLENCE

Beirut AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 71, 18 Aug 84 p 20

[Article by Ibrahim al-Burjawi: "After Increased Criticism on Part of His Allies, Karami Is Between Rock of Rule and Hard Place of Opposition"]

[Text] Beirut--No observer of the Lebanese events can disregard in any way the extent of the stormy differences among the members of the national unity government--differences which surfaced recently through the positions and statements of ministers Nabih Birri and Walid Junblatt and the reactions of the media of the Phalange Party and of the Lebanese Forces. These differences have, as all are aware, led to delaying implementation of the security plan, i.e. deployment of the legitimate army in the mountain and the north. They have also led to obstructing completion of the security plan for Greater Beirut, especially at the level of abolishing sectarian separation in the military brigades and divisions maintaining security in the eastern, western and central parts of Beirut and the level of returning the fifth dock of Beirut Port to legitimate authority and of ending the Lebanese Forces' utilization of this dock.

The circles of ministers Nabih Birri and Walid Junblatt accuse the government of failing to implement what was agreed upon in Lausanne and at the Damascus summit between Presidents Amin al-Jumayyil and Hafiz al-Asad. Ministers Birri and Junblatt see in the regime's proposals regarding the mountain security plan an endeavor to restore politically what was lost by war. Before deployment of the legitimate army in al-Shuf and 'Alayh and the return of the Christian evacuees to these two areas, Birri and Junblatt demand that transfers be made among the army officers to restore a sectarian balance to its command, that the army be deployed in the areas controlled by the Lebanese Forces, especially on the international coastal highway from al-Awwali in the south to al-Madfun Bridge in the north, that the Lebanese Forces' roadblock in al-Barbarah--a roadblock that separates the north from the other parts of Lebanon--be removed, that the illegal ports all along the highway be closed and that the Lebanese Forces be evacuated from al-Damur road.

The circles of both ministers assert that Damascus supports their position and that it is exerting pressure on the regime to achieve these objectives. Meanwhile, the regime's sources deny that Damascus supports this tendency because Syrian officials are fully aware of the degree of criticism which President Amin al-Jumayyil gets from the Lebanese Forces and the Phalange

Party, which feel that they have sacrificed a lot to bring success to the regime's plan to establish the legitimate government's authority over all of Lebanon. These sources say that Pierre al-Jumayyil, the Phalange Party's supreme chairman, has become ill only as a result of the exhaustive efforts he has exerted to ensure his party's and the Lebanese Forces' facilitation of the regime's objectives.

To demonstrate the soundness of the course followed by the regime and by its head, these circles cite the great understanding prevalent in the relations between the president of the republic and the prime minister and also cite the fact that there is nobody who better understands Damascus' real position and tendencies than Rashid Karami. As a result of this position, Prime Minister Karami has received lots of jabs and barbs from those who are supposed to be his allies, especially from Minister Birri. Despite the serious impact of this criticism against Prime Minister Karami on the relations between those who hold the same Islamic and national position and despite the possibility of a sharper impact in Beirut, the capital, especially as a result of the sectarian sensitivities that exist in the western quarters of the capital and that have led to military clashes and to the dissemination of rumors that spread among the Sunna like fire in straw and whose danger is known only to God and to the plotters that fan the fires of these rumors--despite all this, Prime Minister Karami continues to maintain his self-control even though his nerves are not as steely as they were well known to be. He understands the position of both Ministers Birri and Junblatt as he understands the position of the president of the republic. Only one minister in his cabinet fights this understanding, namely ex-President Camille Sham'un.

Those close to the prime minister say that what Rashid Karami suffers to maintain his self-control and to confront things that are at times done by his allies and that hit him with wounding arrows exceeds the capacity of man. He tries to pay attention to nothing other than one goal, which, to him, is surpassed by no other goal, regardless of how dear. This goal is to establish the legitimate government in all parts of Lebanon, to prevent Lebanon's partition and to liberate it from Israeli occupation. Karami is ready to pay the price for all this, regardless of how heavy and even if it comes at the expense of losing popularity--a popularity which he can gain simply by going along with the sectarian and denominational currents sweeping the country nowadays.

Will Karami, in cooperation with President Amin al-Jumayyil, succeed in achieving this goal despite the rejection expressed by some of Karami's allies--allies who consider this goal a return to the spirit of the 1943 national charter and which Karami himself considers an action plan emanating from the spirit of the Lausanne conference and the Damascus summit and an action plan [developed] according to a method which he has mastered as a result of his long experience in government? From this experience, Karami has gained the ability to understand all the Lebanese factions and to understand the trick of balancing between fear for the future and the loss of privileges and the demand that injustice be eliminated and demands be achieved.

The Lebanese, especially the vigilant elite among them, wish Karami success because the alternative, in their opinion, will be nothing other than further destruction, perhaps the final destruction, because there will be another chance to test other settlement plans.

CONDITIONS IN OCCUPIED SOUTH SURVEYED

Paris LE MONDE in French 20, 21 Sep 84

[Article by Special Correspondent Francois Chipaux: "Southern Lebanon Caged In"]

[20 Sep 84 pp 1, 5]

[Text] The Narrow Doorway

Sidon--"Southern Lebanon has become a huge prison. The only difference is that it is easier to get out than to get in." This disillusioned comment made by a merchant from Tyre is a good illustration of the resentment of the inhabitants of the south, whether they are Christians or Muslims, at the strengthening of the security measures taken by Israel in order to cut off the territory under its occupation from the rest of the country. Nearly 800,000 persons, three fourths of them of the Muslim religion and a great majority of those Shi'ites, are thus isolated in one third of the Lebanese territory.

On the Jezzine trail, with the sun beating down, even though it was only 900, Salim, his plastic bag stuffed with books, his cardboard valise closed by means of string, had been waiting since 500 for a place in one of the five broken-down buses that transport Muslims to the only point authorized for leaving or entering Southern Lebanon. Five little kilometers separate Jezzine from Batir, where the Israeli checkpoint is located, but no individual automobile is admitted there, and transport by bus is compulsory.

Cars had just begun the shuttle service. About 2,000 people were pressed together on the small square, which had been transformed into a caravansary. The sole seller of the precious pass was wearing himself out tempering the passion or the anger of the candidates, who were threatening at any moment to overturn his hut, which was under a tree. The arrival of each bus provoked indescribable scuffles. A militiaman in civilian clothes, an Israeli Uzi submachine gun in his hand, was shooting into the air to try to see to it that the quota of 30 to 40 passengers per vehicle was observed. A waste of effort. In our bus there were nearly 70 people, most of them encumbered with four or five parcels. The ticket, which was theoretically 15 pounds\*, was being negotiated at all prices, and it was even suggested that we do the crucial 5 km in an individual car for 700 pounds (almost 1,000 French francs)!

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\*1 franc = 0.7466.



It was in Batir, however, that things really began to get serious. Installed on a vast dusty platform, which had been laid out by a great many bulldozers, the Israeli check point had been completed over a period of months. Today, no more vehicles pass through it, except for a few ambulances which are subject to strict controls.

One hundred meters separated the exit point from the entrance point. They had to be traversed on foot between two iron bars that only made it possible for one person to pass at a time. Closed trailers made it possible for the agents of the Israeli information services to proceed with the interrogations and confront each name on the interminable lists of suspects that were spread out on the desks. Establishing a right to pass was indispensable only for Muslims since the closing--required by the Lebanese government--of the Israeli office at Dubayyah. That harassment, which was resented as humiliating to the South, also had a deterrent effect, many candidates hesitating to ask for one without knowing whether or not they would be catalogued as "suspects." That was because for each village in the South lists had been established and, as always in such circumstances, denunciations were flying. Leaving the South for Beirut was easier in any case than returning, and generally did not require more than 2 to 4 hours of waiting in Batir. Going in the opposite direction, the time was counted in days.

Standing in line, under the sun, for over 3 hours, Mustafa had arrived in Batir two days before. He was waiting like hundreds of other men. Search after search, interrogation after interrogation, and always the fear that your name was written somewhere and you would be sent to the Ansar camp. An old woman in a chador, dragging behind her a heavy, badly tied carton, attempted to quiet the crying of a dead-tired child. Others, sitting down, even on the ground, contemplated with tired eyes the soldier who was conscientiously exploring their belongings.

Batir was more like a huge cattle market where each animal was felt and evaluated than a "border" station, even though it was most carefully guarded. Some Israeli soldiers, moreover, were aware of this. "What these people feel for us is hatred. That's all we are inspiring in them with this policy," said David. In Lebanon for the third time, he was doing his job, but obviously without any enthusiasm. "We're doing police work," he emphasized. "We won't make friends this way."

In the crowd that was stamping its feet, anger was accompanied by bitter criticism of the Beirut government which tolerated these practices. Humiliation prevailed over every other feeling. "They treat us like animals," Mustafa told us. "They are trying to break us. Christians are not treated this way."

In southern Lebanon under Israeli occupation, even travel has become denominational. It must be admitted that the "Muslim road" is more of a test than the "Christian way." In fact, a boat service provides the connection between Basin No 5 of the port of Beirut, which is controlled by the Lebanese Forces (unified Christian militia) and the port of Jiyah, which they also hold in the South.

## The "Christian Boat"

Rechristened since it was rerouted to Larnaca-Beirut by the Israeli navy two months before, the Alizur Blanco had become the Charlie One. It was capable of transporting 400 persons in a 2-and-a-half-hour crossing. On this particular morning, the "Christian boat" was filled on its departure from the capital. Many families who were going to see their relatives in the South, religious who were going to a seminary, Lebanese Forces fighters going to their posts in Iqlim al-Kharrub, where there are ongoing engagements between Christian militia and Druze militia from the Progressive Socialist Party.

When we arrived within sight of Jiye, an Israeli patrol boat made its appearance. It circled us, twin-mounted machine guns aimed at the ship. At its rail, a civilian scrutinized the passengers' faces with binoculars. Distress suddenly replaced the carefree atmosphere of a cruise that until then had been trouble-free. One of us, who wanted to take some photographs, was immediately prevented from doing so by those more prudent ones who feared trouble. "Sometimes they come aboard, verify the passenger list and search some of the baggage," said a woman who was going to the South for a few days' vacation. "The worst thing with them is that you never know what they are going to do. They can just as easily order us to stop offshore for 2 or 3 hours, with no explanation, and order us to turn around and go back." On this day, after 3 quarters of an hour of waiting, the boat berths with no problems. On the wharf, 15 Lebanese Forces militiamen, with their weapons slung over their shoulders, took a hard look at the new arrivals. Israeli tanks were stationed along the road leading to the al-Awwali bridge and from there to Sidon. Checking is limited to identity papers and the search is more than a summary one. Undoubtedly the Israelis are relying on the Lebanese Forces; they know they have done this work before the Israelis came.

In any case, restrictions on passage are a source of considerable revenue, that essentially benefits the Lebanese Forces, for maritime transport, the Southern Lebanon Army (ALS), a militia that was created, financed and trained by Israel at Jezzine, and finally the PSP's [Progressive Socialist Party] Druze, who established, on the other side of Batir, a 25-pound charge per automobile and several hundred pounds for a truck. The Lebanese Forces receive 25 of the 100 pounds paid for transport from Beirut to Jiye, while in Jezzine, a city with a Christian majority, the ALS pockets 10 pounds of the 15-pound bus fare.

## A Fruitful Traffic

The highway trip to Beirut, imposed on Muslims by Israel, leads to a juicy traffic. In fact, it all begins, for the candidate for the trip, with the search for Israeli authorization to leave Southern Lebanon and especially to return to it. This authorization to pass is obtained free by the different Israeli QG [headquarters staff] stationed in the South, but the wait is often interminable, the offices closed for unexplained reasons, the official "gone for the day." Lebanese agents obligingly propose, for 100, 200 or 300 pounds, to unjam the affair and are confident they can obtain the precious open Sesame. As a general rule, they succeed, but sometimes they vanish into the wilds with the money. "This fruitful traffic," says Mr Bizri, the only Southern Lebanon deputy who is still a resident there, "is encouraged by the Israeli army, which has built up in this way a clientele of unscrupulous debtors and informers."

Spy mania has become a scourge in Southern Lebanon, where the presence of Jerusalem's forces causes a vague fear to reign. There are not yet many who will agree to speak freely on the street. "The Israelis employ many local informers whose services they make sure of by all kinds of means, blackmail, threats against their families, torture, money," a representative of an international organization told us.

Although severely controlled--there are no less than 18 check points on the road between Sidon and al-Naqurah, a distance of 90 km--, Southern Lebanon remains deadly for the Israeli army, the target of almost-daily attacks. This is no doubt why Jerusalem's soldiers are making themselves less conspicuous and have practically disappeared from the cities. On what the Israelis call "the death road" or "the Ho Chi Minh trail," between Sidon and al-Naqurah, the soldiers are entrenched as a precautionary measure behind earthen mounds or, most often, perched upon watchtowers.

The whole region is compartmentalized by barricades, held sometimes by the Israelis or their allies in the southern Lebanese army and sometimes, in the zone controlled by the UNIFIL [United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon], by the soldiers of various contingents. There is no conversation here that does not revolve around the problem of moving, the occupier isolating, moreover--at the slightest incident and for indeterminate periods--sometimes huge sectors. In the UNIFIL zone, no one moves around between 2300 and 400. "This sometimes causes problems for sick people," Ghassan Haydar, the governor of Tyre and Bint Jubayl told us. In any case, at night most of the roads are unsafe and, outside of the Christian-majority Jezzine region, all life stops at sunset.

In Sidon, the country's third largest city, on the magnificent promenade on the edge of the sea, which was rebuilt after the 1982 Israeli invasion, thanks to the largesse of a native of the region, the Lebanese-Saudi billionaire Mr Hariri, the street lamps shine only for the stray dogs fighting over the trash. At 2100, the capital of southern Lebanon becomes a ghost town. The town belongs to those, agents and spies of all kinds, whose activities adjust very well to the night-time.

[21 Sep 84 p 5]

[Text] The Pain of the Occupied

Since the attacks on their forces became a daily affair, the Israelis have been trying to isolate southern Lebanon in order to control it better. One third of the national territory is subject to an increasingly strict occupation regime and, especially for Muslims, moves are accompanied by administrative harassment and searches that transform departures and returns into painful and uncertain adventures (LE MONDE, 20 September).

Al-Nabatiyah--The state-owned Tobacco Company--the very act of pronouncing the name of this huge building perched at the top of a hill that dominates the large commercial city in the South causes the Lebanese to shudder. It is actually one of the four interrogation centers, with Mar-Elias near Sidon, Tyre and the

Jaba;-Safi observation post, which the Israeli army has established in southern Lebanon. A more or less prolonged stay in these centers, which the International Red Cross Committee (CICR) is not authorized to visit, generally precedes imprisonment in the Ansar camp.

With the increased attacks against its troops, Israel has hardened its occupation and the repression of "hostile activities." All the testimony that has been collected tells of "torture" in these interrogation centers in which prisoners sometimes remain for as long as 3 months. An al-Nabatiah physician, who spent one night near the company, told us he heard cries of suffering.

While the Israeli military presence is making itself less visible, the men of the Shin Bet (information services) and those of the antiterrorist unit, which generally operates in the occupied territories, abound in southern Lebanon. In civilian clothes, they circulate in automobiles bearing Lebanese plates or no registration. They cross the UNIFIL zones with their weapons, on presenting their cards. "When they refuse to show them, they are turned back," a UNIFIL official told us. "That leads to a few protests. Nothing more can be done." These agents can be seen throughout the region, coming out of Israeli barracks and stopping cars on the roads. Moreover, they could be confused very easily with Lebanese youths, whose relaxed style they have adopted, jeans and T-shirts. Most of the arrests are now being carried out by these "specialists" who most often operate at night. Suddenly they disembark from several vehicles in a village, causing agitation among the populace and very often disorders, which on several occasions have resulted in men dying. The French soldiers of UNIFIL, after an incident of that kind in a village in their zone, gave flares to the inhabitants so they could warn them of any untimely arrival. In Ma'rakah, since the August disorders, 15 Senegalese soldiers of the Interim Force have been patrolling at night in the village.

"When you see them arriving, you follow them and try to find out what they want. But they say they are acting on behalf of the security of the occupation forces, and there isn't much we can do," a UNIFIL official acknowledges. In the entire zone where the UN soldiers are deployed, the Israeli army also has permanent posts, and relations between the two authorities are not without problems. "Since we arrived before they did, we have the best positions, and they come and settle near us. Moreover, since we are not being shot at, it gives them a little security. You have to understand those things," our interlocutor adds. However, this neighborliness is not always understood by the populace, who expect protection from the "Blue Helmets."

Emptied of its occupants last November, the Ansar camp today contains between 700 and 800 prisoners, 3 quarters of whom are probably Amal sympathizers. To that figure must be added the prisoners who are in the interrogation centers, whose number is difficult to establish, as well as the resisters, on whom the heaviest suspicion falls and who are actually imprisoned in Israeli.

Things have really changed for the Israeli troops since June 1982, all the way into the border strip that has been occupied since 1978 by the Hebrew state. "Before, people easily went into Israel to work or for treatment," admits a teacher from Ayn-Ibil, a little Christian village on the "good border." Such visits have become extremely rare despite the special identity card obtained on request by the sector's inhabitants so they can enter the neighboring country without any problems. Of course they are still working in the factories of



Galilee, where wages (1,500 Lebanese pounds, versus about 1,000 pounds in Lebanon) are still attractive. Some patients continue to be admitted to Israeli hospitals, where treatment is free, but this seems to be more due to the difficulty of circulating in their own country than to a free choice having been granted. Has not the "good border" been completely abandoned by the Lebanese government?

In Ayn Ibil, the mayor, an old gentleman of 84, who nostalgically praises the French culture, states bitterly, "There is no Lebanese state here. Our everyday security, even against hoodlums, is provided by the Israelis. This year, I had to ask them to rebuild the access roads to the fields. They did it. They come to our aid as friends, but that doesn't take the place of the government." What does he think of the occupation? "The weak have to keep quiet," he answers modestly. "As long as we don't have a strong government, a strong army, what can we do?" In Bent-Jbail, a neighboring Shi'ite village, the language is scarcely different, but no one agrees to talk politics on the street. "The region is very much watched. The inhabitants aren't free to express themselves," says a doctor. "Everyone suffers from the lack of freedom. To put it simply, people are more afraid here than elsewhere, because for years we have been the first victims of the conflicts with Israel." For several months, however, attacks have been aimed at the Israeli army or the ALS--a militia created and financed by Israel--in this border strip, which until then had been calm.

The perpetual rumors of a hypothetical "Israeli plan to regroup" part of the Christian populations in the South in this "security strip", from which the Shi'ites would be chased, does not unduly alarm the Shi'ites. "Here," a student explains, perhaps with too much confidence, "Christians and Muslims have known the same suffering and they share the same poverty. Why should they have to fight each other one day?"

The hardening of the occupation is all the more poorly supported because many of the measures taken and much of the behavior appear to be arbitrary and pointless harassment. "How can we not complain when, in the middle of a surgical intervention you see armed soldiers land in the operating suite searching for suspects?", exclaims Dr Hikmat al-'Amin, an official of the People's Aid Hospital in Nabatieh. "Permission is required to go and look for medicines in Beirut," he adds. "It's compulsory to go to the Tobacco Company and wait there for hours to obtain a permit to transport a patient to Sidon. The telephone line is cut between the principal cities of the South. We are treated like minors."

### The Curse of Taxes

It is on the economic level that grievances against Israel are most severe; it is accused from all sides of "smashing" southern Lebanon's economy in order to monopolize its market. "Since the occupation, the unemployment rate has gone from 5 percent to 35 percent," a Sidon agronomy expert says. "Two hundred hectares of orchards have been destroyed for security reasons by the Israelis, and in any case, we no longer have the means to send our production north. So it is spoiling on the spot and we are overrun with Israeli citrus and vegetables." They arrive by way of Naquoura, where they are transferred to cartons marked "Product of Lebanon" to be reshipped to Beirut, Chtaura and the Arab world. This smuggling, which is being practiced on a large scale, enriches certain Lebanese merchants who understood very quickly, for example, the advantage they



could derive from the free port of Haifa. To avoid customs duties in Lebanon, these shrewd operators import from Europe tons of merchandise that they unload at Haifa for the price of a very low levy of 1 percent intended to finance the ALS. Encouraged by Israel, this traffic thus pays for its allies, the ALS on the one hand and the Christian or Druze militias on the other.

The losers are the small local merchants who are ruined by this competition. Thus, the Christian of Sidon, whose custom it was to ship a truckload of citrus fruit to Beirut every day, can no longer do so more often than once a month. "The ferry only transports five or six trucks on each trip," he says, and then consoles himself: "It's even worse for the Muslims, who have to go by road."

The governor of Tyre and Bent-Jbail, Ghassan Haydar, is tired of inventorying all his encounters with the occupiers. "Yesterday," he told us, "I spent 10 hours in Tyre to obtain authorization to have a vessel boarded that was carrying wheat from Beirut and had been waiting 2 weeks in the roads. They want us to see their farina, but here the state subsidizes wheat to keep the price of bread at an acceptable level. By preventing the arrival of vessels, they make prices rise and increase the tension. In another area, we obtained 50 million pounds from the state to repair the roads (which are especially broken up in the south by poor maintenance and the constant passing of Israeli armored vehicles), but until now the Israelis wouldn't let the asphalt from Beirut get through. They want it to be bought from them. So nothing is done, and in 2 months it will be too late because of the rains."

In this region, where 80 percent of the jobs are in agriculture, failure is threatening. The fate of the fishermen of Tyre, Sarafand or Sidon is scarcely an enviable one. All of them are forbidden to go beyond a perimeter of 5 km around their port of registry, and at sea they are harassed by the Israeli navy, which is increasing its controls. Then, when they return to port, they have to pay the ALS a tax on their catches.

These taxes, levied in the most complete illegality by the ALS or the militias, have become a plague of which as many Christians as Muslims are complaining. They all have the feeling they are being ransomed at every step of the way. "To do or obtain anything at all," comments Dr Bizri, the deputy from Sidon, "you have to pay. For every administrative act, the purchase or sale of a plot of land, obtaining an identity card or a certificate of civilian status, the ALS or the Lebanese Forces take a percentage." Every family must pay a "contribution" which is often extorted from it. Through these practises the ALS is getting itself detested by a populace whose resistance to the occupier is growing constantly.

8946

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PROBLEMS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES REPORTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Sep 84 pp 1, 6

[Article by Francoise Chipaux: "The Great Distress of the Palestinians in Lebanon"]

[Text] Beirut--The second anniversary of the Sabra and Shatila massacres--nearly 1,000 victims between 16 and 18 September 1982--was marked in Beirut by various demonstrations, the most important of which was to bring together on Monday 17 September, in response to a call by the Palestinian organizations, the inhabitants of the camps. The purpose was a meeting at the common grave for Shatila victims. On the other hand, a general strike was ordered by the same organizations.

Two years after the massacres, the survivors of Sabra and Shatila remain profoundly traumatized and painfully recall the scenes of horror they witnessed. The fear that such acts will be renewed is still present everywhere, all the more so because many Palestinians have the feeling that at any moment they may be the victims of changes in Lebanese policy.

If there is one point of agreement among the different Beirut authorities, it is in fact their refusal to see the Palestinians reinstated politically and militarily in Lebanon. In a region that has been controlled since last 6 February by the Shi'ite police force, Amal, and the army's sixth brigade, which has given its allegiance to Amal, the Palestinian camps have been under close surveillance. The Shi'ites have for a long time maintained antagonistic relations with the Palestinians whom they have had to subject to the law in southern Lebanon, and Amal does not want at any price to see a Palestinian threat emerge in its privileged zone of influence.

Despite this, the Palestinians today are not as impoverished as they were just before the Israeli invasion. Little by little, a number of second-level managers who had been forced to leave Beirut in August 1982 have returned to the Lebanese capital to attempt to restructure their movement. Some of them are living more or less clandestinely in West Beirut and, in any case, are still being very discreet.

Some of the combatants have also returned to Beirut. This is the case particularly with certain refugees from 1948 who, having been registered at UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East], are legally authorized to return to their native country. In exile in Yemen, in Algeria or the Sudan, many of them preferred to return home to live near their families. Others took advantage of the divergent interests among the different protagonists of the intra-Lebanese or inter-Arab rivalries.

That was how it happened that shortly before 6 February, when the road from the mountain to Damascus, on the southern outskirts of Beirut, came under the control of the PSP [Progressive Socialist Party], the Druse militia and Amal, the Syrians authorized a number of officials of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command (PFLP-GC) of Ahmad Jabril to return to the Beirut camps, in hopes of seeing them break the influence of Yasir Arafat, which is still strong among the refugees.

Conversely, the Lebanese forces (Unified Christian Militia) are said to have authorized passage in their territory for loyalists of Yasir Arafat, back from Tripoli, thus betting on troubles to come between those faithful to the Palestinian leader and his dissidents.

#### Armament in the Camps

Calculating the importance of these returns is uncertain, because many fighters or leaders come and go, either quite simply to visit their families, or on special missions. Ahmad Jabril, the head of the PFLP-GC, thus came to share a meal with his followers in Burj al-Barajinah in late June, during the month of Ramadan, but left again immediately. The Palestinians' fate has periodically been the subject in Damascus of negotiations between the Amal leaders of the PSP, the dissidents of Abu Musa and the Syrian leaders, who are also opposed to any resurgence of a Palestinian role in Beirut.

One thing is certain, however, which is that the Palestinian organizations have again made an appearance in the camps, where, as in Beirut, some of them--the most pro-Syrian, like the al-Sa'iqah, the PFLP-GC and Abu Musa's dissidents--have re-opened offices of a political nature next door to their social headquarters. The others, like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine of George Habash and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine of Nayif Hawatmah, for the time being are confining themselves to running cultural and sports clubs which have the advantage of bringing together a large number of people.

However, all of this activity is strictly confined to an area inside the camp at Burj al-Barajinah, all of the accesses to which are guarded by the sixth brigade. For although security within the camp is provided by the Palestinians, it is Amal or the sixth brigade that are responsible for it on the outside. The situation is different in Sabra and Shatila, where Amal has a headquarters in the camp and provides the police force there, which on occasion has led to violent encounters between Shi'ite militia and Palestinians.

As far as weaponry is concerned, although there is no doubt that most of the fighters have recovered individual weapons and many are buying them to "ensure their protection," as one of them said, the Palestinians have not reconstituted their military power and the heavy weapons are no longer to be found in large quantities in the camps. Some of them, moreover, were recovered after 1982 by the Amal militiamen, who protect them jealously.

The timid reorganization of the camps is being done, for the time being, to the detriment of Yasir Arafat's Fatah, which is practically absent from the scene at Burj al-Barajinah, and the loyalist leader of the PLO, who says he is simply a cab driver, says he thinks "only 10 percent of the former political activity has

been resumed." But, he says, being very legalistic, "all of the PLO's social activities are being paralyzed by the lack of agreement with the Lebanese government."

For the time being, in fact, the PLO has not always had the right to re-open its offices officially in Beirut, and it is in his apartment, which serves as his office, that Shafiq al-Hut, its representative, receives. "We really were hoping, after the nullification of the accord of 17 May, that we would have the right to resume our civil activities," he says, "but we have to understand that Lebanon has serious problems to solve and that we have to wait until the government can adopt a common attitude toward us. We are also divided, and the Palestinian National Council, whose meeting we are waiting for, has to redefine our future relations with the Lebanese government." However, Mr al-Hut adds, "Lebanon would have everything to gain by the opening of an official PLO representation, which would make the PLO responsible for all the problems involving the 350,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon."

Well, obviously there is no lack of problems and, beyond the political questions, the distress of the great majority of the Palestinians in the camps is profound and real. According to the UNRWA, social cases have increased very significantly in recent months in the camps, and the economic crisis engendered by the war is hitting the Palestinians especially hard and they are no longer finding jobs. "Less than 50 percent of the people who were working before the Israeli invasion have found work again," the director of the Shatila camp indicates.

In Sidon, in the 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp, the unemployment rate is estimated at 80 percent. Small businesses are no longer finding outlets and work has become irregular. "However, the situation is better than it was in September 1982," the director of the Shatila camp believes, "but nevertheless a climate of general despair prevails here."

#### The Progress of the Religious Trend

That despair, which is perceptible in all of the camps has engendered within Lebanon's Palestinian community two reactions that are rather new and that worry the Palestinian political leaders. More and more young people are attending the mosques and a genuine religious trend of a rather fundamentalist kind, whose magnitude is still difficult to measure, is shaking up the Palestinian movement in Lebanon. "Every day, at Burj al-Barajinah or Shatila, rallies are being organized in the mosques and sheikhs are giving classes in religion," says a DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] official who deplores the fact that some people are seeking to strengthen this religious trend in relation to the parties of the left.

Shafiq al-Hut, who reminds us that religious discrimination has never existed in the Palestinian movement--two of whose leaders (George Habash and Nayif Hawatmah) are Christians--, for his part speaks of contagion on all sides, even as he emphasizes that, although until now there has been no Palestinian Islamic movement, some fanatical Palestinians have joined the Hezbollah.

"Since they no longer have any hope on earth, they are turning to God," he says, smiling, as if in forgiveness for what he calls "a psychological regression engendered by too great a misfortune." Yusuf, a former member of al-Sa'iqah, who has spent 7 months in Lebanese prisons since 1982, is not afraid to say, "The

only issue is religion. It's not a bad thing to return to a religious conscience. It's a way of expressing the fact of being Palestinian, it's one form of cohesiveness."

"The second reaction, which is very common in Palestinians of all ages, but especially in the young, is the desire to leave. "If they could, most of them would leave Lebanon," the leader of the international organizations believes. The welcoming country whose name is on the lips of all Palestinians today is Sweden. Why Sweden? "Because they don't deport us," replies Hassa. All of them live under the illusion that they will leave for Sweden," says one of the UNWRA officials. "Many have already left, but many will never be able to go."

In her very clean small apartment, at the bottom of a tortuous alley, whose open sewer carries greasy water, Mme Safis would really like to have news of her son, who left 4 days ago for this new Eldorado. In his wallet he is carrying a card with the telephone number and address of a Stockholm hotel. "That is where he is to go," she says, "until the Swedes find work for him and get him settled." "It's a conspiracy against the Palestinians, to erode our unity," Yusuf comments bitterly. "Arafat is personally in favor of emigration, because he gave in, in order to have a Palestinian mini-state and there will be no place for us, the 1948 refugees. The only ones who will be able to get there will be the inhabitants of Cisjordan and Gaza."

The problem, for many Palestinians, however, is still the difficulty they encounter in order to obtain a passport. Yusuf requested his in July 1983, but he still awaits an answer. And, he sighs, not without humor, "after 7 months in their prisons, they are familiar with my record." Shafiq al-Hut admits that in that respect the situation has improved slightly in the last year, but that the problem remains a crucial one. "If they don't want to give us travel permits," he says, "let them at least give us the right to go and seek one somewhere else. Palestinians are not asking for privileges, but for respect for the rights that are guaranteed them in the Arab countries, and Lebanon is an Arab country." "We just want a normal life on our own land," concludes Mr al-Hut, sweeping away a past that nevertheless is now feeding the distrust of nearly all of the Lebanese for the Palestinians.

8946

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# FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS STRIVE TO BOLSTER POUND

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 71, 18 Aug 84 p 63

[Article: "After Declining by 44 Percent Versus Dollar and 32 Percent Versus French Franc, Efforts to Bolster Pound Create Crisis Among Financial Institutions"]

[Text] Beirut--After concerted consultations between the state's currency and financial departments, represented by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Lebanon, and on the instructions of the national unity government, some steps were taken to bolster the national currency in the wake of the sharp drop in its exchange rate in 1983 and in the second quarter of 1984, with the pound's exchange rate declining by 44 percent versus the dollar, 25 percent versus the Deutschemark, 26 percent versus the Japanese yen, 29 percent versus the pound sterling and 32 percent versus the French franc. Meanwhile, the pound's exchange rate dropped by 8 percent in the first quarter of 1984. This sharp decline in the national currency's exchange rate has created numerous economic problems for Lebanon, the most significant being the rise in the cost of living as a result of the rise in the cost of all Lebanese imports from abroad, especially since Lebanon imports nearly 60-70 percent of its needs in hard currencies, particularly in U.S. dollars, French francs and Deutschemarks.

The most significant measure approved by the Ministry of Finance to bolster the pound's exchange rate has been the measure raising the interest rates for treasury bonds by an average of two points at once, with the interest rate for the 3-month bonds raised from 11.5 percent to 13.5 percent, the rate for the 6-month bonds raised from 11.75 percent to 13.75 percent and the 1-year bonds raised from 12 to 14 percent. This is a measure that angered the Lebanese banking apparatus and caused an open confrontation between the Ministry of Finance and the Banks Association, which tried to undermine the significance and impact of this measure in bolstering the pound's price and which, on the other hand, restored to highlighting the negative effects of the measure at the banking level and at the general economic level. However, the Ministry of Finance waged the confrontation with the banking sector and emerged triumphant, even if only temporarily.

AL-TADAMUN has contacted Dr Khattar Shabli, the general director of the Ministry of Finance who played the main and fundamental role in persuading the government to adopt the policy of high interest rates to bolster the price

of the national currency, and asked him about the objectives of this measure. Dr Shabli offered the following explanation:

"The Lebanese pound has been facing for a long time pressures in the local market that have caused and are still causing its exchange rate to decline versus the foreign currencies, especially versus the U.S. dollar, which is benefiting from high interest rates [in the United States] and benefiting locally from other causes, the most significant being the speculation activities. All this has created numerous difficulties for the Lebanese pound. The financial authorities have had to confront these difficulties in order to protect the price of the national currency. This is a legitimate and essential national confrontation to which most countries of the world resort.

"In the course of examining the steps that need to be taken to bolster the pound's price, the currency and financial authorities decided to raise the interest rates for the bonds issued for the treasury and subscribed to by the banks in Lebanese pounds. We decided this when we found out that high interest rates offer an important "inducement" in converting those who deal in the money market from transactions in currencies yielding low interest rates to currencies yielding high interest rates. This will contribute to increasing the demand for the Lebanese pound and, consequently, to improving the pound's exchange price and position versus the dollar and the other western currencies, especially since this policy has proven its effectiveness and success in more than one country adopting it, as in the case of the United States where the dollar is obviously benefiting from the high interest rates in improving its position in the major money markets.

"In addition to the above, the improvement in the pound's exchange rate, which will be followed by an immediate drop in the prices of the major European currencies and of the U.S. dollar, will contribute by a large degree to reducing the cost of Lebanese imports, most of which are paid for in dollars, and, subsequently, to reducing the cost of living and to reviving the economic cycle which is currently experiencing considerable stagnation.

"These are the objectives of the Ministry of Finance and these are the results it seeks to achieve through its decision to raise the interest rates for the treasury bonds, keeping in mind here that the ministry may resort after a while to reducing these interest rates if it deems it necessary to do so."

As for the Association of Lebanese Banks, it has on the issue of the high interest rates policy a viewpoint that is totally different from the viewpoint of the Ministry of Finance. 'Adil al-Qassar, the association's vice chairman, has said in the course of the explanation he has given AL-TADAMUN on this issue: "The high interest rates policy approved by the currency and financial authority is misplaced and will produce adverse results for numerous reasons, the most important being:

- Raising the interest rate by a large degree (by 2 points) and in one boost is something which the Lebanese money market will not be able to withstand and which will inevitably generate obvious troubles that will have negative consequences in the foreseeable future.

- Raising the interest rates for the treasury bonds will force the banks to raise the interest on loans and this will be reflected negatively on the bank loans advanced to the economic sectors, especially the damaged sectors, such as industry, tourism and trade, which need soft-term or low-interest loans to be able to rebuild themselves, not the opposite.
- The difficulties that will face the indebted sectors as a result of the high interest rates which will by necessity develop in the loans will have a negative impact on the general economic situation in its entirety and on construction activity because the economic cycle will experience stagnation when the influential production sectors find themselves in a position where it is difficult for them to obtain soft-term loans.
- The high interest rates policy will be futile in bolstering the price of the national currency versus the dollar and the other major European currencies because the problem of the pound is a "security" problem fundamentally, meaning that the pound's exchange price in the Lebanese market is influenced directly by the security situation. When this situation is troubled, the pound's price declines, and vice versa."

Concluding, al-Qassar has said: For these reasons, we have reservations about the policy to bolster the pound, especially since this policy will not produce the desired result. We would have preferred to see the financial and currency authority leave the market to its own devices while waiting for the security situation to improve because only this improvement is capable of bolstering the pound's price, especially since we will be compelled, given the new interest rates policy, to raise the "preferred interest rates" by the same percentage by which the interest rates for the treasury bonds have been increased, i.e. by 2 points.

In the face of this obvious difference in the viewpoints of the Ministry of Finance and of the Banks Association, it remains for us to say a word on the issue, namely that bolstering the Lebanese pound is a national necessity to which the Ministry of Finance committed itself when it decided to raise the interest rates for the treasury bonds. But this measure will not, under any circumstances, have a major impact in rescuing the pound from the pressure it is facing, especially since these pressures are complex, difficult and intricate and include the security aspect and the political aspect, as well as the purely economic aspect. These are aspects that have a strong influence on the pound's crisis and that need to be dealt with in a comprehensive manner in order to free the national currency of the pressures to which it is subjected.

8494

CSO: 4404/628

## BRIEFS

SOUTH BEIRUT ALLOCATIONS--In its meeting on 8 August 1984, the Lebanese Council of Ministers decided to allocate 10 million Lebanese pounds for the implementation of projects to develop the southern suburb of Beirut. The sum was approved on the suggestion of Lebanese President Amin al-Jumayyil. The sum will permit the start of implementation of the construction and development projects for the southern suburb of Beirut which was damaged heavily by the fighting which erupted last spring between the Lebanese army and the Shi'ite militias. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 71, 18 Aug 84 p 61] 8494

DECLINE IN INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS--In the first half of 1984, the Lebanese industrial exports incurred enormous losses, declining by 47.06 percent in comparison to the corresponding period of 1983. The statistics of Lebanon's Directorate of Industry show that the value of industrial exports in the past 6 months amounted to 416,673,000 pounds compared to 787,077,000 pounds in the first half of 1983, i.e. a decline of 370,404,000 Lebanese pounds or of 47.06 percent. This decline in the value of industrial exports is attributed to the security incidents witnessed by most parts of Lebanon since last February--incidents which resulted in closing Beirut Airport and Beirut Port for more than 157 days. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 71, 18 Aug 84 p 62] 8494

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SOVIET PEACE PLAN REVIEWED, PRAISED

Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic No 520, 11 Aug 84 pp 4, 5

[Article: "The Soviet Plan for a Just International Solution"]

[Text] The Soviet plan which was officially announced last week is in essence a basket of plans in a single comprehensive one, aimed at a solution which will be both comprehensive and just! One can summarize it in the words peace for all with the participation of all, in the context of supervision by the international organization, whose secretary general had gone to Moscow stating that the region was lacking in plans -- meaning, of course, plans which are just, comprehensive and viable. The Soviets declared their venerable plan a few weeks after De Cuellar completed his discussions in Moscow and met with the chairman of the Liberation Organization in Geneva.

Some people who will concur in describing the plan as venerable, since the Soviets are their friends and since the region is headed toward stagnation, following Israel's elections and preceding America's, will choose to wonder, But what is new in this venerable plan?

Of course the ready response is that there is nothing new under the sun and that plans for resolutions do not suddenly burst forth in thin air. However, a serious ready response would also add that the Soviets' return to formulating a resolution and formulating peace is vigorous, and this is not a matter of small importance. It is the declaration of a major American failure in imposing unsuitable solutions and the declaration of a more major Israel failure in imposing an Israeli peace.

However, the most serious response lies between the lines of the six-section plan. There is no great need to state that the venerable Palestinian state has now more than at any time in the past become a basic issue in Soviet policy and that the Liberation Organization has become a basis for any international conference on a solution in Palestine and subsequently in the region, indeed in the world.

Therefore the organization and Israel hastened to declare an immediate opinion. The former was strongly receptive and the latter intensively dismissive. However, the remaining capitals concerned are supposed and obligated



to think carefully, study and offer clarifications. The Soviet Union is not just any country, and the Soviet state's recommendations are not just any recommendations. In the language of politics and diplomacy, it is said that when countries study a plan, the plan is serious, even if it does not contain new, unknown elements, although it does contain elements which have not yet been recognized. There is nothing new under the sun, and plans do not come from a void in order to fill an area which has been fraught with crises and wars for decades and centuries.

A reading of the six-point sections in the proposal and a comparison of that with the nervous, deceptive Israeli response shows how much Tel Aviv, which is provocative and active in sterile wars on the one hand and is more and more intensively paralyzed in dealing intelligently with reasonable, acceptable peace plans on the other, is not serious or intent in pursuing the road to a just peace.

But yes, Moscow's plan is of the utmost seriousness, contrary to what Tel Aviv claims, and it is of the utmost realism, in a way which does not conflict with principles. Moscow is not Washington. Moscow, unlike Washington, has not accustomed anyone to a lack of seriousness in politics. In this regard, the Soviets are the master of the position of principle, contrary to what many of its determined adversaries or ephemeral enemies claim. This is the way they are, and, as they have repeatedly proved, they are masters with regard to the suitable position in the most suitable timing.

Is the situation suitable when Tel Aviv does not know what it wants and Washington does not know what it really should do? In answering this question, we should go back to what we said at the beginning, that Moscow's plan, declared 2 years after the expulsion of the Liberation Organization forces from Lebanon and Reagan's declaration of his evil plan to remove them from the political map, is a basket of plans in one. It contains much from the United Nations' successive resolutions, something from the resolutions of the Fez Arab summit, and something from the Franco-Egyptian plan which is still knocking on the closed American door. All these plans which have been presented have lacked something essential: the role and influence of the Soviets, first of all, an explicit definition of the role of the PLO, second of all, and a precise determination of the parties which are to take part in the desired settlement conference, third of all. All these deficiencies have been satisfied by Moscow's Chernenko plan, which is Brezhnev's plan, modified and with things added, more accurately, in detail. In a country other than the Soviets', plans are connected to the names of their advocates, but Moscow's plans are the policy of the Soviet state. Therefore one can say that the position regarding the proposed plan is that of real peace plans which can be carried out, not ones that are imposed or fragmentary in form and collapse the moment they are tested, that is, when they are tested to see if they are serious, comprehensive and just.

In spite of brilliant flexibility in the formulation of their plan, which is in reality the requisite international plan which was set forth after the positions of all the countries concerned were studied, this flexibility does not negate but indeed asserts that the plan is a complete whole. It is a plan which precedes the new American-Soviet detente, indeed the situation

behind it; it is the detente which they are talking about starting now and whose date they will be setting at some time next year, if Washington is serious in going back to the policy of detente or is compelled to do so, having tried isolation and individual action, alienation of the Soviets, and an organized attempt at eliminating [the Palestinians] from the political map, without succeeding except in obstructing the resolution, not in formulating one, and most specifically failing in the role of "peacemaker" and succeeding in the role of "maker of crises and wars."

Of course it is harder to make peace than to instigate wars, and the Soviets' is a peace plan which is to be negotiated over, a plan for everyone, a right to exist for everyone, a guarantee for everyone. However, the justice in the plan is not just a moral justice but also political justice. We might add that it is the alternative to the Israeli wars that have failed and the American resolutions that have failed.

The peace which is to be negotiated over is a deliberate peace, not a hasty one, although it is just. This is not what the people who accept, who are wary or who are hesitant about and concerning the Soviet plan hope, a rapid solution. It is a strategic plan for the future. However, the organization welcomes it because it loves peace, because it is proof of the failure of the Israelis' wars and the Americans' plans to crush or obliterate it, and thirdly because it is proof of the impossibility of replacing the organization with anything else which will represent its people and speak in their name. In a word, it is a Soviet and international sanctification of the Palestinian demand for a Palestinian nation, although the Soviets have gone farther in their plan, in embracing the contents of the National Council's resolution concerning a subsequent Palestinian-Jordanian confederation -- on condition, however, that it be preceded by a Palestinian nation.

On that subject, the official spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry stated that Moscow ultimately supports a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. This is what the director of the Soviet Middle East department, Vladimir Poliakov, relayed to the Jordanian foreign minister, Tahir al-Misri, who welcomed the Soviet proposals, which were similar to the Brezhnev plan for 1981, which Jordan had previously welcomed.

One must also state, especially to people who wonder about timing, although the timing has been as beneficial as it could be, that Moscow offered its plan after relations between itself and Cairo had been restored to the level of ambassadors. Moscow knows that without Cairo it is not possible to claim that Washington's isolated plans have failed, and Washington knows that without Syria it is not possible to say that any plan at all will succeed. Everyone says that Europe has a role, and many people will say that 'Arafat was wise in going to Egypt, as in trying to rectify the situation with Syria.

Therefore the Arabs, in general or particular, have agreed, Europe is not explicitly opposed, the Liberation Organization, which is concerned above all others that no one usurp its role, is receptive, and no one ignores that the Soviet international plan is an alternative to Camp David and is the way out of the dilemma posed by the failure of the Reagan plan and the failure

of the Israeli wars in Lebanon. All, or the most important, of the Arab states which have tried, or some of which at least have tried, to create or fabricate a marriage or synthesis between the Fez Arab peace plan and the American Reagan plan for capitulation, will find that it would be easier and more just to create a state of marriage and synthesis between the Arab Palestinian and Soviet international plans.

The United States has engaged in a policy of keeping others from making peace, their own peace. It has pursued a policy of using others to make its own peace. The peace of the United States, since the October war and since its president Gerald Ford abandoned the notion of the international conference and embraced Kissinger's notorious notion, has led to war after war and crisis upon crisis, to the point where Washington, by the explicit or implicit agreement of all, has become the obstacle to peace in the region, not the peacemaker.

Europe has engaged in the policy of waiting for the results of American policy and of waiting till some Arabs accept it. It is not a coincidence that Western Europe has refrained from taking initiative and offering proposals since Reagan came to power, and the policy of hostility toward the Soviets, more intense hostility toward the Liberation Organization, and unlimited support for Israel came along with him.

Some Arab countries have pursued the policy of going along with the American peace, and some of them have also tried to play America's game in shutting the organization out of the resolution. That has resulted in the substitution of Arab reconciliation, which is desired and vital, with Arab feuding and disputes of unprecedented severity. This is the Arab situation which Israel and Washington want. It is the situation from whose sufferings the Liberation Organization has made every possible effort to extricate itself, and which it has sought to replace with a state of upright Arab action, succeeding in that in the Fez summit, whose resolutions some Arabs have not adhered to properly, having indeed gone to Washington in an attempt to reconcile it with the evil Reagan plan whose gist is that there is no room for a Palestinian state and no scope for the Palestinian people, because they are a dangerous people and their country would be a transmitter of heat!

Nonetheless, the Liberation Organization, which is a revolution, and a threatened one, has pursued the policy of a responsible country, has shown patience and has demonstrated wisdom and sagacity, while Israel has become afflicted with a state of insanity because its war against the Liberation Organization in Lebanon did not lead to any conclusions in the Bank and the Strip, or in the world. As for the negative results which have been achieved in the context of the Arab world, the Liberation Organization has suffered doubly from them, but it has tried, and is trying, to turn these negative results and bring Arab ranks close together, since, unless the Arabs go united to any conference for a comprehensive peace, there is no use in any comprehensive plan for a just resolution.

The Moscow plan has defined its six points, even defining how it is possible that there could be an Arab reconciliation and an Arab-Palestinian reconciliation, and how the road to a reconciliation and agreement in this area

could be taken. However, there is no way to avoid saying that much time still remains and the actual strides to peace have not yet started. However, what can be said is that the Liberation Organization, which is a fact, has actually, fundamentally, become the basis in the equation of any solution.

11387

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PALESTINIAN NEWS AGENCY COMMENTS ON AL-ASAD INTERVIEW

Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic No 521, 25 Aug 84 pp 8, 9

[Article: "Between the Statements Made and the Logic of Affairs"]

[Text] The French newspaper LE MONDE published a lengthy interview with President Hafiz al-Asad on 1 August 1984 dealing with answers related to our brother Abu 'Ammar. The journalist who held the interview tried to goad President al-Asad to take a subjective position and personal approach in the conversation with his question bearing on Abu 'Ammar. President al-Asad put it well when he said that he "did not like to express his opinion on people through the press."

The president then went on to give answers from the perspective of a political discussion and expressed his opinions on more than one point, including some we agree on and others we can only disagree on, whether these opinions are the result of an error in information or individual judgment.

President al-Asad said, "'Arafat has harmed the Palestinian cause and Syria." We can only reject this description from a man holding President al-Asad's responsibility. The Palestinian cause, although it is the cause of the Arab nation, is the cause of the people of Palestine, and the people of Palestine, by virtue of their experiences, do not give loyalty to their leaders easily. The Arab masses do not deal lightly with people who abandon the Palestinian cause, so how would they deal with people who harm it?

Our brother Abu 'Ammar enjoys very broad mass support inside and outside the occupied nation, throughout the Arab nation and the Islamic world and among the peoples of the third world, who, through their senses, understand the meaning of injustice and in whose imaginations enmity toward colonialism and love for people who stand up to it take concrete form.

This position by which the masses express their respect and appreciation for Yasir 'Arafat throughout the world cannot be compatible with the statement that Abu 'Ammar has harmed the Palestinian cause; indeed, the opposite is true.

So much for the general position. From the standpoint of essence, Yasir 'Arafat and his brothers have been leading the Palestinian struggle since



1965. A single glance at the actual state of the Palestinian cause on 1 January 1965 compared with the situation that exists can only cause us to say that the achievement that Yasir 'Arafat's leadership has realized has exceeded many expectations. The Zionist-American strategy of eliminating the Palestinian people and closing the file on the Palestine cause has been eliminated. When we say this, we are not denying Arab efforts on the international stage; we can only state that before 1 January 1965 the Palestine cause was locked up in Arab drawers, in the Arab and international contexts.

As far as harming Syria goes, that is something which does not constitute part of the logic of things. Abu 'Ammar and his brothers realize the importance of Syria as a people, Syria as a territory and Syria as a position as far as the Palestinian cause is concerned. The commander of a cause cannot harm Syria, no matter what the cause has done for its people and what martyrs it has given up for its struggle, because that is contrary to its interests first of all, contrary to its understanding second of all, and contrary to its affiliation and its national characteristics third of all.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that some harm has been done. That is not how one measures relations between Syria and the Palestinian revolution. Constructive dialogue aimed at correcting error, at a distance from reactions or discussions of verdicts, is the logical basis for combative relations, and since its establishment the Palestinian revolution, had it wanted to act by reacting toward the damage which it has suffered on the official Arab stage, would thereby have betrayed its higher interests and unleashed innumerable problems. However, the higher interest requires that one be patient so that the damage can be eliminated through understanding and mutual understanding and dialogue which cannot be broken off.

President al-Asad, in the same conversation, said that he could not "call resistance which is far removed from Palestine a resistance while what it had sought to resist was drawing close to its land and the goal of its struggle. What can the resistance do, hundreds of kilometers from Palestinian territory, except be represented by a number of politicians and media?"

The public interest and concern for the restoration of normal relations with Syria make it mandatory that we discuss this statement on the basis of the words of the text without going into anything else.

The resistance exists wherever the people exist. Its existence or absence depends on whether or not it engages in struggle.

Any reading of written or broadcast news bulletins, not to speak of the existing situation, will show in a manner which will not admit of argument that the people are present on the territory of the struggle and that daily armed struggle is going on on the territory of the struggle, inside the occupied homeland and southern Lebanon. This sort of struggle does not come from a void and does not take place haphazardly; consequently, the requirements of the struggle in terms of organization, men, arms and money exert their influence in accordance with the resources available, in a manner in which it has been able to overcome one way or another a state in which all

Arab borders, including the Syrian borders, have been closed off to the Palestinian resistance.

This confused Arab situation, especially as regards the offensive military option, has made it mandatory, in terms of environment and practice, that publicly known Palestinian military forces not be on the lines of confrontation which have been closed to it in the Arab arena; this makes guerrilla activity and organized mass struggle through its leaders mandatory, each in its own field.

This sort of situation has no bearing on the place where the higher command is situated, since effective communications exist and there is interaction between the command and our masses through the commanders of the arenas in which these masses are located.

The higher Palestinian command is not restricted to commanding the military struggle. There is the command of the political and media struggle throughout the international arena and the centers of the higher command for areas of combat, distributed among more than one Arab country by virtue of Arab circumstances, which have been extremely harsh for the Palestinian struggle.

President al-Asad then said, "We and 'Arafat are pursuing two totally contradictory policies." This statement inspires amazement and astonishment. So far we have not been able to discover one place or area of contradiction between the policy of the PLO under 'Arafat's leadership and the declared policy of Syria under al-Asad's leadership.

President al-Asad, in the same conversation, stated that he wanted a solution which was founded on United Nations resolutions. Hasn't that been Yasir 'Arafat's position?

Syria and the PLO, through Yasir 'Arafat in person, reached agreement concerning the Fez summit resolutions, and Syria and the PLO reached agreement concerning the Brezhnev initiative.

Syria and the PLO under the leadership of our brother Abu 'Ammar rejected the Camp David agreements and the autonomy plan which it presented.

The PLO, under 'Arafat's leadership, rejected the Reagan initiative by a decree of the Palestinian National Council and Syria rejected the same initiative through the Syrian media and the party's positions.

Syria and the PLO want Egypt to return to Arab ranks on a basis where it abandons the Camp David policy, and they are both in communication with Egypt by various means to that end. The position of the Syrian delegation at the Islamic summit conference was more than clear in this regard.

Syria gave agreement to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 while the PLO did not, but we do not consider that a contradiction; the same situation existed between the Egypt of 'Abd-al-Nasir and the PLO, for well known reasons.

From all this, it is clear that there is no contradiction between the declared policy of Syria, under the leadership of al-Asad, and that of the PLO under the leadership of Yasir 'Arafat. Rather, there is what can be called a conflict, and this conflict can also disappear, rapidly, through common dialogue and common coordination in the context of a single policy embodied in the resolutions of the Arab summit and the Palestine National Council. Therefore we believe that it is the responsibility of Syria to begin the dialogue in this context and that the PLO under the leadership of Yasir 'Arafat and his brothers have declared their desire that this happen more than once.

President al-Asad then says, "We do not want to dictate our policy to 'Arafat" and adds, "but it is natural that we should support people who share our opinion."

We welcome the statement in the first part of this remark but what happened in the al-Biqa' and Tripoli gives evidence of another dimension. That is the dimension of the dictation of policy, since imposing views by the force of arms is dictation, not cooperation, agreement or reconciliation. Moreover, the statement of supporting "the people who share our opinion" means obstructing democracy in the framework of Palestinian legitimacy, and it means ignoring the National Council as a legitimate representative and the body which takes the Palestinian people's highest decisions.

If a dispute occurs, it is remedied by legitimate, responsible leaders, and not by support which goes as far as armed combat, because that leads not to unity but to rifts and negates the position of rejecting "the dictation of policy."

The leadership which our brother Yasir 'Arafat heads has not dealt, for example, with the internal crisis which Syria went through recently by supporting whoever backed it against whoever opposed it, because it considered that that would mean inflaming the struggle at a time when national and regional duty required that one work to support a resolution to the crisis in order to protect Syria. Therefore we are in agreement with President al-Asad when he stated, also with respect to 'Arafat's policy, that it "was his affair and that of the Palestinian organizations," although we would wish that that would take concrete form in accordance with the content and significance of the statement and not the platform which was followed in the events in the al-Biqa' and Tripoli.

The FATAH central committee, including our brother Abu 'Ammar, has taken a positive view of the meeting between our brother Abu al-Lutf and President Hafiz al-Asad, which occurred before the interview which LE MONDE published, and saw that it contained a positive beginning which would result in mutual understanding and comprehension through constructive joint dialogue, as was stated at the time in a party declaration.

Dispute is not merely a legitimate matter; rather, it is the handmaiden of relations, and one cannot refuse to solve a dispute if people's objective is the same and their intentions are the same.

The resumption of normal Syrian-Palestinian relations is a matter that is dictated by regional and national interests, and it is necessary that that take place through serious, tactful respect and interaction between the PLO and the Arab countries. That cannot be realized if disputes which obstruct proper actions continue in favor of the Zionist enemy and its hostile schemes, and in favor of American Middle East policy which is hostile to our causes and our nation.

The time has come for a successful Arab summit meeting. This requires that the Syrian-Palestinian dispute be eliminated and it requires that legitimate activity in Palestinian contexts, primarily the convening of the National Council, not be obstructed. It is our hope that we will see all this realized soon, if not very soon.

11887

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## ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-JAZIRAH in Arabic 8 Sep 84 p 13

[Article by the Investigations Department of AL-JAZIRAH: "The University of Petroleum and Mining, Its Establishment, Curriculum and Services to the Nation and the Citizens"]

[Text] Since the date of the start of the new academic year at the University of Petroleum and Mining is close at hand, AL-JAZIRAH is pleased to present a brief report on the establishment of this unique university in its fields of academic study, whose curriculum has a direct scientific and economic connection with petroleum and mining, which are our two main sources of national wealth, and which have made our nation prosperous under the leadership of His Majesty King Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. They have brought the nation and the citizenry economic, social and cultural prosperity unequalled in the Third World.

### Establishment of the University

The University of Petroleum and Mineral Resources was established in accordance with a royal decree in 1963. At that time, it was given the name of the College of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, and in 1975 a royal decree was issued changing the name to the University of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. This reflected the considerable development, which this institution went through from its inception. The number of persons enrolled when it in fact opened its doors on 23 September 1964, was 67 students. Since that time, the university has grown steadily, until its students numbered 3,814 in the 1983-84 academic year. That was the goal set by the third 5-year development plan. The first class graduated from the university in 1971.

### Its Growth Was Balanced With the Growth of the State

This rapid growth, achieved by the university since its inception, corresponded to a considerable extent on the growth rate achieved by the Saudi Arabian state in the fields of economic and technical development.

Moreover, it also reflects the expansion of fields and open opportunities for the citizenry with the increasing importance of the kingdom on the international scene, as the largest and most important source of energy.



## Complex and Stimulating Challenges

There is no doubt that the huge oil and mineral resources available in the kingdom constitute complex and stimulating challenges, which impel it toward growth in the fields of scientific and technical education to meet these challenges. The university's goals were to train its students on the highest levels of sciences and engineering, in order to provide professional and administrative skills to offer services to the kingdom in the petroleum and mineral industries. An additional goal was to develop research that could disseminate information pertaining to these fields. Moreover, the university was committed without reservation, which distinguished it in a special way because of its being a technological university in an Islamic country, to broadening and expanding its students understanding of Islamic principles, and to implanting in their souls an appreciation of their ancestors' contributions to the world in the fields of mathematics and sciences. Therefore, the University of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, with its administration, faculty and students, and all of its programs, is dedicated to achieving these goals.

## Number of Faculty Members

The number of faculty members currently working in the University is 686, of whom 44 percent are Saudis and the remainder of various nationalities. The majority of these are from the United States, Britain and Western Europe. There are also a large number of Arab and Muslim professors, in addition to the Saudis on the faculty, whose numbers are increasing each year.

## English and Arabic Languages

All courses in the university are given in English, with the exception of Islamic studies and Arabic. Reference works and technical periodicals form the backbone of the university's central library, which also includes an excellent collection of books on the Islamic and Arabic heritage, social sciences and the humanities.

Teaching methods, programs and administrative and organizational methods have been prepared in accordance with the most modern international standards available, along with seeing to it that they were modified for application to the kingdom's needs.

## An Independent Legal Entity

The University of Petroleum and Mineral Resources is considered an educational institution, enjoying an independent legal status. It operates under the supervision of an independent board of directors, called the university council. The council, which is chaired by the minister of higher education, is composed of the director of the university, seven members who are senior government officials, three senior educators and two administrators who have experience outside of the university.

## Preparatory Year

When they are accepted by the University of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, most of the students enroll in the preparatory year. The main purpose of this year is to develop the student's proficiency in the use of the English language and to develop good study habits. The preparatory year's curriculum is concentrated on study of English, studies in sciences and mathematics, engineering workshops and physical education. All this is aimed at developing the student's prior knowledge in these materials, along with giving him the opportunity to ascertain the various specialities in the university and helping him to choose his field of scientific speciality. He has been introduced to the curriculum with the aid of a computer in his secondary school year. This program gives the students the opportunity to interact with the computer and to learn ways of using it. This facilitates their working with it in the future, since advanced courses depend to a considerable extent on its use in all the university programs.

After finishing the preparatory year, the students matriculate according to their desires into one of the university's five colleges. They are the College of Applied Engineering, the College of Engineering Sciences, the College of Sciences, the College of Industrial Management and the College of Environmental Planning.

### College of Applied Engineering

The curriculum of the College of Applied Engineering concentrates on the practical aspects in engineering, in addition to the theory. The studies that form the curriculum of this college combine a number of scientific and technical courses with enabling the students to gain practical experience through engineering laboratories and workshops in the university. In addition, they spend a period of not less than 7 months working in one of the industrial organizations within the kingdom or abroad. This is done through the cooperative program, which is one of the graduation requirements for each student in this college. After completing the desired program, the student receives a bachelor's degree in one of the following specialties: applied chemical engineering, applied civil engineering, applied electrical engineering and applied mechanical engineering.

### College Of Engineering Sciences

The College of Engineering Sciences offers eight concentrated programs of studies, which qualify the student to receive a bachelor's degree in engineering 4 years after completion of the preparatory year, in one of the following categories: petroleum engineering, chemical engineering, civil engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, systems engineering, computer sciences and mining engineering.

Students of the College of Engineering Sciences, just as in the other colleges of the university, were developed on the basis of qualifying the student to

obtain a higher degree on the international level, which permits the graduate to continue his studies in other universities or to practise a profession immediately after graduation. The courses in this college are marked by considerable dependence on the use of computers, especially in the engineering programs, computer sciences and the systems engineering program.

#### College of Sciences

The College of Sciences offers a 4-year curriculum, after the preparatory year, which qualifies the student to receive a bachelor of science degree in one of the following specialties: chemistry, geology and geophysics, mathematical sciences and physics. The college also has a Department of Islamic and Arabic Studies, which offers courses in Islamic culture, social science and humanities for all the university students.

#### College of Industrial Management

This college is distinguished by the teaching of management sciences from the technological standpoint and not from the point of view of the humanitarian sciences, as is the case in most world universities. The instruction is aimed at advancing the student from the stages of learning the basic skills in the field of his specialization to how to apply these skills to arrive at sound managerial decisions, by defining the options available to him in each case, and evaluating their costs and advantages, in order to reach an appropriate decision. This college offers an integrated curriculum, which gives the student an excellent educational and technological foundation, in addition to opening the way for him to learn the most modern theories and techniques of management, especially those that rely upon the maximum use of computers and scientific managerial methods, which rely upon statistical methods. Courses in the College of Industrial Management include the following fields: management, economics, finance, accounting and information classification.

#### College of Environmental Planning

The College of Environmental Planning is considered the most modern college in the university. It has been developed to cover an obvious need in the flourishing architectural and building fields in the kingdom. This has been accomplished by expanding the basis of the architectural program, which was one of the departments of the College of Engineering Sciences.

The College of Environmental Planning in the University of Petroleum and Mineral Resources is larger than an architectural college. Modern architecture requires three stages of professional specialization. They are design, which means concentrating on the purpose and the special use of construction; and technique, which means concentration on the cost. Each stage of this broad specialization includes, for its part, the stages of sub-specialization, and requires specific, professional instruction for the integrated architectural team.

This college includes the following branches of specialization: architecture, city planning, horticulture and surveying, construction techniques and construction project management. Apart from its special curriculum, the College of Environmental Planning makes use of strong programs in other departments of the university, such as industrial management, and civil, mechanical and electrical engineering. This is done to develop an integrated program to comply with the needs of the local environment.

#### College of Higher Studies

In addition to the masters in labor management, which is offered by the College of Industrial Management, the College of Higher Studies offers courses to qualify students to obtain masters of science degrees in the following fields: petroleum engineering, chemical engineering, civil engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, computer sciences and engineering, systems engineering, applied mathematics, physics, chemistry and earth sciences. The student will spend 2 full years after his matriculation in a masters program, during which he will take theory and scientific courses, in addition to conducting scientific research under the supervision of a professor with the requisite higher skills in his field of specialization.

After completing the basic foundation required to grant a doctors degree, the university has begun this year doctoral programs in electrical engineering and chemical engineering. Moreover, preparations are underway to offer doctoral programs in other fields of science and engineering.

#### Libraries

The University of Petroleum and Mineral Resources was eager to develop a specialized, technical library aimed at serving the educational and scientific research programs. It endorsed this trend by basing the central library on quality of reference sources, their suitability for the programs and the extent of their use and benefit, and not merely on the number and size. The plan to develop the university libraries also stressed specialized scientific periodicals and the use of modern tools, such as computers and audio and optical devices, including microfilm, microfiche and television sets. It also stressed the establishing of contacts with the centers of technical science in the world, so that any source work or research paper that exists in these centers, whether in America or Europe, can be obtained in a short period of time. To a considerable extent, the university has been able to impelment the plan to develop the library, so that the Central Library in the University of Petroleum and Mineral Resources now has more than one-quarter million reference works in various forms of retention and retrieval. The number of scientific periodicals that the library regularly receives now numbers more than 3500.



## Workshops

The university has 137 workshops for instruction and scientific research, in addition to the Institute for Research. These workshops have attained a high degree of development, whether in equipment, operation and maintenance. They share in achieving the university's goals in instruction, scientific research and public service. A great deal of important research is being conducted in these workshops.

## Center for Information Classification (Computer)

The University of Petroleum and Mineral Resources was the first national institution to establish and manage a computer center, and the university's center is still the largest. It has an IBM 3033N, which is considered one of the largest and most modern of its type. It has a 8-million bit memory and storage capacity of  $2520 \times 8 + 317 \times 8$  million bits. In addition, there is an IBM 158/370 with a 4 million bit memory, and a storage capacity of  $317 \times 16$  million bits. There are 249 visual display monitors tied in with the computer, distributed in the various departments of the university.

## Services for Students and Faculty

The center provides services to the students and members of the faculty, since the computer is considered one of the important teaching and scientific research aids. Moreover, the center participates in classifying information for the management of the university, since it prepares salaries, organizes depository records and financial affairs, student and employee records, and prepares the budget, phone bills, etc., in short, all of the information that the university requires. Recently, a program of library operations was prepared for the computer, and a program for the operations of the purchasing office will be ready soon.

## Two Units for Various Government Offices

In addition to these services, the information center offers its services to various governmental agencies and private sector organizations. These services include information systems design, such as systems to prepare salaries, manage warehouses, statistics, etc. They also include preparing technical studies, such as economic feasibility studies, and preparing plans and programs that will be entered into the computers of these agencies. The Office of External Services in the past 4 years, has prepared studies for the Ministry of Health, Foreign Affairs, Higher Education and Interior, as well as the Riyadh Water and Sewage Board. The number of agencies and organizations that have received services from the information center during recent years totals about 65.

7005

CSO: 4404/661



ELECTRIC COMPANY'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR '83 DISCUSSED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 18 Aug 84 p 4

[Article: "Efforts to Raise Proficiency of Saudi Technicians, Reduce Costs of Producing Electricity and End Disruptions"]

[Text] The total amount of electrical generator capacity in 1983 of the power stations tied in with the Eastern Province Electric Company was 4,342 megawatts (mw).

This was stated in the annual report issued by the Saudi Consolidated Electric Company, Eastern Province for the year 1983.

The report pointed out that the company's efforts were concentrated as well on the training of its Saudi employees. For that purpose, it opened a new training facility last year to prepare Saudi technicians, in order to raise their technical and scientific proficiency. The company has also tried to reduce the cost of its total operations and to improve the services offered to subscribers. The possibilities of main interruptions occurring in electrical current from the network, or from any principal part of it, have been controlled to a considerable extent.

The report indicated that the total capacity of diesel-operated power plants in remote places, to supply villages with energy during 1983, totaled 39 mw, compared with a 20 mw capacity during 1982. Moreover, the total generator capacity of the 50 hertz stand-alone network in al-Hufuf was 34 mw. The capacity of the generator installed by ARAMCO was 327 mw, and the maximum amount of available capacity for the Eastern Province's electricity, from the two power plants of the State Desalinization Organization in al-'Azaiyah and al-Jubayl, 788 mw.

The report stated that work has been underway since the end of last year to install eight generators in the Fars electricity station, each with a capacity of 55 mw. The first two units began operation during the first part of 1984.

The report mentioned that last year experienced growth in power loads, since the peak load of the tied-in network in 1983, including the al-Ahsa' network was 2,886 mw, thereby achieving an increase of 7 percent over the peak load

of 1982. Moreover, the peak load of the stand-alone networks in the district of Hafr al-Batin and in some remote villages was some 30 percent, since it rose from 44 mw in 1982 to 57 mw in 1983. Main growth was also achieved in the load of the tied-in network in the residential and commercial sectors, since the load in the al-Dammam district increased by 16 percent, al-Ahsa' 20 percent, and al-Jubayl 31 percent. As regards ARAMCO's peak demand for 1983, the report indicated that it was reduced by 5 percent over the 1982 figure. In the industrial city of al-Jubayl, last year's load exceeded 300 mw. This is considered a record, compared with 1982's peak which was 86 mw.

#### New Lines

The report pointed out that last year approximately 300 km of electrical circuit lines were added to the Eastern Province's electricity network, in order to transmit power some 69 kms or more. The total length of electricity power lines was increased from 5,295 km to 5,595 km.

During 1983, five high-voltage sub-stations were put into operation, with a total transformer capacity of 840 mw, volt, ampere. Therefore, the total number of high voltage sub-stations at the end of 1983 was 241, with a total transformer capacity of 24,340 mw, volt ampere.

The report stated that the number of subscribers, as of the end of last year, amounted to 242,900. More than 700 kms of electrical circuit lines were added to the network. This included feeder and main distribution lines to serve the new subscribers and to provide power to the farms.

Total sales of electrical energy during 1983 were nearly 13 thousand trillion, 990 million kilowatt hours. Last year, concern was concentrated on guarantying the integrity of the existing facilities' operations. Overhead feeder and distribution lines were also replaced with ground lines, and unsafe and old installations were also replaced. Preventive maintenance of distribution facilities and testing of the meters' installations was also emphasized, in order to guarantee their life expectancy and the safety of their operation. This has led to a considerable reduction in the number of cases of power outages for subscribers.

#### Increase in Support Activities

The report stated that a fundamental increase was introduced in support activities during 1983, since a detailed study was made of the means currently being followed to store materials, aimed at reducing costs and introducing the required improvements in this regard. A new system has also been started that will inventory the stocks of materials through the use of a computer, so that when it is completed, the company will be able to record and control the levels of stored materials.

7005

CSO: 4404/661

METHANOL PRODUCTION DISCUSSED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 7 Sep 84 p 4

[Article: "Saudi Arabia Exported 845,038 Tons of Methanol from the al-Razi Company's Production Up to July"]

[Text] The total amount of methanol exported by Saudi Arabia, up to the end of last June, was 845,038 tons. That was stated to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT by an official source with the Saudi Basic Industries Company (SABIC). All of this amount was produced by the Saudi Methanol Company (al-Razi), which began operation in April of last year. Of this amount 149,582 tons were exported to Europe, and the rest to various parts of the world.

The figure pertaining to Europe caught our attention, because last June the European Common Market imposed fees amounting to 13.5 percent of the revenue received from Saudi petrochemical products, on the pretext that the kingdom has used up its allocated share of exemptions from fees.

Al-Razi was the sole producing plant. Recently, the National Methanol Company (Ibn Sina) began production, and it is expected that it will reach maximum capacity within 5 weeks. There are also six other plants for the production of various petrochemical products, which will be completed at different times at the beginning of next year, thereby achieving the kingdom's goal of entering into the industrial age. When all of these projects are completed and operating at full capacity, the kingdom hopes to obtain some 5 percent of the world petrochemical market. This would bring a profit ranging between \$4-5 million a year. Moreover, it will open the way for the establishment of other industries. The most important part of this is that these industries will achieve a strategic goal, which is deriving benefit from raw materials, i.e., the gas that used to be burned in the atmosphere in the past, because it could not be used. At the same time, it establishes the industrial foundation in the kingdom on firm bases, the most important of which is oil.

SABIC uses every possible method to market its products. In accordance with the agreements that were contracted with the foreign firms that share equally in the projects, these foreign firms are required to market a share of these products ranging between 50 to 70 percent of the production. This was done to benefit from the marketing assets of these firms that have been long-time

sellers in this field. Aside from the share that the foreign firms market, SABIC for its part markets its share, whether through the free market, or by entering into direct competition, or through long-range deals. Three months ago, SABIC contracted for its first long-term deal with the Italian firm AINICOM, by which SABIC will supply the company with 300,000 tons of methanol annually at current prices. Moreover, the contract will be renewed annually at current prices. Moreover, the contract will be renewed annually, unless either of the two parties wishes to abrogate it. SABIC has established two companies, one for marketing, and the other for marketing services. The latter is to serve the first company and its clients.

Since the beginning of planning and working to establish these projects, there has been talk that SABIC would benefit from the cheap gas that it has in abundance, either to flood the market with its products or to break down the price structure. This matter provoked a number of discussions with officials in the kingdom and several visiting delegations. The last delegation to visit the kingdom and look into this matter was the Japanese delegation, composed of 24 persons representing both producers and consumers. Ibrahim Ibn Salmah, the vice chairman of the board of directors, and the appointed member of SABIC, said that the delegation, after the visits it made to the industrial city in al-Jubayl and the discussions that it conducted with officials, returned assured that SABIC had entered the market on the basis of competition and that consequently, it has no interest in instability in the market or in selling at lower prices.

7005

CSO: 4404/661

## BRIEFS

PLAN TO DOUBLE REFINERIES' CAPACITY--Saudi Arabia has decided to double the refining capacity of its refineries by the beginning of 1986, from .91 million barrels per day to 1.74 million barrels. This will increase the refinery production earmarked for export, as well as equally increasing that production allocated for domestic consumption. In 1983, Saudi refinery capacity totaled 450,000 barrels per day at ARAMCO, 30,000 barrels a day at the Arabian Oil Company, 50,000 barrels daily at the Getty Oil Company, and at PETROMIN 380,000 barrels per day. Production from the additional refinery capacity will start in the refineries assigned for export purposes, and which are located in al-Jubayl, Yanbu and Rabig. During the current year, a joint project will be opened between PETROMIN and Shell, in the industrial city of al-Jubayl. This refining capacity will total 250,000 barrels a day, including oil, gas, gasoline, gas oil, kerosene, heavy heating oil and sulphur. In addition, the refinery will provide raw materials for other local industry. By the end of 1985, production will begin in a PETROMIN-Mobil project in Yanby', with a capacity of 250,000 barrels per day of various refinery materials, in addition to the light oil production which will be converted from heavy gas oil. There is another refinery under construction, being built by the PETROMIN Company in Rabig. Its production capacity will amount to 320,000 barrels a day, including naptha, Kerosene, gas oil and heating oil. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1452, 31 Aug 84 p 44] 7005

CSO: 4404/661



## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

### FIRST QUARTER IMPORTS DROP

Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 19 Jun 84 p 2

[Article: "Abu Dhabi Imports Drop 26 Percent During First Quarter of Year to 3.2 Billion Dirhams"]

[Excerpt] The total value of Abu-Dhabi Emirate imports during the first 4 months of last year, 1983, dropped 26 percent from the same period of the year 1982. It reached approximately 3.2 billion dirhams, after having been 4.3 billion dirhams.

An analytical report of the Economic Studies Department of the Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the studies which the Department of Customs prepared about Abu-Dhabi's external trade for the first third of the year 1983 revealed that in spite of the decline in the value of imports of machines and transportation equipment from what it was during the same period of the year 1982, they still occupy first place among imports since the value of what the Emirate imported reached around 1.8 billion dirhams. This figure represents about 57.9 percent of total imports.

Following in second place comes the import of the manufactured commodities with a total value of 649.4 million dirhams, or 20.6 percent of total imports.

As to the imports of equipment and miscellaneous instruments, it gave up its third place to the foods and livestock section, since the emirate's imports of the latter reached about 217.5 million dirhams, this figure making up 6.9 percent of total imports.

The gross weight of the imported commodities during the first third of the year 1983 was about 589,100 tons, in comparison with 762,400 tons during the same period of the year 1982.

By comparing the total value of the imports with the gross weight, the average value per ton amounts to 5.3 million dirhams, in comparison to 5.6 million dirhams as was the case during the same period of the analysis of last year. Therefore, the rate of decline is about 5.4 percent.

By dividing the import value among the exporting countries we find that Japan stays at the top of the list, in spite of the decline of the relative importance of its imports, from 17.9 percent to 14.7 percent. At the same time the United Kingdom gave up its second place, which it had occupied during the first 4 months of last year, to the United States of America as American exports to Abu Dhabi Emirate amounted to 459.6 million dirhams, this figure representing about 14.6 percent of the total value of imports. United Kingdom exports to the emirate amounted to about 400 million dirhams (12.7 percent), in comparison to 717.9 million dirhams (16.9 percent) during the same period of last year.

12527

CSO: 4404/543

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

### FORIEGN TRADE SHOWS SHARP DECLINE

Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 16 Jun 84 p 2

[Article: "89.5 Billion Dirham "Trade Movement Between Emirates, Other Countries During 1983"]

[Text] The movement of the commercial exchange between the Emirates and the world declined by 10 billion dirhams during the last year to 89.5 billion dirhams in comparison to 98.9 billion dirhams during the year 1982. That was due mainly to the decline in the value of the state's oil exports.

According to the figures, which the last report of the Central Bank issued on the state's balance of payments during the last year, the total exports and re-exports from the Emirates reached 56.5 billion dirhams, while the volume of the imports reached 33 billion dirhams during the past year. The year 1982 recorded imports of 34 billion dirhams and exports and re-exports of 66.9 billion dirhams.

The state's oil exports dropped from 53.1 billion dirhams in the year 1982 to 43 billion dirhams in 1982. Likewise, gas exports dropped from 5.5 to 5 billion dirhams. This happened as a result of the drop in the level of oil production on the one hand and the drop in its prices by \$5 per barrel on the other hand.

As for the gas whose exports dropped by 9 percent, that resulted from the decline of the amount of the associated gas which is produced with the oil from the different fields since these fields are still being affected by the decline of production averages as a result of abiding by the quota which was allocated by OPEC.

The non-oil exports and re-exports reached 9.5 billion dirhams in 1983 in comparison to 8.3 billion in 1982. On another level the Emirates' balance of payments figures showed that the total surplus in the balance dropped from 6 billion dirhams in 1982 to 550 million dirhams in 1983.

The negative balance of the services and exchange balance rose from 4.8 to 5.5 billion dirhams, while the official grants-in-aid dropped from 2.4 billion dirhams to 1.3 billion dirhams in 1983.

Likewise, the current accounts surplus dropped 35 percent to 16.7 billion dirhams in 1983 compared to 25.7 billion dirhams in 1982.

Government and private capital experienced a drop in the net capital flow abroad in comparison to the past years, since the net value of this article of the state balance of payments during the coming years [sentence incomplete]. This comes at a time of a proliferation of reports about the exports of the state through the emirates of Ra's al-Khaymah and al-Fujayrah and the exports of the Abu-Dhabi National Oil Company, especially the fertilizer factory "Fertile" in the industrial area at al-Ruways. This factory's reported production capacity will reach about 1,000 tons of ammonia or 1,500 tons of urea. It is worth noting that the production capacity of the Umm al-Nar refinery increased from 15,000 barrels to 60,000 barrels daily, so that the refining capacity of the state has become 180,000 barrels daily.

12527

CSO: 4404/543

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

YSP CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON FUTURE PLANS

GF281810 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 28 Sep 84

[Text of press statement issued on the conclusion of the meetings of the 13th session of the YSP Central Committee--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] The YSP Central Committee held its 13th ordinary session under the chairmanship of Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the YSP Central Committee, chairman of the Supreme People's Council Presidium, and chairman of the Council of Ministers, during the period from 25 to 28 September 1984. The committee discussed a number of issues and topics concerning the party's activities in different political, economic and social fields.

The economic situation occupied a distinct position in the meetings of this session. The Central Committee looked into the level of implementing the plan of the third year of the Second 5-Year Plan in 1983 and highly valued the positive results achieved in the course of executing the plan which materialized in the emergence of remarkable increase in the economic growth rates and in effecting additional boosts in the levels of income, investment and living standards of citizens. The committee noted that social production increased during 1983 as compared with 1982 at a growth rate equivalent to 8.2 percent, while national income increased by 8.3 percent as per fixed prices. The average per capita income increased at a rate of 5.5 percent.

In the course of its review of the situation in the Yemeni arena, the Central Committee highly valued the efforts made on the level of coordination and cooperation with the leadership of the northern part of the homeland on the path of achieving a unified democratic Yemen. The Central Committee valued the results of the second session of the joint ministerial committee of the two parts which convened in Aden, and reaffirmed the necessity of continuing the development and improvement of the methods of coordination and cooperation, and of adopting the necessary measures in order to implement resolutions and conclusions agreed upon during the different unification meetings and contacts in the direction of increasing the effectiveness of the joint economic activity, expanding trade between the two parts, removing obstacles that may hinder the accomplishment of the aforementioned, and bolstering political cooperation between the two leaderships toward various national and important pan-Arab issues.



The committee also discussed the situation in the Red Sea region in light of escalating imperialist military presence which constitutes a hostile expansion of the military bases and the naval fleets scattered in the Mediterranean, the Arabian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa, and which directly threatens the security and stability of the region and the interests of its entire nations. The Central Committee believes that the countries overlooking the Red Sea are the ones which are directly responsible for its security and safety, and that the presence of the imperialist military forces is the main source of the increasing tension in this sensitive region of the world. The committee stressed that our country will, in coordination with all the concerned parties of brothers and friends, contribute to any joint efforts aimed at deterring the hostile threats which endanger this region and security and stability in the Red Sea considering it to be an important maritime passage for world navigation.

Reviewing the efforts exerted by our country in order to preserve the integrity of the PLO, the Central Committee noted that confronting the submissive liquidation plans of the imperialist and Zionist powers requires additional persistent struggle in order to maintain the integrity of the PLO and bolster the struggle alliance between the Palestinian revolution on the one hand and Syria, the Lebanese National Movement, and all the Arab liberation movement factions on the other hand.

The Central Committee expressed satisfaction for the efforts exerted by our country during the past era with the aim of repairing the chasm and surpassing the state of division and disagreement in the Palestinian arena. It stressed the necessity of continuing the intensification of these efforts in order to overcome the obstacles which hinder the achievement of PLO's unity on the basis of its national theme which is opposed to imperialism and Zionism and which relies on the periodical political program and on the resolutions of PNC sessions.

CSO: 4400/6

## U.S. SAID TO BE 'HAPPY WITH STATUS QUO' IN AFGHANISTAN

East Burnham ARABIA, THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 37, Sep 84 p 17

[Text]

⊙ Apart from issuing regular statements in support of the Afghan Mujahideen, the US contribution towards solving the problem of Afghanistan has not been very impressive. It seems that the Reagan administration has accepted Afghanistan as an area of Soviet influence and has used the Russian presence there to justify US actions in Central America and Africa. The argument that the Russians have expansionist designs in South Asia and the Gulf has, however, not moved the Americans to provide assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen, unlike the anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua.

Rather, the continued presence of Soviet troops is being used as a propaganda tool to embarrass the Soviet Union in various international forums.

There are semi-official reports indicating that since 1980 the United States has been providing military aid worth \$30m a year to the Mujahideen through Pakistan. These reports have neither been denied by the Reagan administration nor confirmed by the Mujahideen. Interestingly, they appear in the press only when the Russians intensify their military operations inside Afghanistan, suggesting that the US has not written off Afghanistan completely.

The present American policy towards Afghanistan is similar to the policies pursued by successive US administrations since 1921, when an Afghan delegation's request for diplomatic ties with the US was rudely rejected by President Harding.

Behind this policy of indifference are American apprehensions about Afghan society. As early as 1933 some American businessmen were of the view that Afghanistan should be considered a

potential American market. But Wallace Murray, a Middle East expert in the State Department discouraged them, saying "Afghanistan is doubtless the most fanatic hostile country in the world. There is no pretence of according to Christians equal rights with Muslims."

Later, when John Foster Dulles organised the Baghdad Pact to contain the Soviet influence in Asia, Afghanistan was ignored completely. This American indifference was not due to some omission. In 1955, when asked to explain why the US was ignoring anti-Russian Afghans, an American official replied: "If the Afghans are already so anti-Russian we don't have to worry about them."

It cannot be assumed that the Americans were unaware of Soviet expansionist designs. Angus Ward, US ambassador in Kabul, warned in 1956 that the Soviet penetration and "economic aid in Afghanistan was laying a logistical infrastructure for a Soviet invasion."

Unlike Europe where, through the Marshall Plan, the US maintained a uniform policy towards various countries in the area, in South Asia it has pursued a biased policy, often playing one country off against another. This has resulted in the growth of mutual suspicion between the countries of the region. Relations between various South Asian countries have deteriorated to such an extent that even the crisis of Afghanistan has not brought them together to evolve a common strategy against the danger of Russian expansion. The argument that, together, India and Pakistan can pose a serious challenge to the Soviets has so far not convinced the Americans.

The US has toiled with the idea recently of creating a national government with the

approval of the Soviet Union. In 1982 some relatives and friends of ex-Afghan ruler Zahir Shah visited Moscow to discuss such a plan which was later postponed due to strong resistance by the Mujahideen. However the US has not given up the idea.

This means that the US is unwilling to provide assistance to Islamic groups to liberate their country. In the view of one Afghan Mujahid: "The US is happy with the status quo in Afghanistan because it is using the Russian presence for political propaganda, as was evident from the US decision to boycott the Moscow Olympics in 1980 and to grant the Russians in the same year large quantities of grain."

CSO: 4600/18

# REINSTATEMENT OF MONARCHY, SPLIT AMONG REBEL GROUPS DISCUSSED

East Burnham ARABIA, THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 37, Sep 84  
pp 37-38

## [Text]

Indirect talks between the usurper Karmal regime and representatives of General Zia of Pakistan are taking place in Geneva amid signs that a major split in the Mujahideen leadership is developing. If the split takes place, the political situation in Afghanistan could undergo a drastic change.

It seems that the Afghan royalists have succeeded in persuading secularists and traditionalists to set up an Afghan government-in-exile under ex-King Zahir Shah. This government is likely to be formed in September in Madinah after the Hajj by a grand assembly (Loya Jirga) of Afghan leaders and elders. The assembly is being called by Zahir Shah's representatives who have spent a considerable time in Peshawar convincing various Afghan tribal heads that the ex-King is the only Afghan leader who can achieve a quick solution of the Afghan problem.

The proposal for a government under Zahir Shah has not been received favourably by the Hizb-e-Islami and the Jamaat-i-Islami, the two major constituents of the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen. Zahir Shah is clearly unacceptable to the Mujahideen. The two parties have consistently opposed any restoration of the monarchy, arguing that it does not represent the real resistance forces inside Afghanistan. It is believed that Zahir Shah would be acceptable to both Moscow and Washington.

Moscow is said to have suffered a serious setback in its efforts to build a stable and loyal political party to institutionalise communist rule in Afghanistan. The ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan remains divided between the Khaliqis and Parchamis. Because of these

factional differences, Babrak Karmal has been unable to call a party congress, five years after coming to power. In the first and only national conference held in 1982 Karmal himself referred to "factionalism, anarchism, lack of discipline, localism and ethnicity in forming party cadre."

Moreover, widespread defections by Afghan government troops have put the burden of the fighting on Soviet forces. This is creating unrest within the Soviet army. With high Russian casualties the situation is worsening every day and the morale of the troops is said to be the lowest since Soviet occupation began in 1979.

There are indications that Constantin Chernenko might accept a nationalist government under Zahir Shah if the ex-King is willing to safeguard Russian interests in the country. It was Zahir Shah who, after succeeding his father in 1933, provided the Soviets with facilities for consolidating their position in Afghanistan. In August Pakistan ordered all Afghan Mujahideen groups to leave Peshawar because, according to officials their presence was giving half a million Pakistani inhabitants of the city "a feeling of uncertainty."

However, the question is why was this decision taken a couple of weeks before the Geneva talks? It may be argued that the Kremlin had warned Pakistan of possible Soviet and Babrak Karmal troop cross-border raids against Mujahideen on Pakistan territory if the Mujahideen were allowed to operate from Peshawar or nearby areas.

Zia's representatives want to go to Geneva in a conciliatory mood, seeking to give Moscow the impression that they are no longer keen in their support of the Mujahideen. In the past the Zia regime

has declared its support for the cause of Afghan Mujahideen. It will not be easy for it to give up its commitment. However, its decision to join the Geneva talks and to expel the Mujahideen from Peshawar suggest that Zia is changing tack.

These changes might be attributed to the failure of the regimes in the Muslim world and the West to identify with the jihad. There is no justification for this at a time when the jihad has entered its most crucial phase. The Russians are determined to isolate the Mujahideen from the Afghan people. If the Muslim world fails to identify with the Mujahideen at least verbally the jihad in Afghanistan will receive a serious setback.

Islamic groups in Pakistan have argued that Pakistan's participation at Geneva is futile because the Mujahideen have rejected such talks. They have also argued that any meeting convened in the absence of the leaders of the Afghan Mujahideen is meaningless. However Zia's regime has so far ignored these arguments.

The Islamic groups have failed to effectively oppose the expulsion of the Mujahideen from Peshawar. They have also failed to establish a network of popular bases in Pakistan for supporting the jihad. For this both the Mujahideen and the Pakistani Islamic groups will have to pay a heavy price in the near future.

CSO: 4600/19



## FOOD SHORTAGES REPORTEDLY HAMPER REBEL ATTACKS

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 3 Sep 84 p 21

[Article by Tom Henegan]

[Text]

FOOD shortages are now so common in parts of Afghanistan that some guerilla units have had to scale down attacks on Soviet troops for lack of rations, according to key resistance leaders here.

Peshawar-based guerilla groups have begun sending seeds into Afghanistan and urging their fighters and local farmers to tend the fields of peasants who have fled to Kabul or Pakistan, they told *Reuters*.

The shortages, caused by repeated Soviet bombings of irrigation canals and the burning of crops, are part of an overall strategy to destroy the village infrastructure which supports the rebels in their war against the communist government, they said.

"Mujahideen have had to pull back from some operations because of a lack of rations," said Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Jamiat-I-Islami Party fighting in the north.

He and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of the radical Islamic party Hezb-I-Islami, said food shortages had hampered their men in at least six provinces, mostly in southeastern Afghanistan.

Their warnings about hunger in these areas tallied with reports from Westerners coming out of Afghanistan who say food is in short supply even in some traditionally rich agricultural areas.

### Malnutrition

Hanneke Kouwenberg of the Dutch Support Committee for Afghanistan said she rarely got more than coarse flat bread and tea during her latest tour of central and northern Afghanistan. The hospitable Afghans usually give guests their best food.

The Panjsher Valley, a former Jamiat stronghold taken after a major Soviet offensive this spring, was the worst supplied, she said. "Some days we got only sugar and hot water."

Afghan Aid, a British volunteer group, warned last May that widespread famine could hit the country, especially the Panjsher Valley and the remote northeastern province of Badakhshan, because the five-year war had left many

farms untended, irrigation systems destroyed and cattle killed.

Food prices and transport costs had also risen, upsetting the usual pattern of food distribution, said a study funded by Britain's Overseas Development Administration.

"A high prevalence of malnutrition is common in some parts of Afghanistan and does necessarily indicate famine conditions," it said.

### Shortages

Rabbani said the current shortages, which began with a dry winter and were then worsened by the Soviet offensive this year, forced Jamiat to hastily arrange seed shipments for farmers in guerilla-held areas.

"We prefer very resistant crops, like potatoes, because they grow underground and can survive bombardments," he said. "We're also sending in seeds for very strong wheat that can grow in cold climates like in the mountains in northern Afghanistan."

While guerilla-held areas are suffering shortages, Kabul enjoys good supplies because the government is

paying higher prices to attract them, Hekmatyar said.

### Exodus

"They are trying to create such a gap between the city and the countryside that people will leave their villages to go to Kabul," he said. "That destroys our base of support and gives them more men to conscript into the army."

Western diplomats in Islamabad, who reported Soviet troops had stepped up efforts to destroy crops now that harvest time was approaching, said they heard from Kabul that bazaars there were well stocked with fruit, vegetables and meat.

But prices have been rising and a much-publicised government campaign begun earlier this summer to hold them down seems to have been quietly dropped.

Afghanistan's official news agency, *Bakhtar*, denied famine reports soon after the British study appeared, saying marketplaces were full of peas, beans and wheat. It did not say where the marketplaces were.

Rabbani and Hekmatyar said lack of rations had kept their guerillas from carrying out their

normal number of attacks in parts of Logar, Ghazni, Wardak and Zabul, all southeastern provinces hard hit by fighting and the exodus to Pakistan.

### Bleak picture

They also mentioned Ghor province in central Afghanistan and Herat in the west as areas suffering from food shortages.

Rabbani said Jam'at had approached international aid organisations, which normally help only the refugees in Pakistan, to ask them to begin shipping food and other aid into the country.

Two field commanders recently interviewed by *Reuters* reported serious food shortages in their areas. Taj Mohammad from Ghazni said harvests had been burned in three villages near Ghazni City, fields and orchards damaged in eight others and traditional underground irrigation canals known as karez blown up in three more.

Maulvi Shafiullah, commander in the Koh-I-Safi area just north-east of Kabul, painted an even bleaker picture. "There is no farming in my area, all the fields are barren." — Reuter

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN JANADAL REPORTED

Supreme Council Formed

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 6 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] The Supreme Council of Janadal has been formed as per draft constitution of the party pending nomination of the chairman, a Janadal Press release said in Dhaka on Wednesday night, reports BSS.

The members of the Supreme Council are Mr Ataur Rahman Khan, Prime Minister, Mr Shamsul Huda Chowdhury, Minister for Education, Mr Korban Ali, Minister for Jute and Textiles, Mr Reazuddin Ahmed, Minister of Ports and Shipping and IWT, Mr Abdul Halim Chowdhury, Minister for Agriculture, Mr Yousuf Ali, Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation, Mr Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, ex-Minister, Mr Shan Mozzam Hossain, Minister for Labour and Manpower and Babu Sunil Gupta, ex-Minister for State.

Mr Mahbubur Rahman, Minister for Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives has been made Member-Secretary of the council.

Central Executive Committee

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 6 Sep 84 pp 1, 14

[Text] The Central Executive Committee of Janadal has been formed as per draft constitution of the Party pending nomination of the chairman, a Press release of the Party said Wednesday night, reports BSS.

The members of the Central Executive Council are: Vice Chairmen Mr K.M. Aminul Islam, Dr Shafia Khatun, Mr M.A. Haque, Md Shamsul Haque, Mr Ali Amiad Khan and Hasimuddin Ahmed.

Secretary General Mr Mahbubur Rahman, Joint Secretaries General Mr Munsur Ali, Mr Shafiqul Gani Shawpan, Mr Abul Kalam, Mr Abdul Bari Warsi and Mr Mahbubul Haque Dulan.

Treasurer, M.A. Sattar, Joint Treasurers Md. Jahangir, Mr Abdus Sobhan and Mr S.B. Jaman.

Organising Secretaries--Mr Ruhul Amin Hawlader, Mr Ismail Hossain Bengal, Mr Naziur Rahman Manju, Mr Sheikh Shahidul Islam, Mr Fakhrul Islam, Mr Ali Tareque, Mr Najimuddin Al Ajad, Mr Khalequijjaman Chowdhury and Mr Shamsuj-jaman Mintu.

Joint Organising Secretaries--Mr Ibrahim Bin Khail, Mr Khaled Khurram, Mr S.M. Murshed, Mr M.R. Barua, Mr Janangir Kabir, Mr S.M.A. Khaleque, Mr S.I. Chowdhury and Mr Nurul Karim Khoman.

Secretary, information and research--Mr Shamim Al Mamun. Joint Secretaries, Information and Research--Mr Afazuddin Khan, Mr Palash Anwar Mati and Mr Taherul Islam Patwari.

Secretary, Publicity and Publication--Mr Nuruzzaman Munna. Joint Secretaries Publicity and Publication--Mr Ulfat Mana, Mr Rejaur Rahman Janu and Abdul Mannan.

Secretary, Agricultural Affairs--Mr Moinuddin Sarker, Joint Secretaries Affairs--Mr Abdul Baten Chowdhury, Mr Golam Mortuza and Mr Golam Sorwar. (Incomplete)

CSO: 4600/1015

ANTI-, PRO-MAHBADUR RAHMAN FACTIONS IN JANADAL

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 24 Aug 84 pp 1, 8

[Article by Kazi Montu]

[Text] Ministers belonging to the Janadal have been polarised between two groups---one supporting its secretary-general Mahbubur Rahman and the other desperately opposing his supremacy in the party.

Ports and Shipping Minister Reazuddin Ahmed Bhola Miah, Textile Minister Korban Ali, Agriculture Minister Capt (retd) Abdul Halim Chowdhury and Women Affairs Minister Shafia Khatun have formed an alliance with Mahbubur Rahman.

On the other hand, Labour and Manpower Minister Shah Moazzem Hossain who is a vice chairman of the party, Commerce Minister Dr Abdul Matin, Food Minister Air Vice-Marshal (retd) A.G. Mahmud, Water Resources Minister Air Vice Marshal (retd) Aminul Islam and Shafiqul Ghani Swapan, State Minister for Youth Affairs have combined together against Mahbubur Rahman.

According to a source, Mahbubur Rahman is also being backed by such powerful ministers as Establishment Minister Maj Gen Mahabbat Jan Choudhury and Health Minister Maj Gen Shamsul Huq. Besides, he is enjoying blessings of the backstage patrons of the party.

It is learnt that Shah Moazzem Hossain, Abdul Matin and A.G. Mahmud have incurred Mahbubur Rahman's wrath as they are considered potential contenders for the much-coveted position of the party's secretary-general while the holding of youth ministry by State Minister Shafiqul Ghani Swapan has stood in the way of the secretary general's scheme to bring the ministry under his control through one of his trusted lieutenants.

He considers the youth Ministry important as the responsibility of supervising the party's youth front has been vested with this ministry.



## Reorganisation

Meanwhile, Mahbubur Rahman has started reorganising the party with a view to consolidating his position. The district convening committees of the party are being replaced with full-fledged committees. In the new committees most of the key positions are going to his followers.

Consequently, discontent has arisen in the segment of the rank and file of the party. It exploded at Pabna when an attempt was made to reconstitute the Janadal committee of the district under supervision of Health Minister Maj Gen Shamsul Huq on August 21.

Two rival groups of the Pabna district Janadal clashed over control of the stage and in the melee five persons were injured.

One of the two conflicting groups is led by Mahatabuddin Ahmed who is organising secretary of central Janadal and joint convener of the Pabna Janadal convening committee while the other group is led by Golam Ali Quaderi, convener of the district committee of the party.

Mahatabuddin Ahmed enjoys blessing of Mahbubur Rahman as he was convener of the Pabna district 18-point implementation council which was organised by Mahbubur Rahman and Commerce Minister Dr Abdul Matin backs the group sheperded by Golam Ali Quaderi.

Health Minister Maj Gen Shamsul Huq who was chief guest at the workers' conference of Pabna district Janadal could not attend the conference due to outbreak of the clash between the two groups and had to cancel the programme of the conference from the circuit house where he was staying.

Party vice-chairman Mizanur Rahman Choudhury and Shamsul Huda Choudhury are maintaining low profile in the party, but they have developed a sort of understanding with Mahbubur Rahman who was at loggerheads with Mizanur Rahman Choudhury earlier because of his vocal protest against what was described as injustice done to him.

However, loud dissenting voice of Mizanur Rhaman Choudhury was silenced by "the high command" of the party. Under compelling circumstances Mizan Choudhury has bargained a compromise with Mahbubur Rahman.

## Supreme Council

Mahbubur Rahman has proposed to form the supreme council of the party which would be the second highest central body of the party according to its draft constitution. The highest body is national council.

The supreme council will consist of chairman, member-secretary and nine members. The secretary-general of the party will become its member-secretary by virtue of his position.

A list of the names for induction into the proposed supreme council was submitted to President Gen Ershad on August 19. It has not yet been approved by him, a highly-placed source says.

The list includes Prime Minister Ataur Rahman Khan, Textile Minister Korban Ali, Education Minister Shamsul Huda Choudhury, Ports and Shipping Minister Reazuddin Ahmed, Janadal vice chairman Mizanur Rahman Choudhury, Women Affairs Minister Safia Khatun, party leader Sunil Gupta and three other ministers who do not belong to the Janadal.

It is gathered that some in the party have become unhappy because of general's personal decision to observe "democracy day" on August 27 by passing the decision-making committees of the party.

A sizeable segment of the party has decided not to support 'democracy day.' The youth front of the party, Natun Bangla Jubo Sanghati, has not been active to campaign for the 'democracy day.'

In spite of opposition, Mahbubur Rahman has however, succeeded in expanding the organisational base of the party.

CSO: 4600/1006

MOSCOW REPORTEDLY KEEN FOR CLOSER TIES

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 24 Aug 84 pp 1, 8

[Article by Abul Mohsen]

[Text] Despite the expulsion of nine Soviet diplomats and five Soviet officials from Dhaka earlier this year which cooled off ties between the two countries, Moscow appears keen to restore closer economic and political ties with Bangladesh.

The visit of a Bangladesh trade delegation to Moscow for the signing of the annual trade protocol earlier this year was cancelled by the Soviet Union following the expulsion of the Soviet diplomats apparently to register its displeasure for the expulsion.

The recent signing of the annual barter trade protocol in Moscow for the calendar year 1984 under the provisions of the trade agreement between Bangladesh and the Soviet Union signed in March, 1972 clearly indicates such a move.

Last year's barter trade between the two countries envisaged exchange of goods worth £26 million each way but actually exports from Bangladesh totalled about £20 million while imports from the Soviet Union was about £19.5 million.

Exports to the Soviet Union included 42,000 tons of raw jute, 16 million metres of jute cloth (against projected 24 million metres), 5 million pieces of jute bags (against 15 million pieces agreed), about 1.1 million pieces of cow hides, about 2,500 tons of loose tea, some tobacco and handicrafts. Imports from the Soviet Union included, among others, 1,500 tons of raw cotton (as against agreed 12,000 tons), 54,000 tons of high speed diesel, spare parts for Radio Bangladesh and other machinery and equipments.

The Soviet Union is learnt to have agreed to speed up the export of raw cotton to Bangladesh during the current year and the Soviet side expressed its willingness to establish labour-intensive industrial units such as textiles with Soviet-made machineries and the guarantee to buy back such industrial products. They also suggested that raw cotton for the expanded textile industry would also be provided by them.

Additionally, the Soviets have indicated that they were considering signing of a long term trade agreement with Bangladesh which would be instrumental to expand power generation, increased construction of railway carriages establishment of a steel mills and other infrastructure development projects. However, no substantive discussions at any level between the two countries has taken place yet. Obviously, this development has to be based on political consideration and a decision to that effect has to be taken at the highest level.

However, an analyst suggested that without higher level political decision in Moscow, these indications would not have been conveyed to the Bangladesh government and any further development in this sector would perhaps depend on the reaction they receive from Bangladesh side.

Another important development in this year's agreement was that the rate of interest to be charged on outstanding amount in excess of £700,000 swing credit to be allowed to each other by the designated banks from the two countries, was raised from 2.5% to 4%. Since Bangladesh has always enjoyed trade surplus with the Soviet Union, it would be more advantageous for this country than the Soviet Union.

CSO: 4600/1006

DELEGATE TO PRC-BANGLADESH JOINT COMMISSION RETURNS

Remarks to News Agency

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 10 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] The first meeting of the Sino-Bangladesh Joint Economic Commission has expressed "optimism" of widening the coexisting bilateral economic, trade, scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries.

The principal Finance Secretary and Finance Adviser, Mr M. Syeduzzaman, who led the Bangladesh delegation at the just concluded meeting of the commission in Peking, said in Dhaka on Sunday that the two countries reached "understanding" on wide ranging issues to expand the bilateral relationship.

Talking to BSS, the Adviser described the meeting as "successful" and said the meeting held in a "frank and cordial" atmosphere reviewed the entire gamut of bilateral economic, trade, scientific and technical cooperation between the two friendly countries. The meeting ended with signing of agreed minutes, he said.

Besides reviewing the existing fields of cooperation, Mr Syeduzzaman said that the meeting identified new areas and projects for future cooperation. It also took note of the fact that the progress of the Chinese aided projects in Bangladesh was "satisfactory."

The Finance Adviser said the meeting discussed in detail the project and commodity loans, the status of trade agreement and the status of scientific, technical and shipping agreements.

He said that understanding was also reached between the two sides on taking up both big and small joint venture industrial projects and on strengthening the scientific and technical cooperation further and transfer of technology.

Mr Syeduzzaman said that the other important issues which came up for discussion were Buriganga River Bridge Project which would be cent per cent financed including the local cost through a state credit by the Chinese Government. An agreement on the project was expected to be signed by the end of the current financial year, he said.



The Adviser said that the meeting also discussed threadbare the new long-term trade agreement to be initialled by the two countries by the end of this year.

Mr Syeduzzaman said that besides exchange of views with the Chinese Minister for Foreign, Economic and Trade Relations, Madame Chen Mahua, led the Chinese side at the meeting, he also held talks with the Minister for Finance, Mr Wang Bing Oian, and the Vice Minister for Planning and Finance, Mr Wau Yi Lin.

The Adviser said that in course of his discussions, he informed the Chinese leaders about the recent economic changes and policy reforms taken up by Bangladesh Government and the preparation for the country's Third Five-Year Plan.

He said that the Chinese leaders said that the economic ties between the two countries would grow on the basis of "needs and ability" of the two sides.

Mr Syeduzzaman said that they also had exchange of views on cooperation among the developing countries on international economic issues in various forums.

The Finance Adviser observed that the growth in agriculture and industrial products in China during the last three years on the basis of new policies should be a source of "great inspiration" to many developing countries.

He said that the Chinese authorities had indicated that suppliers credit would be made available on the basis of capability and resources of Chinese enterprises.

In this connection, Mr Syeduzzaman said that Bangladesh visualises development of economic cooperation between the two countries on the basis of a pattern which would be a contribution of state credit, suppliers' credit, joint venture and technical assistance.

He said the Chinese side had also indicated to supply 20,000 tons of rice including 5,000 tons of food aid for the flood victims under credit and barter programmes. He said that China had also offered to export a reasonable quantity of rice to Bangladesh on commercial terms to be negotiated by the two governments.

NEW NATION Correspondent Reports

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Sep 84 pp 1, 8

[Article by Zahiduzzaman Farooq]

[Text] Successful economic reforms in China in recent days have opened up new doors of economic recoveries for developing nations like Bangladesh, according to some experts of an economic delegation that visited China recently.

The experts said the Chinese experiences of low cost technology may have a far reaching effect in creating economic infrastructure and enhancing uplift of the least developed countries.

While talking to this correspondent, Mr Syeduzzaman, Economic Adviser to the President who led the Bangladesh delegation to Peking at the first meeting of China-Bangladesh Joint economic Commission said his talks with Chinese leaders were fruitful.

Mr Syeduzzaman who met the key figures of the Chinese economy, made special reference to the light engineering equipments for agriculture and consumers goods production.

He said this technology would have positive effects in reducing production cost and increasing production at the same time. It should be applied in Bangladesh keeping in mind the political and other precondition in the country.

The Adviser said the Chinese were satisfied with the progress of Chinese-aided projects in Bangladesh. He, however, said that it was for our fault that the Rooppur water conservancy project was being delayed.

Mr Syeduzzaman said China has expressed its eagerness to participate in the international tender for collecting equipments for foreign aided projects in Bangladesh. He said China also assured us in installing hydro-electric power projects in Sylhet, Chittagong and Hill Tracts.

An agreement has been reached with China in imparting training to the railway personnel including the maintenance of workshop facilities.

He said the Chinese delegation will arrive soon to renew the five year trade accord between the two countries.

CSO: 4600/1015

REPORTAGE ON AWAMI LEAGUE WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING

Hasina's Speech Reported

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Sep 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] Diverse opinions on the burning political issues came from among the district leaders of Awami League who addressed the first-day session of the two-day attended meeting of the central working committee held yesterday at its central office with Sheikh Hasina Wazed in the chair.

The meeting is being considered as very important in the perspective of next course of joint movement and parliamentary election on December 8 to be held under this government.

The second-day session of the meeting scheduled for today is likely to take some significant decisions on the current political issues through discussions among the central and the district leaders of the party.

Addressing the yesterday's session of the meeting Awami League chief Sheikh Hasina Wazed underlined the need for building it as a more well-organised, disciplined and ideology-based political party in order to bring about an end to politics of killing and conspiracy formed from the soil of Bangladesh.

She said that the Awami League was involved in politics not for power, but to achieve total emancipation of the wretched people of Bangladesh. Our strength is people, not arms, she added.

She called for uniting people to restore their rights lost in 1975 after killing of the Bangabandhu by overthrowing the military government through movement.

The Awami League chief said we have to mould ourselves and move ahead on the basis of definite political, social, economic, cultural, education, labour and agricultural programmes. Otherwise the party would not be able to implement the ideals of the Bangabandhu for establishment of an exploitation free society, she added.

The meeting began with the speech of the party's acting General Secretary Sajeda Choudhury who reported party's organisational activities in her speech.

The meeting was addressed by the party's national committee members and presidents and secretaries of 20 district committees of the party.

In their speeches they focussed on the flood situation in their respective districts, organisational state and their views about democratic movement.

A resolution adopted in the meeting expressed concern at what it described as official silence on frequent attempts to smuggle arms into the country.

The resolution referred to the latest case in which a ship hired by two Bangladeshis reportedly carrying arms for Bangladesh was intercepted at an Italian airport by Italian Naval Intelligence service.

It said that in spite of demands by the patriotic and democratic forces including the Awami League, the 15-party and 7-party alliances and Chhatra Sangram Parishad, the Foreign Ministry had been maintaining meaningful silence.

It further said that by patronising "the well-identified killers" the government had been conspiring to disrupt the democratic movement in the future.

The meeting in another resolution expressed profound grief at the demise of some of the party's district and local leaders. The resolution condemned the government for its failure to save the flood victims who died in flood and due to post-flood epidemic diseases.

The meeting denounced killing of Pabna Jubo League leader Rafiqul Islam Tutul and demanded immediate identification of the culprits responsible for his killing and their exemplary punishment.

The first-day session of the meeting was adjourned at 9 p.m. and the second day session at the Dhanmondi residence of the Bangabandhu.

#### Resolutions Reported

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 13 Sep 84 pp 1, 12

[Text] The extended meeting of the Central Working Committee of the Bangladesh Awami League in a resolution adopted on Wednesday felt the need of a representative government to implement a long term plan to control flood. The meeting called upon the people to come forward to bring an end to the dictatorial regime to achieve this goal.

The two-day extended meeting of the party concluded on Wednesday. The meeting was held at the Dhanmondi residence of former President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and was presided over by party chief Sheikh Hasina. The meeting of the Central Working Committee of Awami League will be held at 9 a.m. today (Thursday) at the central office of the party, says a Press release.

The meeting in a resolution condemned the bomb explosion at the party public meeting at Baitul Mukarram on August 16 on the occasion of observance of mourning day. The resolution added that the identity of the person killed due to public beating after the explosion has not yet been disclosed by the Government. Terming this "significant," the resolution said that it means that the Government wants to bypass its responsibility and does not intend to check this type of terrorism.

The meeting expressed sympathy with the flood affected people and said that the relief measures taken by the Government is inadequate in comparison with the damage caused by the flood. The meeting criticised the distribution of relief through Janada. Tour of government leaders in the name of relief distribution is actually intended to organise Janadal, the resolution said.

The resolution alleged that the Government was silent about any long term comprehensive plan to check the recurrence of flood every year.

The meeting expressed concern over the killing of Jubo League leader Tutul at Pabna by the so called Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal supporters recently. The meeting on Wednesday was addressed, among others, by Presidium members Mr Abdul Malek Ukil, Syeda Zohra Tajuddin, Mr Abdus Samad Azad, Mr Abdul Mannan and Mr Zillur Rahman. Begum Sajeda Choudhury, Acting General Secretary of the party thanked the district leaders for their cooperation and advice. It may be mentioned that besides members of the central working committee, members of national committee presidents and general secretaries of district unit also attended the meeting.

CSO: 4600/1015



PRESS REPORTAGE ON GANGES WATER TALKS

Reply to India

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 24 Aug 84 p 1

[Article by Jehangir Hussain]

[Text] Bangladesh has sent its reply to the recent Indian letter on the river water issue. The content of the reply could not be known.

Bangladesh High Commissioner in New Delhi, A.K. Khandker, who was here last week, himself carried the reply. But officials here could not confirm whether the communication has been handed over to India.

The Indian communication which sought to further complicate the Ganges front, came in reply to the then Agriculture Minister Obaidullah Khan's letter to his Indian counterpart written in February last.

India kept mum for more than five months before sending its reply, possibly demonstrating that it is in no hurry to solve the Farakka problem.

The new trouble shooter of New Delhi on the Ganges front, Indian Irrigation Minister P.C. Sethi, has launched a fresh offensive to undermine the main issue--sharing the Ganges waters using the same old question of augmentation.

The main thrust of New Delhi's offensive is, as it has been, to make Bangladesh compensate for the so-called shortage in the Ganges created by India's Farakka Barrage.

Irrigation Minister Aminul Islam was not available for comments on the latest Indian offensive on the Ganges which sidetracks the main issue of sharing its waters on a permanent basis.

A three-member Bangladesh water-export team, now in the Indian capital to review the sharing of the Ganges waters during the last dry season, is also expected to pursue the issue of sharing on a long-term basis.

Official sources indicated that Bangladesh continues to uphold its position of sharing the river's waters on a long-term basis as Obaidullah Khan had proposed in his February letter.

Bangladesh, they indicated, remains opposed to inter-basin transfer of water.

On the Ganges negotiations, they said Bangladesh would not shift from its position.

#### Commission Report Finalized

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 26 Aug 84 p 1

[Text] The expert level Ganges sharing committee of Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission has finalised its report on sharing the river's waters during the last dry season which ended on May 31, at its meeting held in New Delhi, reports BSS.

The Bangladesh team leader at the meeting, Mr Amjad Hussain Khan, Member JRC on return to Dhaka told BSS on Monday that the teams of the two countries would submit the report to their respective government.

The sharing arrangement for two dry seasons made in October 1982 under the memorandum of understanding signed between Bangladesh and India expired on May 31.

Bangladesh has been pressing India for long for renewal of the agreement on a long term basis.

The three-member JRC Committee team which had left for the Indian capital on Wednesday last included Mr A.S.M. [line illegible] Abdul Khaleque, Executive Engineer JRC.

#### Bangladesh Seeks Renewal

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 31 Aug 84 pp 1, 10

[Text] Bangladesh has formally approached India for an immediate renewal of Ershad-Indira agreement on the sharing of the Ganges waters to cover the dry season beginning January 1985.

Disclosing this at an exclusive interview with the Bangladesh Observer at the Foreign Office on Thursday, Mr Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury, Foreign Affairs Adviser to the President, said that Bangladesh Government is continuing its efforts to find an immediate solution to the problem so that a vacuum is not created and Bangladesh's interest in this vitally important area is not adversely affected.

The arrangement for two seasons beginning January 1 to May 31 for the years 1985 and 1984 for sharing of the Ganges waters was reached during President Ershad's visit to India in 1982. The agreement has expired on May 31 this year.

On barbed wire fence the Foreign Affairs Adviser said that the issue would be an acid test of India's interest on maintenance of friendly and good-neighbourly relation with Bangladesh.

Mr Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury said that the concept of the barbed wire fence does not take into account the sensitivity of the people of Bangladesh.

Friendship between the two countries, Mr Chowdhury said, would have to take into account the sensitivities of the peoples of the two countries.

Mr Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury said "on the face of it I can see potentials for negotiated settlements of all problems between the two countries."

He said Bangladesh believes in solutions of problems through peaceful negotiations and is hopeful that India would reciprocate the feeling.

Mr Chowdhury said any unilateral construction on the zero line of the border is an infringement on the sovereignty of Bangladesh and an encroachment upon its territorial integrity. The construction within 150 yards of the border is clearly in violation of the Indo-Bangladesh border guidelines and therefore rejects the concept as it is not in conformity with the principles of good neighbourly relations.

The Foreign Affairs Adviser said Bangladesh is endeavouring to get this project abandoned and resolve the issue through mutual consultations.

On Iran's proposal for expulsion of Israel from the United Nations, Bangladesh would concert her efforts with like minded countries particularly the OIC members for the greater unity of Islamic Ummah, he said.

Asked what has been Bangladesh's stand on the OIC appeal for the condemnation of Afghanistan for bombing Pakistani territory, the Foreign Affairs Adviser evaded a direct reply and said Bangladesh had always reaffirmed her commitment to implement the relevant resolutions adopted by the OIC summits as well as the Foreign Minister's Conference on Afghanistan.

CSO: 4600/1006

BRIEFS

**RETURN FROM PRC**--The 5-member delegation led by Dr Shafia Khatun, Minister for Social Welfare and Women's Affairs, returned to Dhaka on Wednesday after a 15-day visit to China, reports BSS. Senior officials of her Ministry and representatives of various women's organisations received the team at the Zia airport. Dr Shafia Khatun said the visit was very fruitful and it would further strengthen the existing friendly relations between the two countries particularly, in the field of women's development. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 6 Sep 84 p 14]

**TRIBAL STUDENTS' APPEAL**--Dhaka based tribal students union has called upon the government to stop the settlement of outside people in the tribal zones of the Hill Tracts. In a statement issued in Dhaka the representative body of the tribal students said the existence of the tribal communities in the Hill Tracts was threatened due to massive influx of non-local settlers in hill tracts. They hoped the government would take new attitude towards the problem keeping in mind the human aspect of the problem. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Sep 84 p 1]

**BORDER THEFT REPORTED**--Maulvibazar, Aug 30--Eighteen buffaloes were lifted by the Indian nationals led by BSF personnel on August 25 while three cowboys were grazing them at Hacharkona Char which is well inside Bangladesh territory under Kulaura Upazila, reports BSS. The Indian nationals of village Kalipur under Kailashahar of north Tripura backed by BSF personnel of Ranguti camp entered Bangladesh territory and on their way back lifted the buffaloes to India. The B.D.R. authorities have already taken up the matter with their Indian counterpart but till now the matter appeared without any result. The buffaloes belonged to Jitendra Malakar (3), Kari Abdul Mannan, Md Wahabullah, Mokbul Ali and Mowla Miah, two each and Ananta Malakar, Monoranjan Malakar and Surendra one each. They all hail from Monohor Gona village. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 31 Aug 84 p 1]

**NEW FINNISH AMBASSADOR**--Mr Jan Henrick Groop has been appointed Ambassador for the Republic of Finland to Bangladesh with residence in New Delhi, a Foreign Office announcement said, reports BSS. Born on February 26, 1934, Mr Groop graduated in Law in 1980. A career diplomat, Mr Groop joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1962. He served Finnish embassies in Geneva, Brussels and Stockholm before he became Ambassador in Baghdad in 1978. Mr Groop is married and has two daughters. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 31 Aug 84 p 10]

PRIME MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON VARIOUS ISSUES

Part I

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Sep 84 pp 1, 22-23

[Interview with Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi by KEYHAN during the period 8-14 Sep; place not specified]

[Text] Last week, after a long time, we had an opportunity to meet with and interview the prime minister.

In this meeting, which lasted about three hours, an effort was made to hold a conversation devoid of slogans and generalities, to discuss the realities, and rather than involving ourselves in secondary, superficial issues and problems, to get at the roots of issues, because there have been shortcomings in finding the roots of the existing problems and deficiencies. Unfortunately, in interviews with the authorities, no attention is paid to this important issue; there have been only generalities. As our beloved imam has emphasized frequently, we must force ourselves to admit that the people are able to understand, to fight, and to withstand hardships. Therefore, we must trust in this great power and discuss the issues with them. Certainly, this method will result in the cooperation, participation, and unlimited self-sacrifice of the Hezbollah nation.

The people have thus far shown that they recognize the difficult, winding road of the revolution and can withstand hardships. Therefore, we must follow the directives of the imam to the letter and greatly value this great



blessing of the revolution. In this connection, since we consider the press as having a vital and effective role, and conscious that the press does not in its present situation quench the thirst and wishes of the people to know more and become aware of the problems, and noting that the purpose of the domestic press is criticism and proper investigative treatment of various issues, observing the necessary piety--even though in this connection, some have not realized this grave responsibility of the press or forget and speak against this necessary and essential role in various assemblies and lectures and try to stop its formation in newspapers--with a sense of commitment to the Islamic revolution and the Hezbollah nation, we began our conversation concerning the shortcomings of and self-censorship and criticism in the press. We complained about the lack of active, revolutionary behavior on the part of some of the ministers and other authorities in their dealings with the press. We said: There is a lack of dynamism in public relations; in fact, these offices have become great obstacles for the press; the authorities have in fact disrupted the organic relationship between the people and the officials. The result of this meeting, which follows, is a discussion of the actual role and practical presence of the people on the scene of the revolution, the shortcomings with regard to radio and television, governmental problems, the legal vacuum, economic problems, the expanse of the interests of the revolution, and the absence of students and academicians on the political and economic scene.

This interview may not respond to all the questions, ambiguities, and problems existing in our revolutionary society. Various strata of readers may expect the newspaper to raise the questions which address their problems. We are aware of this and believe that the mission of the press and other mass media at this juncture of the revolution is to provide the necessary grounds for the exchange of views and ideas, to find the roots of problems, to avoid slogans and generalizations, and to expose deviant events and policies. Hence, we held our interview on this basis. In conclusion, in

addition to thanking Engineer Musavi for devoting hours of his time to us, helping the newspaper to achieve its mission through his valuable statements, we hope that in other meetings, this conversation will continue along the same lines.

We began our interview with Engineer Musavi by raising the question of criticism and said: Criticism is an important element in reform. While expressing the pains, problems, and shortcomings, it prevents deviations and stops the creation of complexes and statements remaining unsaid. In your opinion, what is the role and duty of the press in this regard and, considering that you were active for some time in the press, what are the problems of the Iranian press at the present time?

The prime minister responded: Firstly, the criticism of the work carried out by the executive system will result in the strengthening of that system. Lack of criticism, on the other hand, will result in the destruction of the executive branch. I think this is peculiar to the executive branch. That is, if this branch is not a target of criticism, it will move towards autocracy; it will lack the correct evaluation of the realities and will be subject to weakness and failure in this area. Hence, criticism, which must exist in our regime, must be offered with compassion rather than malice or for political purposes. Thank God, we have very little deviation in our regime. One of the destructive factors to our regime is to be subject to political considerations which are beyond the general interests of the people. The more the press speaks for the people and the in the public interest, the stronger and more exalted their position will become and the more effective and beneficial for the government and the authorities their criticism will become. Another point is that I believe the newspapers are institutions which can prevent the growth of corruption. We expect the press to be /biting, harsh, and strong in regards to corruption wherever it exists; otherwise, we will face a situation once again in which the seed of corruption will grow and threaten to poison the revolution/ [in boldface].

In connection with the problems of the newspapers, I think one of them is the officials' lack of understanding of and familiarity with the role and importance of the press in transmitting the facts as well as criticising the existing situation. Few of them sense this important issue. The stronger this understanding of the importance of the press on the part of the authorities, the bolder and stronger our newspapers will become. I think a more favorable situation will be created in the courts. /I believe that if the officials follow the just path, they should have no fear of the criticism of the newspapers. If there is criticism, the officials may try to respond correctly. This will result in

the growth and awareness of the people, and this growth and awareness is the greatest investment for our regime/ [in boldface]. Although at the present time the newspapers suffer a degree of self-censorship, what has been noteworthy in the evening newspapers recently has been the comprehensive reports investigating and analyzing all aspects of an issue. These reports can be very informative for the people, particularly for the officials. In my view, these reports could be shorter and more concise, quickly analyzing several issues and offering solutions; as such, they would inform the people on issues in a shorter space. Perhaps one of the best activities now started in the newspapers is that, due to the shortage of space, we do not spend too much time on an issue, in order to inform the people and alert the authorities on several essential issues on one day. This, of course, depends largely on the ability and tolerance of the officials. Then the society will feel that objections and criticism are normal and an official is responsible for listening to these criticisms and mending his ways.

[Question] You pointed out the self-censorship of the press. Of course, some of it might be in order to protect the interests of the revolution, which a writer or reporter takes into consideration. However, in your opinion, what are the causes and roots of self-censorship, which unfortunately strongly governs the press and other mass media without having any definite boundaries?

[Answer] I believe that all the newspapers and the people place importance on the interests of the revolution. However, the problem is that the extent of these interests is not clear to the reporters. Of course, determining the limits can be contemplated, analyzed, and criticized in terms of not providing information to the enemies. The lack of clarity of these limits sometimes results in dulling the sharpness of a critique or report and sometimes (of course less often), when such criticism goes beyond the usual limits, it may result in weakening the government. (Of course, what is meant by the government is not the 23 ministers, but the goals of the executive system belonging to the Islamic revolution.)

In the Majlis discussions regarding national issues, a standard is gradually reached, through extremist and moderate tendencies, which determines the just statement which must be made and not hidden. In my opinion, the reporters, with their strong sensibilities, can understand this in connection with the Majlis and the government. Another point that can help in this issue is to strengthen the relationship between the media and the officials.

If there were certain meetings and seminars with the officials and the newspapers, this

issue could be examined in such sessions and these limits would be clarified to some extent.

#### Importance of Working on Public Relations

[Question] You pointed out tolerance of criticism and also establishing a relationship. In our opinion, the officials in the executive branch must take the first step in this regard on various levels. For instance, while the members of the Cabinet were being given a vote of confidence in the Majlis, despite the clear direction of KEYHAN based on the directives of the imam of the nation, we faced some strong objections by some of the brother ministers as to why some of the criticism made in the Majlis was headlined in the newspaper. Considering the points that you have made now and in the past in regards to the necessity of criticism and tolerating it, such reactions, particularly by some of the members of the Cabinet, were quite surprising to us.

[Answer] I think since the revolution, in all the executive centers of the country, little importance has been given to the issue of public relations, propaganda, and providing information.

This is the very thing that, as the imam said, may be interpreted even as religious pretensions and impotence. What is meant is the inability to communicate something which has been accomplished. Much is being done and we have not yet found a way to report it to the people. This is very important for the stability of the revolution. If we could achieve this communication, the problems in accepting criticism would be much simpler. I have always felt that a minister or an official on other levels suffers from a feeling of oppression when he accomplishes much and no one takes notice and only a part of his work is placed under scrutiny. In this case, unfortunately, it is not noticed that this problem is not the fault of the reporter who has not seen the whole but only a part. But the officials themselves are also guilty, because they are not sensitive enough in regards to such issues. In other words, a part of the duties of a ministry must consist of propaganda. However, as you pointed out in the introduction, our public relations are weak in establishing relations and providing responses. Hence, when a minister sees that there has been a weakness in his executive organization which has occurred because of needs, ties, constraints, or weaknesses and he is criticized for it, he feels that there is a conspiracy against him, excessive pressure has been placed on him or he has been wronged. We must resolve the problem bilaterally, the newspapers and the officials together. Another point is that when an important issue is singled out, it creates a disruption in the continuation of other works.



## The Role of Television in the Country

[Question] In connection with radio and television, among the people today, it is considered a government organization which does not actively engage in transmitting the problems and difficulties of the society, mostly acting in one direction from the officials to the people, and whose news and reports are generally second hand. It has often been observed that a report broadcast by foreign radios opposing the Islamic revolution of Iran goes out over the radio or television or even by the press of our country. While causing distrust of the domestic mass media among the people, this issue has compromised the reputation of the Islamic revolution. It is unfortunate that the people hear some of the news of their own country with distorted by the foreigners. Also, thus far, television has not clarified its direction in the broadcast of entertainment and artistic programs. The present lack of programs can cause the appearance of cultural and social deviations, promoting and establishing the standards and values of foreign cultures.

[Answer] The issue you mention has several dimensions. It was stated that the Voice and Vision is a government organization. If we take government in its broad sense, which concerns all the forces in the country, that is true. But if we take government in its common sense, whose news and positions are presented, I do not agree. In this connection, we consider the government to be oppressed in comparison with other governments of the world; it is not true that the official policies are dictated to the Voice and Vision. Of course, the Constitution has anticipated certain interests. For instance, we have official athletic policies in the country and the policies that are broadcast through radio and television are included among them. /But, as the prime minister, I announce that I do not, by any means, agree with the programs that I see on radio and television. They do not reflect the official policy of the government and are destructive. But in regards to some other issues, such a situation exists. In my opinion, the Voice and Vision tries to move in a direction to strengthen the government. We thank the brothers in the Voice and Vision for this. But it is not arranged that all the official government policies are paid attention to/ [in boldface], such as higher education, education, sports, and foreign and domestic policies. This is the situation with the Voice and Vision. I believe that the Voice and Vision (besides the criticism which was just made and partly due to the nature of the Voice and Vision in the regime of the Islamic Republic and must be resolved somehow) is making strides that may be exemplary in the whole Third World. /For instance, the economic vision which is produced for television is a sharp program; its producers do not compromise; while there is deep compassion for the regime and the government in this program, which we appreciate, this interest and comparison has not caused them to



ignore an in-depth look at the details/ [in boldface]. We must encourage them to expand such programs. In other words, in-depth and overall looks at the issues and reporting and explaining them must increase. If we are able and have the opportunity to learn the art of explaining well, the fear of telling the people about the issues will be eliminated. Since the regime is of the people, we have no fear of the people. When in domestic and foreign policy everything is told to the people and the faults and deficiencies are expressed, the people will demonstrate support. This is the method that the imam has in explaining the issues. The imam said: People, you made a revolution, and a revolution is accomplished with problems and hardships. You must resist. Some say we made a revolution and there are no calamities or hardships. This kind of keeping the people uninformed shows distrust of the people, whereas the imam has established a basis of trust in the people. The newspapers can also follow this policy. The Voice and Vision will be successful in those programs in which it places trust in the people. In regards to programs which can have great cultural influence on the society, television faces some problems, the most important of which is insufficient domestic production. In domestically produced programs, the values of the Islamic revolution can be observed, whereas imported programs bring with them the values of other regimes and are destructive to some extent. Of course, some of the scientific programs (of course, I watch little television; if there is an opportunity in the evening, I watch television), which appear to be scientific, in reality propagate Japan or some Western country. My general feeling is that they even publicize Japanese products or Japanese culture within the framework of the programs; even though on the surface they are scientific films. Moral values can be found less often in scientific subjects. It is only a sort of understanding which is common to human beings and can be exchanged among various cultures without bringing along corruption. But this is just the surface of the issue. Cultural and artistic issues can be and are employed in a much more subtle way in these films. When the great, heavy, polished machines of Japanese or German factories are seen, a feeling of reverence or awe is created in the minds of the people towards those civilizations. Or, in regards to entertainment programs and films about which we have some problems, generally, these films speak from within a particular civilization and transmit their concerns to the people, and a country somehow transfers its culture and customs to others. Recently, I saw a film from China about the agricultural situation. While this film was entertaining, it had a message. Of course, the message of a film may be beneficial or harmful. But, in any case, we must realize that the film has a message. In this film, a military commander, who in their view is an ideological man and intends to develop an uncultivated farm, chooses an expert as his assistant. The whole film centers around the interaction between these two, in other words,

expertise, ideology and commitment. Finally, we see that the ideological individual keeps the expert and they come to an agreement. In any case, what is important is the message of the film. In that film, there are perhaps 10 to 15 different issues for which solutions have also been offered. Nevertheless, these solutions influence the public mind. /I do not know whether or not the Voice and Vision does anything in connection with Western or Eastern films, but, of course, the Western films are more mischievous and surreptitious. Our solution in this regard is to encourage domestic production. In my opinion, the newspapers, with their praise and criticism, can prevent the growth of "weeds" and bring more attention to the pictorial arts and their growth so that we will be rid of the evils of this dependency as soon as possible/ [in boldface], because dependence in cultural and artistic areas is more deadly than dependence in industrial and economic areas.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, the point in question and which you referred to was the need to report the problems and difficulties of the people. The criticism we think exists in regards to your government involves a lack of proper treatment of the people on the part of government and other authorities. Why do you not discuss with the people the problems, obstacles, and complications, and the hard, rough road of the revolution--which is natural--as you should? Certainly, if the people are informed of the problems and obstacles, not only will they not allow themselves to be afraid, but they will cooperate more than ever before. This issue is so important that the imam frequently refers to it in his speeches; it is, in fact, one of the ways to continue the presence of the people on the scene.

[Answer] In regards to explaining the issues, as I pointed out in the beginning, the government is weak and in this area, the ability to explain the issues and problems to the people must be created. But this issue aside, there are issues that cannot be discussed due to the war situation. For instance, in the Friday prayer in Qom (two weeks ago), I cited an example of these problems. But realized both that it was difficult for me to do so and that I must censor parts of it. Also there was little time. About a year and a half ago, when we had the problem of wheat and bread, how could we tell the people how severe our hardship was, that we had swept the silos clean, that we had transportation problems, or that no correct planning had been done in regards to the purchase of wheat? If we had explained these problems to the people at that time, in my opinion, those problems would have increased. Hence, at that time, we suffered in silence and engaged in complicated, extensive measures to improve our situation, and we increased our supplies in a manner unprecedented in the last 50 years. Now that this problem has been resolved, we are able to tell the people about it, whereas, at that time, it would have resulted in public fear.

Of course, in informing the people of the problems, there are always political considerations. That is, the government does not want to create a chaotic situation in the society, because some of the problems can be resolved in the long run. For instance, on various levels in the country, there is interference in the affairs of the government. Dealing with such interference can be interpreted as another government having been created within the government, that is, the same reaction that the transitional government displayed in connection with the revolutionary institutions and the clergy. On the other hand, such interference can be considered as stemming from the nature of the revolution. That is, certain new institutions have appeared as a result of the revolution which consider themselves to have certain authority and rights, and, thinking that under such conditions, an official institution is not carrying out its duties as it should, they subsequently interfere. We consider it this kind of problem and are sure that with the passage of time, by speaking, acting, and the establishment of proper institutions, the problem will be resolved, whereas, speaking out earlier and discussing the problem would complicate the matter and delay the resolution of the problem. Of course, sometimes it is not proper for the government to speak of problems. For instance, in one of the recent speeches of the imam, it was pointed out that the Friday imams should not weaken the governors general. This should have been said by the imam, because the government makes use of the great power of the Friday imams to manage the country and if such interference occurs in a few cities and is mentioned by the government, it can inflict great harm on the use of the great power of the Friday imams by the government and, God forbid, create disunity. But, when the problem is stated by the imam, it immediately has a decisive effect. In any case, I think some of the problems that were pointed out in your question will be resolved with the passage of time and the increasing strength of the government in explaining its accomplishments. We must learn how to explain the problems to the people, not to be afraid of speaking about them, and consider the people with more respect. This fear may create self-censorship among the authorities and even the newspapers, who usually underestimate the power of the people to solve the problems. However, the imam has shown us that he greatly trusts the people to resolve the issues. If we pay close attention, there has been a deep belief on the part of the imam in the movement and role of the people since before the revolution. For instance, everyone thought 8 September would be a day for retreat, but, on the contrary, the imam made use of this incident to overthrow the shah. Of course, the people had also responded well to this trust of the imam. Hence, the government officials must learn a lesson in this case.



## Explaining the Problems to the People

[Question] When we invite the people to cooperate and ask for their support, we must consequently provide the necessary information concerning various issues, including procedural affairs and the goals and the obstacles of those who are in the opposition, in order to attain the practical cooperation of the people in addition to their support. Otherwise, making use of the revolutionary zeal and excitement of the people without offering information can have bad consequences in the long run and result in a lack of the presence of the people on the scene. For instance, we can explain the existing economic situation and the existing shortcomings, obstacles, solutions, and policies and define the boundaries of the people's cooperation in order to expedite the attainment of the goals and expose and eject the deviant movements with the help of the people.

[Answer] In these areas, at the present time, explanations are provided to the people as much as possible. Of course, there may be issues that have not been explained. For instance, the government has always existed in a legislative void (which I have mentioned since about two years ago). Neither this nor any other government can deal powerfully and decisively with problems and issues in such a void. The examples that I have provided thus far consist of five fundamental issues. If the existing legislative void is eliminated in the area of these issues, we will be able to move more rapidly. They are foreign trade; land; taxes; the issue of the private sector, for which a bill was presented two years ago to the Majlis and remains stagnant; and the issue of the law of the councils, which, I believe, could be very helpful in solving our problems, such as distribution and order in the cities and villages, if it were resolved rapidly. These are fundamental laws which the government needs to have at its disposal, and without which certain practical problems would arise. In such a case, the explanation of the long term goals would also be difficult for the government.

There is some doubt as to whether what we say about foreign trade will be the same thing that the Majlis will ratify or whether it will be considered by the Council of Guardians as conforming to the religious laws and the Constitution. Another example is Article 49, which is one of the important articles of the Constitution. When this Article was discussed in the Assembly of Experts, I remember that much excitement was created among the people. Despite the existing difficulties, the government devised a bill for its implementation in the course of two years.

Of course, during the time of martyr Bahonar, the Majlis had instructed the government to devise this bill. (My purpose in relating its history is to facilitate an understanding of our problem.) This issue, which also has a judicial aspect, was

referred to the Judicial Council at the time by martyr Bahonar. When the new government began its work, we contacted the Judicial Council and realized that for some reason, the brothers had not worked on it and the deadline was extended another three months. After this period, again nothing was done. Of course, they had certain reasons in this regard. Then the brother ministers made an effort to devise the bill in the government and a bill was offered, which, on examining its various aspects, we thought would have no problems in terms of the Constitution and religious laws. Discussions on this bill took some time in the Majlis and the Council of Guardians found several problems. In other words, this law had been held up for more than two years. This is one of the problems of the government. The people expect explanations, because they consider it the fault of the government. Ordinarily, the boundaries and differences between the Cabinet and the executive branch, and the duties of the Majlis and the legislative branch, must be explained to the people. I think the newspapers can play a beneficial role in explaining this issue.

I do not want to point out the reasons for the delay in Article 49 and why such a delay has been created, or on what grounds, because this issue is in the hands of the Majlis and the Council of Guardians. However, my purpose is to clarify the problem which this legislative void creates in terms of the expectations of the people. Naturally, it places pressure on the government. In regards to economic issues, we also have a similar situation. We can raise the issue of the policy of defending the oppressed and downtrodden people by following the imam's instructions and we stand in its defense. But helping the oppressed and the downtrodden requires the cooperation of the Majlis and the thinkers. It is not within our authority to change policy. But the government has displayed its desire and strong determination to help the oppressed and deprived people by following the imam. In regards to the activities of the private sector, based on the interests of the revolution, we have thought that the existing capital in this sector must be employed in some manner in production in order to provide the grounds for the blossoming of extensive, unlimited talents in the society. Hence, we pursued this issue; but the boundaries and where we should stop have not yet been delineated for us.

[Question] What is your opinion in this regard?

[Answer] Of course, if you want my personal views in this regard, I might have certain views, but if these views are to become laws, they must pass through special channels and other organizations must give their final opinions.

This is one of the problems of the government. In regards to economic problems, we cannot speak about the details, but we can



say, for instance, that in regards to rice, the government believed that by rationing (in emergency situations) it could very easily put such a commodity at the disposal of the people, along with a few other essential items. But there are other views as well: that imported rice must be distributed or rationed by the government, and that in order to encourage production and put the forces of the people to use, domestic rice must be part of a free market. The government (since we do not have a dictatorship in the country) is obliged to take into consideration various views. If the clerics in the north do not agree on the issue, no matter how much we insist, even if we are right, it will not be carried out. In examining other views, first of all, those of the president and the Majlis are at issue as revolutionary institutions, and the views of each play an essential role. Or, for instance, if there is a proposal with which the judicial branch disagrees, certainly this causes problems in our work. Therefore, we see that all the points referred to restrict the area of government activity even more. Contrary to popular thought, the government cannot do everything; it simply cannot. The government is able to work within the course of realities; if it does not take into consideration some of the conditions for every decision maker, this will certainly harm the regime and itself. A proposal can be implemented in the country when it is supported by the people, the leader, and the revolutionary figures of the country. If a decision is made and it does not follow this course, it will certainly fail. In fact, while this issue is one of the main differences between the regime of the Islamic Republic and other existing regimes, it is a blessing from within which carries with it certain burdens for the government, and it may hold certain disadvantages. But, on the whole, it is a good distinction. For instance, in regards to rice, perhaps our views do not agree very much with the new proposal. But we cannot face the realities inflexibly, because of the ill will it will cause. Naturally, the government values the views of the revolutionary figures, the people, and the clerics under such circumstances. Now, out of several programs, two may have ill effects, but I believe that most decisions made in this way and which follow this course are in the interests of the country.

[Question] Please explain the blessing to which you refer in this connection.

[Answer] Sometimes structural decisions are made and the structure has been legitimized due to its legislative situation. In the Islamic Republic, the government can be considered mostly as a high organizational body whose decisions and measures require numerous forms of consent in the society, including the counsel of the people, the clerics and revolutionary figures, and the institutions. This characteristic guarantees the increasing presence of the people on the scene. Of course, it slows down

the work; but we see that despite the passage of six years since the victory of the revolution, we have assemblies of several million people, or during the mobilization of the forces for the war, the people set out for the fronts in large numbers, and it is due to this very situation. This is the blessing referred to. The opposite of this would be that the government would remove itself from the existing situation and assume a decisive posture, but the decisions would have no ties to the normal, legitimate channels. In this manner, the government would be distanced from the power-giving elements. I believe that in the regime of the Islamic Republic, the work of the government is more difficult than in other regimes.

#### The Presence of the People on the Scene

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, you pointed out the presence of the people on the scene. We have noticed the participation of the people on the scene on a large scale, which has, in fact, been one of the elements in our victory, and participation in political-worship assemblies is part of the presence of the people on the scene. In regards to the participation and cooperation of the people and employees on other economic, cultural, and social scenes, this force to eliminate the remaining signs of the past and replace them with a system stemming from Islam, are there any definite analyses or evaluations or does the presence of the people on the scene mean only their participation in the demonstrations and Friday prayers?

[Answer] This issue has broad implications. First of all, the repetition of this issue is meant as a reminder. In regards to the participation of the people, I will give you an example. Last year, we were visiting one of the very oppressed, ghetto-like villages of Boyer Ahmad. When we sat as guests in one of the huts with all the inhabitants, it was decided that one of the rural brothers should tell us all their shortages, problems, and needs. He said: "You might expect us to talk about our problems and needs, but we will not do so, because we know that the government is involved in the war and other problems. We must tolerate the difficulties and make self-sacrifices in order to be victorious in the war." I see this phenomenon as a sign of the true, practical presence of the people on the scene. In my opinion, at the present time, the participation of the people on the scene is so expansive that we have become accustomed to it, like we have air. If this expansive presence did not exist, we would suffer calamities in all areas. We might not have told the people thus far about the drought this year in order to prevent an increase in prices and its side effects, but we have had a drought in 11 provinces, in the farthest provinces, such as Bushehr and Khorasan. In five of the provinces, where the problem has been most critical, the government has created

headquarters to deal with the subsequent problems and to provide aid. When we examine the activities which began in late winter of last year, we realize the role of the people in resolving this issue and would not consider success to be only the result of the government efforts. Had the government not provided the necessary resources with the help of the people to fight the effects of the drought, we would have faced a vast migration, which we have succeeded to resolve through the faith and interest of the people and their presence on the scene, thereby preventing a national tragedy and disaster.

Another point is that the views and opinions of the people at the present are very important in protecting various policies and the regime. The Majlis and the authorities are under the influence of the people and the people believe that public opinion is effective in determining the fate of the revolution. Hence, we see that in speeches and other propaganda, primary use is made of this lever to preserve the revolution. The imam emphasizes this issue as our sharpest weapon. In other words, if the people withstand the hardships, the revolution will continue. In the practical sense as well, when we sometimes have an emergency, as we saw last year when we faced the problem of the transport of goods from the ports, with a little hint by the imam as to the problem, the problem is reduced in this area.

[Question] A part of the presence of the people on the scene is as you said, in other words, the people accepting the decisions and programs of the authorities and supporting them. Another part of the presence of the people on the scene, which can distinguish the regime of the Islamic Republic from other regimes in the world, is that the people can also participate in decision making, which relates to the administrative and bureaucratic system of the country. Are decisions made through definite government administrative channels and meant to be accepted by the people or are the people given the status and responsibility to make decisions and impose such decisions as well? Obviously, the government acts in accordance with the opinion of the people, but the important part of the presence of the people on the scene is the case in point.

[Answer] To do so, various mechanisms must be proposed. The most essential mechanism, according to which we can see whether such a thing is done in a regime or not, is the Constitution and the legal institutions. Are the organization, form, and classification of these institutions made in such a way that the views and ideas of the people are taken into consideration or not? In this area, we face different mechanisms and government systems. One form is Eastern, in which such a thing does not exist at all. In the Western kind as well, it is a sort of deception of the people in the form of such acts as participating in the presidential and parliamentary elections. Now appearing

on most American magazines is a huge picture of Reagan and his wife on television, raising his hand to the people. This picture leaves a great pictorial effect on the minds of the American people. But when we speak of the presence of the people on the scene here, we must see whether or not the people are on the scene in the most essential spots. Our government method is that in addition to public opinion (which is considered more than in other countries of the world), this is the case with regard to other legal institutions, such as the Majlis, and most importantly, this exists in the leader. The reason for the power of the leadership in our regime is that a decisive majority of the people emulate the leader, and this emulation is not artificial. In other words, the people are not told that they should emulate a leader, but with the people's emulation, that person becomes the leader. When the principle of theological guardianship was being discussed in the Assembly of Experts, we said that this principle will guarantee the presence of the people on the scene, because of the relationship between the leader and the people as emulators. An emulator has a characteristic which does not exist in any other regime, because the leader can keep the people on the scene permanently by his deep ties and can be in touch with the people. When we take the whole thing into consideration, I believe that in the Islamic Republic, the people are on the scene with true power and in an unequalled form. One of the reasons behind our survival is this very thing. It is because of this mechanism that the revolution has been able to withstand conspiracies and even neutralize them.

#### It Is Because of the Support of the People

It is not only support, but this support has found a practical way to appear. For example, the same spot where there was an explosion 20 meters from where we are, and in one moment the president and the prime minister of the country were martyred and eliminated, besides the fact that the people marched that day and it had an effect, free of these things, with this mechanism which has been anticipated (whether there is or there is not a president or a Majlis or the like), immediately the regime was able to repair this wound. Whereas, if the regime did not rely on the people, this wound would not have been repairable, or it would have had to side with a power such as the Soviet Union or the United States in order for its wound to be healed, or it would have fallen. They thought that it would fall. In their mass media, they even predicted it would take one week. This indicates the importance placed on the wishes of the people and their manifestation in the general affairs of the country. This is not only through demonstrations and appearances on the streets, but in the division and classification of the Constitution, we find this presence strongly; it really exists.



[Question] In connection with the presence of the people, has the government thought about organizing and deepening this presence as much as possible, for instance, through parties, councils or societies?

[Answer] I believe that this great force is not sufficiently utilized. This might be the answer to the previous question as well. In practice, what is the ultimate manifestation of these inclinations? Our weakness is not in the people not being present, but in not making the best use of this presence. Considering this great power, with the previous miracles on various political, economic, and social levels, and the war, we can expect many other miracles and minds must move in this direction. Recently, there has been a discussion in the supreme agricultural council that we have not been able to make good use of this great force in agriculture.

The brothers offered a plan entitled the "martyr Bahonar plan," according to which school children are to be used for nurturing saplings and planting some vegetation and which can develop about 15,000 hectares of pasture land every year. The brothers in the Crusade say that by using the students, we will be able to raise the level up to 1 million hectares, and this would mean that we would be free of the need to import fodder, which is at a very high figure.

Well, when we think about this issue, we see that it can be done, but we have not made use of it. Also, due to the administrative and bureaucratic conflicts, which take us back to the previous questions, we have not succeeded in making full use of it. But since we have not made use of it or are unable to do so, we do not say that it does not exist. This force exists and must be a means for making use of these great resources. In the political area, in fighting the shah and many other issues, we were successful. But in the economic and social areas and in building a new system, I believe we have not made sufficient use of this resource.

## Part II

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Sep 84 pp 26-27

[Question] Although the issue of the people's participation in various dimensions is one of the essential concerns of the revolution, and it can be said that the factor for the survival and continuation of the revolution is the presence of the people on the scene, allow us to raise the next question. One question which comes to mind is: Why have the essential economic problems of the revolution not only failed to be resolved, but even become more complicated, despite the presence of the people on the scene as well as the passage of nearly six years since the



establishment of the regime of the Islamic Republic? What could be the reason for this situation?

[Answer] We have solved many of our problems. We have preserved the security of the revolution and our own national security; we have overcome the difficulties of the war; and we have put an end to the political domination of our country by the United States, and many other problems. On the whole, our country has not been tranquil for a moment. In order to take these steps in the economic area and given the bureaucratic problems that we inherited from before, we are faced with an unprecedented situation in the world. In other words, we want to implement a regime which has no similarity to the East or the West. One of the justifications of all the factions is that when we say that one economic problem or another should be solved in a particular way, one faction says it is leftist and another faction says, no, it is right wing. However, everyone says that we must have an economy which is neither Eastern nor Western but based on our Islamic standards. In fact, we made the revolution and we did not leave any of the past laws concerning our fundamental issues. We want to start everything from zero. Concerning the administrative issues, in which we also want to implement our own value system, the situation is the same. The revolutionary institutions are more or less examples which provide us with a model of which direction we want to move toward. This is precisely our problem. We are building something with no model in the world before us. No model has been offered for even the theoretical issues. Of course, our work has an ideological basis; but an ideological basis does not answer how these issues are to be implemented in the 20th century with a population of 40 million people. The manner of implementation is something that we are drafting. If we compare it with various regimes and value systems, we see that where great destruction has taken place in the previous regime, these differences have existed. As an example, without intending to inform or suggest a similarity in the nature, value system, or laws, I can speak of the Soviet or the Chinese example. It would take a decade to put their legislative system in place and to manage their affairs. In the year 1936, when we witnessed the killings and slaughter and the elimination of many farmers in the Soviet Union, we saw that even in those moments when their government and economic regulations were determined in a dogmatic form, they offered many theories and provided many views. But again, we see that they are engaged in decision making as to whether one or another method is a good one or the like; they are still in doubt. The issue for us is that in political and military areas, we have not allowed ourselves to be hesitant and we have moved forward. In the area of economic issues, a leap was taken during the writing of the Constitution. Later, for the next steps in regards to the vast legislative void, where everything must start from zero, the issue resulted in many discussions in the society. In my

opinion, the passage of time and the realism which appears can advance us in the direction of devising more realistic laws. I especially invite the attention of the readers who are interested in studying. In our regime, in addition to the Constitution, in which the economic system has been shaped, the economic levers have been placed at the disposal of the government. When we nationalized the banking system, it meant that we placed this strong lever at the disposal of the government to support all strata of the nation. This is not something that can be reversed. It gives a form to our system by itself. Or we nationalize major and heavy industries and place them at the disposal of the government. This has been determined by the Constitution and in terms of the interests of the revolution, everyone knows that they cannot be transferred to the private sector. This also forms our economic system.

### Barren Lands Belong to the Government

We have problems with the distribution system. As I said, we have not yet decided. Yes, it is true that we have not made a final decision in this area. The directives which are given now suggest that we make use of the private sector in this area. At the same time, no one denies the role of the government in establishing a fair distribution system. But there is debate about what form it must take, whether it should be in the form of supervision or control. These are the discussions that we are having. In the area of the investments of the private sector, there have been extreme movements, both rapid and slow, in the past 30 years. What is becoming the rule--and, in my opinion, is correct--is that, other than those industries which are clearly cited in the Constitution, there is no need for the government to take over small consumer factories, such as compute manufacturing factories. These are factories in which the private sector can compete. And if there is a need at one time, as allowed by religious and civil laws, to break up a monopoly, the government can enter the market. This is an idea in which legislation is needed to clarify our duty. But there are a number of fears in this regard, which will result in political pressures and might cause a certain degree of mental anguish as to which direction we must move in. But if we return to the roots, we see that the problems are somewhat more clear than in the past. In the area of problems relating to land, there are apparently no doubts at the present time that the barren lands belong to the government, and that the government must take measures in this regard. However, in the implementation methods, we have problems. In Khuzestan, we have 1 million hectares of land which can be cultivated and distributed. But wherever we want to start, one of the dependent (mostly on the previous court) sheiks, for example, appears with a document saying that the land belongs to him.

## The Time Has Come to Solve the Problems

One of our problems is to devise a method to enable us to cancel the documents of the barren lands. We offered a bill, but it faced some problems. The government took the bill back and now it has devised a new bill. Also, in the Revolution Council, we had a law in this regard and the seven-member committees work within its framework, but it has some imperfections. But, a direction with regard to barren lands is not something which can be reversed. This is a religious issue which shows our economic direction. But the existing forces in the society as well as our own lack of skill might slow down decisiveness in this area. The vastness of the work might cause this or other problems. Have the main issues of the revolution which are being discussed now been set aside or not? I think in these six years, we have moved towards clarifying the problem. But we have done so with difficulty. And sometimes they have been mixed with political issues. At the present time, the government has this problem in the Majlis: Sometimes some of the brothers (the Cabinet) are said to move very slowly and others are said to move too fast. This slow or fast speed is certainly discussed in the society as well. At present, there is considerable discussion (the newspapers might also know) about the solution to these programs and problems at these junctures. In my opinion, this is progress and will certainly lead us to find our way. I will give you an example. One of the most important issues was the important decree of the imam which instructed the Majlis to deal with the land issue and two or three other important issues. The recent speeches of the imam meant that the government and the regime seem to have gone through problems, such as security and revolution, and it has become stabilized. Now, it must turn towards solving its problems in these areas.

[Question] Nowhere in the world is there the single model mentioned at the present time; well, we will not have it later either. Consequently, we must sit, work on it, and discover it. Has any work been carried out in this area?

[Answer] Work is being done in this area. The existing large scale discussions in the society, in fact, indicate a general effort to construct this model. But it is a model which will be built from zero, on the basis of our ideology and deeply religious and jurisprudential beliefs. However, the structure to be employed later in issues of foreign trade, ownership, and the like, is something we are constructing without consulting a foreign model. An example in regard to foreign trade is these centers of production and distribution, in which the government has vast authority. But, as Mr Hashemi pointed out in the Friday prayer, and I also said in the Majlis and in the interview with foreign reporters, we did not implement this law such that it would result in a government monopoly; we did not find it

necessary to do so. We do not believe that when we say that foreign trade is nationalized, it means that, for instance, we should import needles and pins ourselves. The private sector can handle a significant volume, which will be beneficial to the country, and, therefore, must be included in this area. We have gained much experience in the ups and downs of this law which we have implemented and these experiences will affect the writing of the new law and the views expressed in regards to this law.

### Success in Foreign Trade

Among the representatives in the Majlis and the government itself, the argument has been raised whether when we say nationalized foreign trade we picture nationalization and Article 44, which we had two years ago, in one form, or it might be in another form now. What we thought was in the interest of the people at that time is different now. All of this has resulted from the vast experiences we have gained in this area. For instance, in regards to foreign trade, we believe that in many areas success has been excellent, and in some areas, we have been weak. This shows that we must make revisions in those areas. We must turn to the roots and determine where revisions must take place. Our ideology can best teach us how and where such revisions must take place.

[Question] If we want to examine the lack of a single model in principle, in fact, it goes back to whether particular economic and political views exist, at least among the authorities, and in order to achieve a single model, one of these views must at least have ideological and political advantages over another. Is this not so?

[Answer] In his talks, Mr Hashemi referred to the differences of opinion among the Islamic thinkers since old times in regards to various issues. But based on my own personal experience (although I am not an expert in those areas and only express my opinion in regards to executive affairs), I can say that the differences of opinion stem somewhat from the differences in experiences and evaluating experiences, the issues existing at the present time on the global level in regards to the Islamic revolution, the problems we have, and the methods we must follow, which are in the interest of the revolution and the people.

Differences in methodology are sometimes interpreted as differences in views. If these problems are eliminated, I believe that the problems will be solved more easily. In other words, the opinion of one expert differs from another in terms of methodology. I am not saying that this is all. I am not making such a claim at all. But, the problem is not what has been interpreted in the society (especially among the students and in the universities): that there must be differences of opinion,



that there must be two views, two ways of thinking, or various views for solving a problem. But the issue is the differences of opinion in the area of expertise, as to whether or not doing one thing or another is in our best interests.

Before all other issues, there is the issue of whether or not doing something is in our interests. The reasons presented by the supporters or opponents of a solution mostly concern the effectiveness of a particular solution rather than its religious and ideological basis. I do not think that there are very deep, fundamental religious or ideological differences.

[Question] Apparently the differences are deep. Some time ago, in an interview with one of the officials, our discussions dealt with foreign trade and the private sector. He held a view which differed from that of the government and some of the other personalities. For instance, in connection with investments by the private sector, he believed that now the capital must be absorbed, and that at the present time, we cannot pay attention to the issue of class differences; in 30 to 50 years, we will be able to say that class differences must be reduced.

[Answer] My understanding is that in practice, most of the differences of opinion in regards to the legislative institutions stem from problems regarding expertise. If you pay attention to the discussions in the Majlis, you will see this clearly. I do not deny that there might be differences of opinion regarding economic issues or interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence in an economy which is to be established in a society. But, what the government deals with, what has practical implications, and the rationale behind what it deals with or offers stem from issues concerning expertise.

#### Filling the Legislative Void

[Question] It seems that in order to achieve a single model and program, ultimately, one view must have ideological, physical, or political advantage over other views in order to advance the regime on the basis of one view.

[Answer] I interpret that differently. I do not consider it related to the materialization of the rule. I believe that we have certain empty holes and these empty holes must be filled with laws. I am only looking from a legislative point of view. I interpret what you call advantage in this way. We have legislative voids, which must be filled rapidly. Laws must be created in this area. We must have a law to tell us decisively in which direction foreign trade must move, what the situation should be with regard to land ownership, how farmers should work, what amount of work the private sector should do, how far the government sector should advance, what role the cooperatives



should play, what sort of centralization they must have, and what form the taxing system should take. I consider it beneficial to promote discussions on these issues in the society in order to fill the void, to devise the laws in these areas and advance them. When we offer the issues in this manner, it will contain the problem you pointed out in a more complex form. After all, there are vast discussions in the legislative institutions. In fact, they choose certain views in their normal course. Of course, to create a law for the Islamic Republic is more complex. The laws ratified in the last Majlis were laws appropriate to the Islamic revolution. We had no laws contrary to the interests of the people and our ideological standards.

For this reason, we must place the emphasis on filling the gaps in order to solve the problems.

[Question] Of course, our question goes mostly back to your clear analysis and views concerning the situation. Otherwise, if you were to answer from the viewpoint of the prime minister, the answer would be that we have a legislative void.

[Answer] Well, I have to and in fact it is my duty to deal with the issues from this perspective. In other words, it is proper in practice to deal with the issue from this perspective in order to resolve the issue.

[Question] Will this slow, turtle paced movement which now exists in devising the laws and also in building the economy of the revolution be able to solve the great problems of a revolution as large as the Islamic revolution, which hopes to be a model for others, or, in your opinion, is there need for a more rapid and stronger speed?

[Answer] We must move rapidly in this area. Certain methods must be created in the Majlis and must deal with the vital questions of the revolution more rapidly. However, if we look at the whole of the movement, it is not turtle paced. When you look at the political structure of the country, it is truly unmatched in the world. You do not see any regime that has reached its ultimate political structure so rapidly.

I believe that we have stabilized this issue and now we are sure of ourselves. We know that we are not under the influence of the Chinese, the West or the East, or the monarchical ideas, because the political structure base has stabilized. Even the foreigners admit that this regime will not fall apart soon. In other words, they have lost hope. Now we can engage in solving our economic problems with more self-confidence. Despite the pressures on the government because of the shortages or the legislative void or the pressures placed on us in the area of conflicting opinions, despite these pressures, I am optimistic. In other words, when I

look at the overall picture, I see that we have really taken some miraculous steps. Naturally, the regime is alive, thinking that it wants to determine its own economy without being influenced by the East or the West or listening to other people's opinions. This gives us hope.

At present, we really have deficiencies in bills in the Majlis, except for the land issue (which was a proposal made there and is not the bill which was in the Revolution Council), and the government is working in this area. In other areas as well, we see that we have some very good bills and proposals in the Majlis.

#### Our Regime Opposes Anti-People Movements

[Question] There is one worry: Given this legislative void, the previous system has to remain in place and might even be legitimized. If so, ultimately, the removal of and dealing with this problem will be more difficult.

[Answer] If you look at the issue sociologically, you will see that we have new, growing realities which more or less neutralize the possibility of the renewal of the previous situation or the continuation of some of the previous institutions and directions. For instance, in sociological discussions, reference is made to influential groups in the society--which is a reality throughout the society. Compare the influential groups in our own regime and those of the previous regime. This in itself influences the direction and the decision making of a regime. In other words, if we study the nature of these two groups (our influential group and that of the previous regime), with our understanding of this group, we can guess in which direction this regime is leaning and in what direction the other one is. As I pointed out, the political foundations of the country have changed and these foundations direct us towards other goals and objectives. With this political foundation, the regime of the Islamic Republic cannot move against the people. In the long term, this will be effective in writing and implementing the laws. There might be some ups and downs, but the foundation will fall apart if it stops its ties with the people. It sees its survival in constantly thinking about the interests of all the people and all the strata of the nation. This in itself will create a particular direction in the kind of laws and regulations of the future of the regime.

I say that we must note these signs, which are the fundamental signs of the regime. Well, we see conflicts in our regime on the various levels of guilds, strata, and different ideological groups. These conflicts are stronger in the economic areas. We must evaluate these conflicts in a short period of time and conclude what our future problems will be. We must look at the

stronger and more fundamental signs in order to see how they have been shaped and whether or not they are in the interests of all the strata of the nation, and in what direction they move. By noticing the signs and looking at them in terms of future directions, we will be better able to judge. Besides trying to react to the current incident, this regime must pay attention to the issues in more depth, and this issue, which incidentally has not been examined, must be paid attention to.

#### We Must Be Anxious and Watchful

[Question] By benefitting from the experiences of liberation movements, we realize that considering the conflicts that have existed among the ideological, revolutionary ideas of the people and the officials of the movements with the actual foundations of the societies, ultimately, these conflicts have helped stabilize and continue the actual foundations, foundations which were reminders of the previous regime and were developing in the same direction, considering that the global capitalist system has also desired the continuation of the same course. Now there is such anxiety about ourselves: What problems are solved by the conflict between the economic and social system inherited from the previous regime, which as a capitalist regime, is dependent on global oppression, on the one hand, and on the revolutionary ideas and thoughts that exist in the minds of the people and authorities of the revolution, on the other hand? Will this also end in the interest of the same actual foundations? In other words, will it submit to the circumstances and social determinism? I do not know if what you meant by being realistic is the very thing that I mention as submitting to the circumstances, circumstances which impose those foundations. This requires the creation or the existence of conservative veins which can explain our inherited situation or resolve them in terms of revolutionary ideas and their imposition. In your opinion, is such an anxiety logical and justified?

[Answer] We say that from the beginning of the victory of the revolution, we have had this anxiety. I do not say that we must not be worried. If this anxiety is lost, we will slip into deviation. In today's world, we are moving on a straight line thinner than a hair. If we are not watchful at every moment, we might slip. In our foreign policy, the same problem exists. We might transgress. In advancing economic issues, the same problem exists, which might force us to slip. In connection with the industries, it is true that 70 to 80 percent of them have been nationalized, but due to dependence in terms of raw material and spare parts, they might have an effect on our foreign trade and foreign policy.

For instance, now there is a natural tendency to choose Western technology, because we are more familiar with this technology,

and on the surface it can be obtained more easily. But we have gathered some data and have seen that our dependence on the West in terms of industry makes up a significant figure, can be dangerous for our future, and can strangle us if the West decides to put pressure on us. Although politically we are so powerful that we can withstand it, in the midst of these worries, if we do not lose sight of the main revolutionary goals (this does not concern the government only, but the people and the newspapers as well), we will be able to move on this road that is thinner than a hair. At present, we have the ability to say: it is not possible for us to import a large volume of technology, raw material, and so on from you, and you are so shameless that you would not even buy our oil, and with the dollars that you obtain from us you go and buy oil from our enemies in the region. We have enough political power and ability to decide. Hence, we issue a strong warning to the countries we have transactions with. Such issues must be watched constantly, otherwise, they can be dangerous. This problem must be included in the analyses which are printed in the newspapers or discussed in the universities as well as in circles in which essential issues are thought about.

#### The People and the Academicians Are Protectors of the Ideology in the Universities

[Question] If you permit me, considering the shortage of time, let us take a brief look at the problem of the universities. In the previous regime, the goal was to train uncommitted experts who were dependent on the regime, and now we see the consequences. At the present time, when the university is discussed by some of the authorities, it is seen only as a center for knowledge. This can cause some problems and difficulties and can mark a continuation of the past policies.

[Answer] As an individual and a citizen of the Islamic Republic, I do not believe in this issue; I say that the university is not the place for an expert. It is the place for an ideological individual who can have an essential influence over social and political currents and, at the same time, learn to be a specialist. Of course, one problem that exists which we want to discuss is that since the universities have reopened and reconstruction has been done in regards to the professors, the faculty cadre is small. The social status of a professor is not very well recognized. There is a sense, as some people say, that we must value the specialized forces in order to fill the void in the universities. Some say we must not be too hurried in this area. Again, we have the problem of two views. However, what must be noted in the society, and especially the media, is that we cannot sacrifice the ideological nature of the universities for anything else. Wherever you see such a thing, it is treason and must be fought. For us, the principle is the ideology and



rule of the values of the revolution. We have much hope for the universities in the future when, God willing, they grow and progress, and, as a significant political force relying on the ideology, they are able to play a sensitive role in this country. We cannot revitalize Western, tyrannical and European values in our universities, because we have little or no specialized forces. The newspapers have a greater role in this than the government. They must constantly emphasize the revolutionary institutions, the revolutionary figures and ideology in the universities. The cultural revolution began in the universities. The government did not say, make a cultural revolution. And it is the same now. The protection of the revolution in the universities is the responsibility of the students and the media.

For the fifth plan, we have a manpower shortage of 260,000. Naturally, the government's problem is how to attract this manpower from the universities. If we do not think about this, we are not a government at all. But what keeps the ideological line in power in the university, and as a result in the society, are the forces of the people and those in the universities.

#### Necessity of the Existence of Students at the Center of Issues

[Question] At present, the views of students in regards to various issues has been practically set aside.

[Answer] Unless the student sets himself aside, he must come to the center and see that the leader of the revolution, who is the greatest dynamic force in the revolution, has said that the universities must be involved in the affairs. One cannot speak more openly than this. He said that the university should participate in the elections. The position of the imam is the position of the whole regime and all the people. Students must take advantage of this opportunity and get involved in the centers. If they think that the government will come, take the students, and place them in the centers, this is an incorrect understanding of the issue. The brothers in the stabilization office and the Islamic student society who are ideologically committed should come and talk, engage in discussions, and participate in the affairs. Of course, we have said it and request that they understand the problems of the government and we are certain that they can offer solutions in this area. The government is not apart from them. It is not like before, when the government was facing children. At the same time, their strong presence is not bound to the permission of the government. The political activities for which the student has been issued a government permit are really useless and ineffectual.



## Criticism of the Students

[Question] In the programs devised in the universities, the students are kept away from political issues. The aim of the student now is to study and get a grade. It is unfortunate that at the present time, many of the students are removed from political and economic issues and lack dynamism, reaction and firm positions vis-a-vis issues and problems.

[Answer] We also criticize the students in this area.

[Question] Does the cultural revolution headquarters, which devises programs for various sciences, have a duty to prepare the necessary grounds for the growth and awareness of students in political and social activities?

[Answer] The headquarters has recently begun to discuss the meaning of revolution. After that executive task, we reach essential issues. Only before some people were able to sit and talk about cultural revolution, some came and made the cultural revolution on the scene. This is very important for us. The leader also moves ahead and defines and advances the true cultural revolution. Now, in the universities, two or three issues have been combined and I have said this frequently. One is that with the period of the closure of the universities, for the students, the fate of a university employee having control over the university or not was more important than having an opinion and interfering in the main issues of the society. In other words, they had become involved in the internal issues of the university. At that time, as an outside observer, we said that a student must look a little further than his boundaries and look beyond the bars of the university fences. Later, with the participation, excitement and movement that the imam of the nation created, this attention was removed from the university and was focussed outside the university. But it is not enough yet and has still barely started. The students still hesitate concerning whether they should get involved in an administrative issue or not, or whether they should be involved in more essential issues. Sometimes the mistake is that a great student force realizes whether the opinion of the president of the university or our view should be imposed. This is at a time when outside and in the society, where there is a need for the views of the student, they do not benefit from this force. This is what I think should be paid attention to in the university. When this problem is resolved, that is, when attention is paid to outside issues and students have faith in themselves [as published]. If we had a pause and stop, it was due to the necessities of the revolution. The students closed the universities themselves. Many things were closed. Attention was focussed on other things. Now, these problems will be put aside. The university will become a determining force in the society.

We saw the results in our elections. In the future, we shall see this more strongly, provided the students preserve their relationship with the leadership and with the ideology and, secondly, are conscious of their own force, rather than thinking that instructions should come from above whether the university should or should not have a share. Essentially, there is nobody in this society to determine the place of student political movements. This would be exactly like saying that there are a number of people above who are dictating how the people should walk. In our society, such divisions do not exist.

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KHOMEYNI ACCUSED OF HAVING 'ABASED, DEFAMED SHI'ITE CLERGY'

Paris IRAN VA JAHAN in Persian No 209, 24 Sep-1 Oct 84, pp 1, 22, 23

[Paris IRAN VA JAHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Shahin Fatemi]

[Text] Ayatollah Dr Seyyed Mehdi Ruhani has sent a copy of a letter he wrote to Ayatollah Khomeyni for publication in IRAN VA JAHAN. The text below is a summary of his letter.

"You who instruct the people to do good works, how is it that you have forgotten that you yourself do not practice what you preach." Koran, Surah The Cow, Verse 43.

Your Eminence Ayatollah Khomeyni:

From the remarks that Your Eminence made on Sunday, 2 September during a meeting with the Faqihs on the Council of Guardians it can be inferred that you have decided, in order to ride on a stronger wave, to once again sacrifice a group of your past companions.

Since the subject relates to the clerical community from several angles, I considered it my duty to mention several points to Your Eminence: Your declaration that the interference by the clergy in executive affairs causes corruption and will harm the state of Islam is completely correct.

However, it unfortunately cannot be denied that you yourself founded this bad tradition. Your Eminence repeatedly announced in Paris: "I have no intention of interfering in the government, and after the nation, God willing, reaches its goal, technicians will administer the government, and I, who am a student, will go to Qom and take up my religious studies."

If Your Eminence had not violated his oath and had not been willing to pollute himself with executive issues, you could have preserved that unprecedented glory you held in the eyes of the entire world, and not only the Iranian people, but the Muslim communities and even most of the world's nations could have benefitted from the blessing of your spiritual and ethical influence in situations that demanded it.

Your Eminence's specialty is in Islamic philosophy and jurisprudence, but you have made Islamic jurisprudence a pretext for interfering and expressing your opinion in executive, political, military, economic, social and technical affairs. Every day the news tells us that such and such military or state authority had an audience with the nation's imam and reported on such and such a topic, and the nation's imam issued the necessary guidance.

As a fresh example, I will mention this news item, which was published by IRNA on Tuesday, 28 August 1984, station: 'Abedi Ja'fari, minister of commerce, stated: His Eminence the imam has drawn the broad outlines of the country's economy, and the Ministry of Commerce will act on the basis of that plan.

Furthermore, Musavi, the prime minister, in an official announcement on the same occasion, implicitly lifted the responsibility for the country's new commercial policy off the state's shoulders, and wrote: In light of the guidance from the supreme leader!!, since the state must follow the imam!, the following items are hereby promulgated to the executive agencies...

Rafsanjani, Khamene'i, and other regime spokesmen have clearly said on various occasions and continue to say that the nation's imam is the beating heart of the nation, and it is this beating heart that makes the final decisions on the nation's affairs.

Now I ask Your Eminence, what experience, expertise or skill do you have in commercial, economic, political, military or international affairs that you interfere in all these areas and make decisions? Have any of these various reports stated that you hold the entire responsibility for the huge blunder of the hostage-taking and its tragic toll on the Iranian nation, including the signing of the shameful Algiers Accord, according to which, as stated by the deposed Iranian president and U.S. authorities, Iran had to pay 11 billion dollars in damages?

11 billion dollars is an amount which, if the country were administered by technicians and committed, faithful people, would cover the educational costs of 295,000 university students with a monthly stipend of 500 dollars for a period of 6 years. What happened to that money? What did it do for the lives of the youths who today must raise the torch of science and learning in Iran as doctors, engineers and technical experts? Allow me to say: The money went into the pockets of U.S. capitalists, and the students were sent to the Behesht-Zahrah Cemetery.

Has it been said that you personally bear the responsibility for the continuation of the ruinous Iran-Iraq war and for losing the best opportunities for a truce to the benefit of the Iranian government and nation?

When Your Eminence, who is chief of the tribe, cannot overcome his desire to interfere in government affairs, what can you expect of some ordinary prayer leader who is appointed Friday prayer leader and the imam's representative by two strokes of your pen? He considers himself your imitator, he follows you, and interferes in the work of the commander and the governor-general. An eye witness told me that during the tenure of the temporary government, the cabinet

approved legislation without getting permission beforehand, and that you quarelled in the meeting with Eng Bazargan, and said: "I am going to punch the government in the mouth." So why are you surprised when some Friday prayer leader tells the commander and the governor-general, 'I am going to remove you from office?'

Another portion of your remarks pointed out that the clergy and the religious students have turned towards luxury and opulence, and that this will make the people cynical towards the clergy so that they will say: 'They said this and that until they got what they wanted.' There is no doubt that the greed, the worship of luxury and the love of power of a portion of the clergy during the present regime have inflicted a grievous blow on the prestige and reputation of the clergy. But it is of the utmost importance that your blessed mind be aware that almost all of the clergy, from the sources of imitation on down to the mojtaahids and the students, have had nothing during this era than great suffering, tears and deprivation. At no time in history has the Shi'ite clergy been so degraded or bourne such a burden of disgrace as they do today. In Iran there are 60,000 clerics, counting the sources of imitation, the mojtaaheds, the preachers and the eulogists. Of this number only several hundred persons are cooperating with the regime and have gained positions. The rest are persons who continue their simple, humble and honorable lives, heedless of the pomp and ceremony of their colleagues in the government.

The Qom Theological School has about 7,000 mojtaaheds, students and teachers, and as far as I am aware, the students still live in their damp, dark cells on a monthly stipend of 100 tumans.

One cannot consider this deprived, oppressed majority in the same breath with the minority who, after the victory of the revolution, immediately planned to take the places of the rich men of the past regime and grasped the riches left behind, the palaces and castles, and the positions of authority. Countless tears could be shed over the fact that you consider this minority as the self-sacrificing, committed clergy. One of these committed persons is Montazeri, who as every fiqh expert will admit, holds fifth position in the clerical hierarchy. Yet what has happened is that the budget for his ceremonial expenses, maintenance and protection must be estimated to equal the sum of all the living expenses for all the students in Qom Theological School. Who has provided all this ceremony to a religious student?

You wish the students to follow the examples of the lives of Shaykh Morteza Ansari and Shahid Sani, and they have taken this path and are still on it. It is these Islamic republican statesmen that are traveling the road of deviation.

This government, which claims to be the prophet's successor, is one which has given Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni a bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz 500, whose price exceeds the expenses of the entire lives of the two great faqihs Shaykh Ansari and Martyr Sani.

The true clergy have never been polluted with the dirt of ambition, worship of position, opulence and ceremony.



Many prominent clerical personages have quit the scene and pulled aside because they have observed these phenomena and wish to keep their own hands clean.

The small number who did not consider silence permissible, and wanted to act according to their religious duty, meaning enjoining the good and forbidding the bad, and who have pointed out the perversions, have been subjected to unprecedentedly abuse by the government. If I point to the oppression of the two great sources of imitation, Shari'atmadari and Tabataba'i, of Qom, I need say no more. The desire for opulence, corruption, power-seeking, gaudy ceremony and spend-thrift ways have no connection to Islam and no relation with the clerical community.

Those connected with the leadership and the government's high authorities have founded this impious innovation, and whenever they come out of their palaces and their costly protective enclosures, there can be hope that others will follow. Advice given by those who do not practice what they preach will continue to be without effect.

Peace on those who follow the true religion.

Paris--September, 1984. Dr Seyyed Mehdi Ruhani, leader of European Shi'ites

9597

CSO: 4640/431

IRAN TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO OUST ISRAEL FROM UN

GF040654 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 4 Oct 84

[Text] In response to the statement by U.S. Secretary of State Shultz who said that if the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf voted against the proposal of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Israel from the United Nations, the United States would press the Palestine-occupying regime to withdraw from Lebanon without the conditional, prior withdrawal of Syrian forces, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman has said.

Following the constant failure of the United States in the Middle East and the growing campaigns of the Muslim inhabitants in the region against international imperialism and Zionism, we again see coming to life the noxious movements of U.S. authorities in the region. These movements are taking place at a time when the Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to campaign against the usurper Israel and oust the regime occupying Palestine from international bodies, and topple the Iraqi regime. This determination on the part of Iran has frightened the United States and its henchmen in the region and they are trying to neutralize this by spreading an atmosphere of distrust and misunderstanding among Muslim neighbors of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf.

Through these means the United States wants to prevent the Muslim countries in the region from supporting the proposal of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations and to achieve its own interests, and also to support its friend, that is, the Palestine-occupying regime and the regime ruling Iraq, by its presence in the region.

They are unaware that the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully determined to take steps toward achieving one of its real goals which is the destruction of the usurper Israel and cooperation with the Muslim countries of the region, and in this way continue the imposed war till the overthrow of the regime ruling Iraq which is playing the role of an American agent in the region and is delaying the campaign against the regime occupying Palestine.

We announce that the overt and covert meetings under the management of the rulers of the U.S. Government in the United Nations to increase unrest in the Persian Gulf and create distrust and misunderstanding in the region between the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Muslim neighbors in the Persian Gulf in

order to further its own programs in the region will have no effect on the determination of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We are certain that in view of the vigilance and unity of the Muslim nations, all hindrances and difficulties which lie in the way of campaign against international imperialism and Zionism will be removed and finally sacred Palestine will be purified of the curse of the presence of the Zionists.

CSO: 4640/37

IRAN, IRAQ PARTIES ISSUE STATEMENT ON AUGUST TALKS

LD031712 (Clandestine) Radio of Iranian Toilers in Persian 0330 GMT 3 Oct 84

["Joint Statement" issued by the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Communist Party of Iraq]

[Text] Discussions between delegations of the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Communist Party of Iraq were held in early August. The political situation in the world, the Near East, and in the two countries, and the relations between the two parties were discussed. These discussions took place in a sincere and comradely atmosphere which revealed the unanimity of views between the two sides.

The masses of our two countries, Iraq and Iran, have been engulfed in frightful hardships and crimes resulting from the war, started by the Iraqi regime, which is entering its fifth year. So far this war has inflicted hundreds of thousands of dead, and hundreds of thousands of injured upon the masses of the two countries. The war has greatly damaged the economies of the two countries, destroyed scores of important economic units for whose creation a great deal of time and effort had been expended, while the resources of the two countries, which are needed by the masses of our countries in order to engage in the reconstruction and to eliminate backwardness, continue to be wasted. Social difficulties, deteriorating living standards, inflation, high costs and the shortages of many necessary items are other consequences of this war.

Only world imperialism, headed by American imperialism, Zionism and reaction, including the reactionary forces and Iraq, benefit from this war which has lasted for more than 4 years. These forces are trying to turn this war into a war of attrition and to spread it to the entire Persian Gulf region. This puts our countries under the threat of foreign aggression by the armed forces of the United States of America and NATO.

The two parties decisively demand that as soon as possible an end should be put to the war and to the hardships and difficulties which the war produces for our masses. Responsibility toward the fate and interests of the two neighboring masses of Iran and Iraq demands that the war should end on the basis of a just and democratic agreement, without annexation of any part of each other's territory, and on the basis of the acceptance of international borders existing before the start of the war, and on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the rights of the masses of the two

countries in choosing their sociopolitical system in accordance with their own wishes.

The Communist Party of Iraq decisively condemns the suppression and terrorism inflicted upon the fraternal party, the Tudeh Party of Iran, and announces its complete solidarity with that party's struggles for its sublime goals. The Tudeh Party of Iran declares its full solidarity with the fraternal party, the Communist Party of Iraq, which, despite hardships and bloody terrorism, struggles for the sake of the implementation of its just goals.

The two parties stress the need for the intensification of struggle against the plans of imperialism in the region which are being implemented through various plots, especially through overt military intervention, in order to gain complete domination over and to impose their wills upon the people of the region. The war fleets of imperialist countries are sailing the waters of the Near East, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, and are threatening the peace and security of the masses of the region as well as world peace.

The two parties decisively condemn the anti-Soviet campaign waged by imperialist circles in order to give rise to an anticommunist hysteria to be used in turn as a weapon of aggression against the masses and the countries of the region.

The two parties express their complete support for the struggles of the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the PLO against imperialism and Zionism in order to achieve the right to return to their homes, to decide their own fate and to establish an independent state.

The two parties express their support for the struggles of the Lebanese people and patriotic forces of that country to liberate their lands, which have been occupied by the usurping Israelis, and in order to implement the program of national accord.

The two parties announced their support for Syrian solidarity in the face of the pressures exerted by American imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The two parties expressed their anxiety over the critical international situation, brought about since the end of the seventies as the result of the domineering policies of American imperialism, substituting the policy of confrontation and war for a policy of easing tensions and peaceful coexistence.

Struggle for peace is the duty of all communists and all progressive mankind. The socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, are an invincible fortress of peace in the face of American aggression. The two parties believe that the struggles of our masses for an immediate end to the war and the elimination of hotbeds of crisis are our most important national duties and an important service to the cause of world peace.

[Signed] The Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Iraq.

CSO: 4640/38



## GULF WAR REPORTEDLY DRAINS IRAN'S FOREIGN RESERVES

East Burnham ARABIA, THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 37, Sep 84 pp 56-58

[Text]

**IF** It is now over a year since the foreign exchange position of the Islamic republic of Iran was last reviewed in this journal. In the file on Iran in July 1983 issue of *Arabia* a detailed study was conducted of the foreign exchange requirements and the potential sources of foreign exchange revenues in the Iranian economy. On the basis of that study we concluded that the highly optimistic view expressed by the government as to the soundness of their foreign exchange position was not realistic. It was pointed out that unless the war is ended immediately and drastic steps taken to revive agriculture and rationalise the industrial sector, the Iranian economy would face a foreign exchange crisis of serious proportions. The developments during the last twelve months have fully corroborated this earlier prediction.

The highly optimistic attitude of the Central Bank authorities during 1982-83 was based on a superficial reading of the international liquidity indicators. According to the governor of the Central Bank M Nourbaksh, in October 1982 foreign exchange reserves exceeded \$13bn and total outstanding foreign debts stood at less than \$1bn. The air of optimism which prevailed at the time was mainly due to this relatively high international liquidity which, seen within the context of the severe balance of payments crises facing other developing countries, indeed appeared highly encouraging. What had added to the complacency of the Iranian Central Bank authorities was that the apparently healthy foreign payments position was achieved within the span of one year by averting what was nearly turning

into a foreign exchange disaster in 1980-81. In February 1981, according to Bani Sadr who was then president of the Islamic republic, foreign exchange reserves had fallen to well below \$4bn and the economy was heading towards an acute foreign exchange position. These factors underlined the highly optimistic position of Nourbaksh, who in October 1982 announced: "Iran's reserve of foreign exchange is now at an optimum level and its steady trend upwards has made it possible to continue with the war without any adverse effects on the daily life of the people for a long time in the future."

What the governor of the Central Bank has missed in making this assertion was that the considerable foreign exchange reserves which the government had managed to build up during the 1982-83 period were mainly due to a combination of circumstances which were of a very short term and temporary nature. First the Iranian economy was then working well below half its full productive capacity and investment activity had virtually come to a standstill. Second, the situation in the international oil market was such that Iran, pursuing an aggressive marketing strategy, could increase its share of the market — which in the immediate aftermath of the revolution had fallen to well below 50 per cent of its pre-revolution share. Third, in the early years of the war Iran could still rely upon the high stockpile of armaments which the Shah had built up without the need to resort to foreign markets for arms on any major scale.

These factors, however, could not persist for long. Any attempt to revive the economy and set it on a path of reasonable

growth would have led to a doubling of import requirements. At the time it was also easy to see that the highly favourable conditions in the oil market which prevailed during the first two years of the revolution were not going to persist, or at least Iran could by no stretch of the imagination be able to expand its oil exports at the same rate as it did during the 1979-82 period. Again, it was easily conceivable that with the continuation of the war Iran's foreign exchange burden was bound to intensify. However, our warnings in July 1983 issue of *Arabia* were not solely based on these considerations. A closer examination of the foreign trade statistics during the first four years of the revolution had shown that the major part of the import bill was composed of basic necessities. Food imports had risen above \$3bn in 1982-83 and were predicted to approach the staggering figure of \$5bn during 1983-84.

The table shows the balance of payments situation of the Islamic republic during the five years following the revolution. In the period 1980-82 Iran's foreign exchange receipts had fallen to about 14bn, which amounted to half of the recorded peak of \$25bn in 1977. In the meantime, due to the post-revolutionary disruptions in the economy, foreign exchange payments (goods and services) had also declined to about \$15bn from their recorded peak of \$24bn in 1977. The reason for the decline in foreign exchange receipts was partly government policy to reduce the volume of oil exports, partly the disruption of oil exports during the early stages of the war, and partly the slump in the international oil market after the 1979-80 price rises.

During 1982-83, Iran managed to rapidly increase its foreign exchange receipts to \$22bn by increasing oil exports and regaining its share in Opec output.

During that year, with the continuation of the economic slump and the maintenance of strict import restrictions, there was a considerable surplus on the current account of the balance of payments of \$6.3bn. It was this relatively large current account surplus which was interpreted by the authorities as a sign of a healthier foreign exchange position, and it was probably for the same reason that in 1983-84 the government pursued an expansionary policy by launching the \$170bn development plan and relaxing the import restrictions. It is important however to note that the \$15.8bn commodity import bill of 1982-83, in real terms, was equivalent to about \$10bn, or only 60 per cent of its 1977 value. In other words, an import bill of \$26bn in 1982-83 was necessary to purchase the same quantity of imports as in 1977-78. This gives an indication of the foreign exchange requirements in 1982-83 for returning the economy to a state of normal capacity utilisation.

Under these circumstances it is no wonder that with the attempt to increase the economic momentum and go ahead with the first development plan of the Islamic republic, the economy once more encountered a severe foreign exchange crisis in 1983-84. Imports rose by 40 per cent to a new post-revolutionary record of \$22bn. The foreign exchange revenues for 1983-84 are estimated at about \$18bn. The inevitable result was a current account deficit of \$4bn, which has turned out to be above what the foreign exchange reserves of the country could finance in the short term, let alone the possibility of sustaining this pattern of trade in the long run.

To finance the relatively large trade deficit in 1983-84 the country has had to rely heavily on short-term trade debts, estimated at about \$7bn. Set against an optimistic estimate of foreign exchange reserves of \$3bn, the scale and severity of

### Iran's Balance of Payments after the revolution (in \$bn)

|                         | 1979-80 | 1980-81 | 1981-82 | 1982-83 | 1983-84 |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Merchandise exports     | 19.8    | 12.5    | 12.8    | 22.1    | 18.1    |
| Merchandise imports     | 11.5    | 15.7    | 15.3    | 15.8    | 22.0    |
| Trade balance           | +8.3    | -3.5    | -2.4    | +6.3    | -3.9    |
| Net services            | -2.2    | -1.3    | -0.4    | -0.5    | -0.4    |
| Long-term capital (net) | -0.1    | -0.3    | +0.2    | -5.2    | -0.5    |
| Balance                 | +6.0    | -5.1    | -2.2    | +0.2    | -4.8    |

*Note:* Excludes short-term capital flows and military imports.  
*Source:* Central Bank of Iran and the *Financial Times*.

the present foreign exchange crisis of the Islamic republic can be understood.

Although the Central Bank has not published any data on Iran's foreign exchange reserves since the beginning of the war, it is not difficult to give a more or less accurate estimate of the present state of foreign exchange reserves on the basis of the table. According to the IMF, at the end of 1978 Iranian international liquidity was \$12.5bn, of which \$10.9bn was in foreign exchange holdings. On the basis of the overall balance of payments figures given in the table, by the end of 1982-83 the level of foreign exchange reserves should have been close to \$11bn. If we assume a conservative estimate of \$2.5bn foreign exchange expended on the war on an annual basis, then it leaves a level of foreign exchange reserves of about \$1bn at the end of 1982-83. Given the overall deficit of \$4.8bn in 1983-84 and the short-term credits received during that year of \$7bn, this leaves total reserves of about \$3bn at the end of 1983-84. Therefore, the country is at present facing an immediate foreign exchange shortage of about \$4bn.

It appears that the economic policy of the Islamic republic has been rather shortsighted. It was not until quite late in 1983-84 that the government realised the gravity of the foreign exchange problem and was forced to take palliative action. With the deepening of the exchange crisis, in February 1984 the government blocked letters of credit for a list of 110 non-urgent goods and further import restrictions were announced by the Central Bank in April 1984. According to a *Financial Times* report which quotes a senior Iranian banker, at present only baby food, medicines and armaments are being allowed through. The effects of these restrictions are clearly apparent in the value of imports, \$828m during the first month of the Iranian calendar year of 1984-85 — which is below 50 per cent of the monthly average figure during 1983-84.

The present foreign exchange crisis cannot wholly be attributed to short-term and unforeseeable circumstances. It cannot be denied that the tanker war in the Gulf has taken its toll of Iranian foreign exchange revenues in recent times. The tanker war has affected Iranian foreign exchange revenues in two ways: first, it has led to a reduction in the volume of oil exports; second, and more importantly, it has led to the government having to offer much keener prices to attract customers. It is reported that the current average price of

crude oil ex-Kharg is \$21 a barrel. Not only is this much lower than the Opec price, but it is also much lower than the officially announced government selling price of \$27.6. In other words, the Iranian government has to foot the insurance bill of the ships which are prepared to take the risk of lifting from Kharg Island in the face of Iraqi threats.

The tanker war factor, however, can only be held responsible for intensifying what is a major structural problem of the Iranian economy — the inadequacy of the potential sources of foreign exchange revenue to finance the required imports for a normal functioning of the economy, given its present structure and that in addition to the "normal" requirements of foreign exchange the country has to finance the ever-increasing costs of the war. It has to be acknowledged that the tanker war is a very recent consequence; during a good deal of the 1983-84 period the tanker war as a factor was non-existent yet still the country ran into the severe foreign exchange problems which are being witnessed now. It should be noted that the \$22bn commodity import bill of 1983-84, which was beyond the financial capacities of the Islamic republic, was in real terms equivalent to \$13.5bn — or 80 per cent of the import bill of the year 1977-78 (excluding arms imports). This clearly indicates that as long as the war continues, and no attempts are made towards a major restructuring of the economy, it is impossible to realise Iran's potential productive capacities without encountering major foreign exchange problems.

What are the future economic and political implications of the policies which the Islamic republic, wittingly or unwittingly, has been conducting during the past few years? After more than five years of the present regime, one can answer this question with a certain degree of assuredness. The government has been unable to reduce unemployment or to solve the basic problem of shortages, and the attempts during the past year to revive the flagging economy have yet to bear fruit. With the present foreign exchange shortages and accompanied import restrictions, the machinery and raw materials which were imported during the past year will have to remain dormant and inevitably rot in the warehouses. As long as the war continues there is little hope of reviving the Iranian economy — and the political implications of the present situation in terms of the gradual apathy and disappointment of the masses are very grave.

Since its establishment, one of the most important slogans of the present regime in Iran — one which has been most effective in articulating the spirit of the revolution and rallying the support of the revolutionary masses behind the regime — has been that of political and economic independence. Political independence is more a matter of power relations than the volition of certain individuals or even the entire ruling establishment of a country. The present foreign exchange crisis into which the Iranian government has managed to entangle the country does little to achieve this political and economic independence — Iran is presently in dire need of hard currency and is ultimately at the mercy of those who can supply it.

In the course of the next few months the Iranian regime will face three options. The first is to end the war, take drastic action to rationalise the economy and to reconstruct after the devastation of the past four years. However, with the passage of time this option becomes more and more difficult and probably in six months' time will be impossible to follow.

The second option is to continue with the war and to follow more or less the same type of policies as carried out during

the past four years. This option, as noted previously, falls beyond the present financial capacities of Iran and to follow this path the Islamic regime would have to increasingly rely on the West for finance.

The third option is suicidal. In a desperate attempt to end the present stalemate the government may try to spread the war in the Gulf and block the Strait of Hormuz. Though this last option is totally irrational from the point of view of Iran, given the kind of mass mobilisation which the government has undertaken and the as yet unstable power relations within the ruling groups, this option cannot be entirely ruled out. Under these circumstances events would follow their own momentum and lead to a disastrous outcome for the entire Muslim world.

Recent moves by the Iranian regime indicated that they are going for the second option; the recent trip by the West German foreign minister to Teheran and his return with the message that Iran is ready to "open up" to the West is an important indicator. It is immaterial whether the Iranian authorities deny these remarks or not — for to continue the war the Islamic republic has no other option than to lower its barriers to the West.

# GENSCHER'S VISIT TO IRAN, POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS EXAMINED

East Burnham ARABIA, THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 37, Sep 84 p 40

[Text] West Germany's Hans-Dietrich Genscher is the first foreign minister of a western country to set foot in Iran since the Islamic revolution of 1979. Bonn has always maintained cordial relations with Teheran or, as Genscher put it, the Iranians did not have "any bad thoughts or memories of Germany." Genscher explained that West Germany had from the start "respected the Islamic revolution as a decision of the Iranian people."

Genscher's visit was not all plain sailing. Newspaper comment was hostile. Jhomhuri e Islami, in a feature article, questioned the propriety of receiving the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany whose original stand of "revenge and hostility" against the Islamic revolution was well-known.

The English language paper Teheran Times stated that if the German government desired "any relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, it must first get rid of the anti-revolutionary elements" living in Germany as political refugees. The speaker of the Iranian parliament, Hashami Rafsanjani, pointed out that Genscher's trip to Iran had not been uncontroversial: there were fears that his visit would be a turning point in Iran's foreign policy, the start of a move away from neutrality to an overtly pro-western stance.

Genscher held talks with President Khamenei, Prime Minister Mussawi, Foreign Minister Namzai. While German delegates spoke gleefully of an "opening" by Iran to the West, Genscher was more cautious--Teheran has also been establishing contacts with Moscow.

German diplomats in Bonn noted that Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati is soon to visit Moscow. After his visit to Bulgaria early in the year, Velayati sent a senior official in the foreign ministry to Moscow with a message for the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Moscow responded by sending its energy minister to Teheran.

It had been believed until recently that Soviet-Iranian relations were frosty. They took a turn for the worse with the Soviet resumption of arms supplies to Iraq, including SS-12 rockets, and credits of up to \$1bn. The Soviet move to arm Iraq had been prompted by Iran's action against the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party.



Although the Soviets made no secret of their irritation over the crackdown on communists in Iran, Genscher gained the impression that the Iranian action would not stand in the way of new contacts between Teheran and Moscow. Since Teheran had been the one to initiate these contacts, Genscher underlined the importance of the West "reaching out" to the Iranians and changing the direction of their search for contacts--from the East to the West. Western analysts argue that Iran's embattled position in the Gulf war could be exploited to achieve this end.

Clearly the Germans are willing to use their economic clout to persuade Iran to return to the western camp. Genscher's talks focused on economic relations and the higher education of Iranians in West Germany. Genscher also raised the question of violations of human rights in Iran and the war with Iraq. This was in response to pressure from Iranians living in exile in Germany, who accused him of lending respectability through his visit to a regime which had violated and continued to violate human rights. Genscher proposed to his Iranian hosts the setting up of a human rights seminar comprising German and Iranian legal experts on human rights, a proposal which was, in principle, accepted by the Iranians.

However, the Iranians also accused the West of deviousness and of speaking of human rights only when expedient, while ignoring violations in areas with pro-western regimes.

The German delegation was also given to understand that Iran did not want the war against Iraq to spill over to the other Gulf states.

CSO: 4600/20

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARD MUSLIM THEOLOGIAN'S REPORTED

LD292027 Tehran IRNA in English 1740 GMT 29 Sep 84

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 29, IRNA--Government sources in Yugoslavia are warning against activities of some of young Muslim theologians in that country, saying that they are interfering in political and social affairs. These sources interpret the travel of Yugoslavian young theologians to Islamic countries to advance their Islamic knowledge a factor for the creation of opposition against the constitutional law and political and social system there.

Meanwhile, government officials believe that some of the articles printed by the publications of the Islamic Association of Yugoslavia are contrary to the constitutional law and would therefore put values of political and social system in that country under question.

They have also expressed concern over the increase in the number of mosques which are under construction without permission and say that such mosques will be destroyed.

International developments, especially the Islamic revolution of Iran, the campaign for the liberation of Al-Quds and the Iraqi imposed war, in addition to intensifying political inclinations of religious figures in Islamic countries have also had their impacts on the Islamic Association in Yugoslavia.

Dragan Novakovic, counselor for religious matters in the Government of Serbia, says that contradictory measures by some of the Muslim theologians in Yugoslavia are due to 'foreign influence' in the country's Islamic Association.

In the opinion of certain officials, foreign influence can be practiced through teaching theology, financial support to Islamic communities and translation of Islamic articles.

It is said that some 300 young religious theologians who are graduated from theological centres in Islamic countries are active in Yugoslavia's Islamic Association.

Meanwhile, the establishment of theological centre in Sarajevo has not been fully effective in blocking the way to departing students of theology and for the penetration of genuine Islamic values into the Islamic Association there.

The departure of most of these students of theology to Islamic countries takes place mostly without permission by the officials of the Islamic Association and are made according to personal decision.

These students are believed to try upon their return to Yugoslavia, to revive and implement religious values which are hardly in contradiction with the ruling social values.

In this respect, some Yugoslavian press agencies have reported on the activities of two Muslim theologians in the province of Kosovo and have charged them with trying to propagate fundamentalistic Islamic ideas after graduating from one of the Muslim countries.

These reports said that the two theologians believed that the true Islam has not been represented in Yugoslavia and that some of the Islamic cases in that country were against fundamental Islamic teachings.

Introducing Islam as a complete system of life which embodies both religion and politics is considered as an illegal activity under the pretext of interfering in political affairs.

The semiofficial Yugoslavian paper, BORBA, quoting parts of the publication ISLAMSKA MISAO, has attacked the latter for printing articles which conveyed the message for the future activities and measures to be taken by the Muslims there.

The ISLAMIC MISAO, in an article printed on the occasion of the beginning of the 15th Hejira century, wrote that there should not be any disunity among Muslims and that all Muslims should congregate under a single banner and in one Islamic country.

The trial of Dr Ali Izzat Begovic, a Muslim intellectual of Yugoslavia, who had been arrested for publishing a pamphlet called "Islamic Declaration," is a clear sign of the government's sensitiveness vis-a-vis any inclination of Muslims of that country towards Islamic principles.

The Sarajevo court last year sentenced Begovic and 11 other Yugoslavian Muslims to long-term imprisonments with hard labour. The court tried to charge Begovic with supporting ideologies of an organization called "Young Muslims" which, according to the press, started activities in 1941, with objectives including the fight against all anti-Islamic movements in the world, implementation of Islamic criteria in society, political freedom of all Islamic states and their unity as a single Islamic country.

To complete construction of mosques and Islamic centres, Muslims in Yugoslavia should inevitably ask for financial support from other Muslim countries. But, officials believe that financial assistance to Yugoslavian Muslims is one way of foreign penetration. They also believe that by such an influence Yugoslavia will be used as a bridge for strengthening Islam in Europe.

KHO'INIHA ON 'DIFFICULTIES CREATED FOR PILGRIM BY SAUDIS'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 17 Sep 84 p 2

[Text] Medina, IRNA.

On Sunday morning, in an interview with the reporters of the Canadian newspaper CRESCENT INTERNATIONAL and IRNA in Medina, the representative of Imam Khomeyni in the hajj pilgrimage and supervisor of the Iranian pilgrims said concerning the problems of the pilgrims created by the Saudi Arabian kingdom: Our revolutionary action in connection with Saudi Arabia faces the same problems that we faced before the revolution with the shah. The Saudi Arabian government receives instructions from the same system as the shah's government did. Both were and are following the same line. The shah's government was dependent on the United States and so is the Saudi Arabian government. Like the government of the shah, this government does not consider itself responsible to implement Islamic laws and the Saudi rulers do not display commitment to Islamic precepts. The corruption resulting from this lack of commitment to Islam has penetrated all the government organizations of Saudi Arabia. From the time of our arrival at the airport and in the city, we faced officials who, under the influence of the government, do not display Islamic behavior, do not consider themselves committed with regard to the pilgrims, and engage in actions which ordinary Muslims should not do, let alone Muslims who claim to be protectors of the city and the interests of the citizens and have accepted responsibilities as police or other authorities. Mr Kho'iniha added: In Saudi Arabia, we are faced with a government that is in absolute conflict with the revolutionary government of Iran. The representative of the imam in the hajj pilgrimage called the existing corruption in the government of Saudi Arabia one reason for the problems created by the Saudi officials for the Muslims committed to Islam. He announced that the number of foreign pilgrims who have been arrested and detained in Saudi prisons due to political activities exceed the number of arrested Iranian pilgrims. He considered the violent behavior of Saudi Arabia towards Iranians and its behavior towards the Iraq Ba'thists a clear example of the corruption and obtrusiveness of the Saudi

officials. Describing the martyrdom of one of the Iranian brothers in Medina, he said: In the assault by the Ba'thists and Saudi security agents on the Iranian pilgrims, in addition to the martyrdom of one of the brothers, it is probable that other individuals have also been martyred. This incident is itself proof of the corruption governing the regime of Saudi Arabia and the police of that country. They do not even permit the Iranian pilgrims to visit their wounded in the hospitals. Another sign of the corruption of the Saudi regime is that it has not arrested the perpetrators of this incident, or it freed them a few hours after interrogation, and has not displayed any responsibility in regards to the protection of the life, property, and families of the Muslims. Mr Kho'iniha stressed: Not only do the Saudi Arabian police lack moral competence, but the government of Saudi Arabia is not competent to manage the two sacred shrines. Concerning the motivation behind the attack of a group of Iranian pilgrims by the mercenaries of the Iraqi regime and the Medina security agents, he said: The main issue is that those who have been slapped by the political actions during the pilgrimage are trying to take revenge on Iranian pilgrims at the instruction of the United States, and, hence, they have engaged in this barbarous act.

While condemning the policy of the Saudi kingdom which is destroying the holy places in Mecca and Medina, the representative of the imam in the pilgrimage expressed hope that in the pursuit of this issue on the part of the Muslims of the world, they will realize it and stand up against this policy which serves the colonialists. Mr Kho'iniha, responding to a question concerning the management of the two shrines, emphasized: The two holy shrines belong to all Muslims and the policy for the administration of the two shrines must be determined and carried out by a group representing all Muslims. But at present, the government of Saudi Arabia has unjustly monopolized the right to make decisions unilaterally, without consultation with other Muslims. This is one reason why the government of Saudi Arabia is not competent to manage the two holy shrines in the future, when it falls into the hands of the Muslims, because at the present time, it has unjustly usurped the right from other Muslims. He expressed hope that the Muslims, with their alertness, the signs of which are clearly evident, will succeed in retrieving their rights in the future and will not allow a group which relies on principles and beliefs which are not only politically rooted, but which will result in dependence on colonialism to violate other people's rights, ignore the views of other Muslims, and govern the two holy shrines. The representative of Imam Khomeyni for pilgrimage affairs considers the break down of the great wall between the Muslims and true pilgrimage created by the enemies as one of the signs of the political actions of the Iranian pilgrims in the hajj ceremonies and said: With a movement which is carried out



during the hajj ceremonies as the result of the Islamic revolution, the question is raised whether the atmosphere dominating the Muslims in the hajj in Mecca and Medina in the course of the past several centuries, in which such a situation had been imposed on the Muslims by the enemies of Islam, or Islamic actions and raising political issues in the hajj, which has awakened the Muslims from the sleep of negligence, was correct and Islamic.

He said: Today, attention is paid to the issue that Mecca and Medina must again today become a center of uprising and struggle against the infidels and polytheists throughout the world, as during the time of the Prophet. Political issues, such as support for the oppressed, a declaration of readiness to fight infidels and oppressors, avoiding the infidels, and supporting all liberation movements of the world, are in fact part of spiritual Islam and have been clearly mentioned in the Koran as good deeds. These issues must be raised during the hajj season, in sacred places such as Mecca and Medina. The question was asked by (CRESCENT INTERNATIONAL): What steps has the Islamic Republic of Iran taken in contrast to previous years to have the pilgrims raise the issues of Lebanon, occupied Palestine and Afghanistan? Mr Kho'iniha answered: Despite the strong opposition of the government of Saudi Arabia and the cooperation of most of the governments of the region with the Saudi government to prevent the raising of the major issues of the Islamic world during the hajj pilgrimage, we have achieved this success. Other Muslims are accepting the reality that during the hajj pilgrimage, these issues must be raised. Based on reports which have reached us, most of the governments of Islamic countries, with the cooperation and encouragement of, even at the request of, the government of Saudi Arabia, wish to prevent political movements during the hajj pilgrimage in any way possible. The governments of the Islamic countries have given permission to the Saudi Arabian government to arrest and deport any of their citizens who make any contact with Iranian pilgrims. And upon their return to their country, they are arrested by their own corrupt governments. In any case, the government of Saudi Arabia, with the cooperation of other reactionary governments, creates every kind of problem for the pilgrims. But, fortunately, these pressures have caused the nations to awaken by themselves and Muslims have realized that such pressures have been imposed because such contacts with the Iranian pilgrims would be to the disadvantage of those governments. Since most Muslims in the world are unhappy with the corrupt governments dominating their country, even as a reaction to the governments, they insist on such contacts. They pay political attention to the Iranian pilgrims and the expression of hope by particular Muslims for the Afghan and Lebanese Muslims during the hajj pilgrimage. All these are signs

of the success of the Islamic Republic in bringing up the problems of the Islamic world.

In concluding this interview, concerning the policy of the monarchical regime of Saudi Arabia as regards the ruining of the sacred places respected by Muslims, the supervisor of the Iranian pilgrims said: One of the issues that has made us very suspicious about the authenticity of the Wahabi sect is the policy of eliminating the historical monuments of Islam. At all times, everywhere, throughout history, every nation and tribe, in trying to protect its cultural, scientific, and historical values, preserves the symbols of its ideology and nation. In Mecca and Medina, where the Prophet was born and lived and where dozens of historical monuments and memories exist, we see that the government of Saudi Arabia has destroyed them all by relying on the dubious sect of Wahabism. In addition to the elimination of Baqi' Cemetery in Medina, along the Mecca-Medina road, the grave of the great companion of the Prophet, Abuzar, who is one of the outstanding fighters of oppression in history, is about to be destroyed; the government of Saudi Arabia and the Wahabi sect intend to eliminate this grave and its monuments. The graves of the martyrs of Badr and Ohod and the Abutaleb Cemetery in Mecca are also in ruins. Dozens of valuable Islamic historical monuments in Saudi Arabia are being destroyed by the incompetent government of Saudi Arabia. We hope in following up this issue, we will attract the attention of the Muslims and make them stand up against this colonialist policy.

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CS0: 4640/429

EDUCATION DIRECTOR CONSIDERS TUITION CHARGE AS 'TABOO'

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Sep 84 p 2

[Text] Starting next academic year, the plan for teacher assistants will be implemented among the best third year students of high schools for boys and girls throughout the country.

In an interview with the mass media, Seyyed 'Ali Akbar Hoseyni, the education director general of Tehran, announced the above statement and explained: Starting next academic year, a number of the most competent, interested third year high school students will be selected by the education headquarters. After they are introduced to the Rahnama'i and elementary schools, they will attend classes one day per week to learn teaching skills from teachers who are competent for this work. The goal in implementing this plan is to familiarize students with the teaching profession who, after completing their education, will be employed in this profession. Also, while continuing their education in the universities, they may serve part time in schools during their leisure time on a tenured or hourly basis. In addition, in the future, priority acceptance into the Ministry of Education will be given to those who have been selected as teacher assistants and have successfully completed their training. The teacher assistant plan is in fact a continuation of the KAD [Government Education Program?] plan. He then added: Those who are selected for this purpose will not be eligible for the KAD plan next year; this plan will be counted as their KAD plan.

The education director general of Tehran then added: This group will for the first three weeks have their tasks explained to them in their own schools and will then be sent to elementary and Rahnama'i schools for training.

The question was asked: During the time of martyr Raja'i and martyr Bahonar, a great deal of effort went into the successful coordination of equal resources for the education of everyone. Recently, it has been observed that some schools in practice establish a rating system for their schools by requiring high student grade point averages, high scores on admission

examinations, or tuition with which to pay teachers' salaries, and thus the resources are placed at the disposal of a particular group. Are the schools going to be nationalized again? He responded: The nationalization of schools will not occur in the sense that is in our memory and the bitter history we had with the previously nationalized schools. He then said: As the imam of the nation said: Ask people for help and have them participate in the affairs. Such participation regards not only commercial issues but also cultural issues. Education throughout the country costs more than 50,000 rials per student. If a number of people volunteer to pay this amount themselves, education will save this amount and the amount saved will help those areas with no resources.

In any case, the [Ministry] of Education will not allow the schools to be specifically for a group of well-to-do people, and our purpose is definitely not to discriminate in education between the well-to-do classes and those not so fortunate.

In connection with the payment of tuition, he then said: A circular letter was sent to all schools during registration by the deputy office of education affairs of the Ministry of Education, according to which no schools, under any circumstances, may oblige the parents of the students to pay tuition. If anyone has done so, he has done so wrongfully; such money is religiously unlawful. If a person has been forced to pay tuition, he can come and I will repay him the money personally. Of course, if the parents of the students want to help their children's school, there is no problem. At the present time, we have schools in which prayer rooms have been built with the aid of parents, or they have added a floor to the school, or provided sports equipment. This aid must be paid to the parent-school societies, the amount depending on the ability of the families.

Concerning the admission to some schools, he said: Part of the circular letter announced to the schools that the schools are to give priority in admissions to neighbors. We do not know of any schools which have not admitted their neighbors. Of course, we have had some complaints in this regard, which were sent to the follow up committee, and these problems have been eliminated. Again, if there are problems in this regard, the people can bring them up for investigation.

Concerning the transportation service for teachers, he said: The problem of the transportation of passengers in Tehran is a general one. However, the general office of education owns 70 private cars for this purpose, and has leased a number of cars, buses and vans. It is hoped that with the help of teachers, the number of leased cars will increase in order to respond to the needs of the teachers next year.

## Message to Students, Teachers, Parents and Instructors

In conclusion, addressing the teachers, students, and school Islamic societies, he offered certain recommendations to improve the work of the educational centers.

Speaking of the students, he said: They should respect and honor the teachers and authorities of the schools more than ever before and avoid waste and excuses, especially in writing supplies. And in regards to covers, it is especially important for the sisters to follow Islamic veiling; it would be better for them to have full length veils. He recommended that the school Islamic societies make efforts to attract the people and make them optimistic about Islam and to carry out planning in all areas.

To the school authorities, he recommended that they show more care than ever before for the children of the martyrs and that they supervise them well. Also, it is recommended that parent-teacher societies of schools guide the schools financially and spiritually, and that parents with any skills place those skills at the disposal of schools in order for the students to benefit from them. He also recommended to the educational headquarters of schools that the teacher assistants for educational affairs give the schools an educational flavor.

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CSO: 4640/427



## REPORT CITES IMPROVEMENT IN ECONOMIC SITUATION

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 20 Sep 84 p 1

## [Text]

The economic situation in Nepal in the last financial year has improved considerably over the preceding year.

This is the assessment of the economic recovery contained in the World Bank Annual Report for 1984 reaching here Wednesday.

The report noted the continuing heavy dependence of the Nepalese economy on the weather.

Pointing out that following two relatively good years, agriculture suffered a drought induced decline of over 2.5 percent in the fiscal year 1983. The report pointed out that the effects of the drought were felt throughout the Nepalese economy.

Higher food imports and reduced agricultural exports led to Nepal's first overall balance of payments deficit in many years despite significantly higher aid receipts.

The report noted that with the assistance of foreign donors, His Majesty's Government was able to avert a major food crisis through the timely

importation and distribution of foodgrains and the successful adoption of measures to increase the winter wheat crop.

The winter crop programme involving a package of shallow tubewells, fertilizers, improved seeds and credit was concentrated in thirty four out of the Kingdom's 75 districts and was mounted with intensive field supervision.

In 1983-84, His Majesty's Government made similar efforts to intensify agricultural production, particularly the main crop, paddy.

These efforts, aided by good weather, led to a strong recovery in agricultural output and exports, thereby improving the economy.

The report, however, noted that over the long term, Nepal's development efforts continue to face major structural problems, including those of rapid population growth, deforestation, and weak public administration.

His Majesty's Govern-

ment has, the report notes, focused increased attention on solving these problems in the recent years.

This has resulted in the introduction of a number of programmes designed to reduce the rate of population growth.

In the area of public administration too, several significant steps have been noted by the World Bank. These include the raising of salaries of civil service personnel and the establishment of a public service training college.

In addition, some budgetary procedures have been simplified to speed up project implementation.

Noting that Nepal is blessed with vast water resources which, if properly utilised, can not only produce adequate irrigation facilities but also generate electricity and other benefits in a large measure: the report concludes, "In conjunction with direct efforts to increase production and reduce Nepal's dependence on rainfed agriculture, continued steps in these areas should enable Nepal to achieve development gains."

# AGREEMENT REACHED TO BOOST TRADE WITH TIBET

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 19 Sep 84 pp 1, 6

[Text] Nepal and Tibet autonomous region of China have agreed to open three more passes--Olanchungola, Kimathanka and Tinkar--on the Nepal side of the border and Riu and Purang passes on Tibet side as the routes for the promotion of the bilateral trade.

A minute of understanding to this effect was signed in Lhasa on September 12 by Nepalese trade delegation led by Damodar Prasad Gautam, Secretary in the HMG Ministry of Commerce, and the trade delegation of the Tibet autonomous region led by Puqiong, chairman of the People's Government of Tibet autonomous region.

Prior to this, Kodari, Rasuwa and Yari on Nepal side and Nilau, Kerung and Purang on Tibet side were the only routes being used for bilateral trade in accordance with the Sino-Nepal trade and payment agreement concluded in November, 1981.

According to the recent agreement, Nepal will export specified amount of rice, flour, cement, iron goods, light industrial products, cloths, beaverage like beer and coka cola to Tibet and import from there wool, sheep, goats and light industrial products and handicrafts from 1985 to 1987.

According to the HMG Ministry of Commerce, Nepal's import from Tibet will include 750 metric tons of wool and 5000 sheep and goats.

The new agreement will not affect the traditional trade being held in 30 kilometres areas across Nepal-Tibet border.

According to the ministry, the agreement is a positive contribution toward increasing the magnitude of the bilateral trade, and consequently Nepal's export to Tibet autonomous region will increase considerably once the portion of the Arniko Highway, now under construction, is completed.

The volume of surface trade between Nepal and Tibet excepting the traditional trade which is conducted on barter system in 30 kilometer border areas, is worth 80 to 100 million rupees per annum.

Both sides have also agreed to make best effort for the exchange of trade delegations and for promotion of border trade as part of the bilateral trade.

During its visit to the Tibet autonomous region Nepali trade delegation had called on the chairman of the People's Government of the Tibet autonomous region, Dorje Chhetan.

The delegation had also visited light industries, carpet factory in Lhasa and Gyannse and Segatse located between Kodari and Lhasa.

CSO: 4600/24

## VULNERABILITY IN FACE OF NATURAL DISASTERS LAMENTED

Kathmandu THE MOTHERLAND in English 20 Sep 84 p 3

[Text]

The lingering monsoon and the resultant destruction caused to the arterial roads has disrupted life in the country. The government cannot be blamed for natural disaster of this kind but it cannot go unblamed for the lack of foresight and the mismanagement from which it suffers. Two days after disruption of the surface traffic, life in the capital itself is paralysed. Mile long queues of vehicles at the filling stations and also equally long queues of people holding containers for kerosene speaks volumes for the mismanagement of the government and the precarious situation the country is passing through. If the road is not to be opened for a couple of days, the life in the country will be completely paralysed. This is the most undesirable situation for an independent and sovereign country.

Very soon the people will have to do without common salt and sundry other

articles of daily necessity. Those in the government do not perhaps know what their responsibility is to the people and country. Petty politicking is what they know but not the real condition of the people and that of the country. Situation like the present one should teach them how vulnerable and helpless we are. We do not have the ability to cope even with small problems like the one we have because of excessive rain. What will really happen to this country if it has to face a major disaster like the ones which occur rather frequently in our neighbourhood. A government can have no justification for its existence if it does not have the ability to tackle such problems smoothly and without causing any kind of panic. Certain amount of preparedness to meet any kind of disaster should be there. This is one of the major functions of the government.

CSO: 4600/24

## COMMENTARY ON PLANS FOR COMPLETION OF MAJOR NATIONAL HIGHWAY

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 7 Sep 84 p 2

## [Text]

Reports that the remaining portion of the Mahendra (East-West) Highway is to be constructed soon by His Majesty's Government with the loans from the International Development Association and the Saudi Fund for Development will come as good news for all. Conceived more than two decades ago by His late Majesty King Mahendra, the East-West Highway project is without doubt one of the more exciting schemes undertaken in the Kingdom in recent times. As such, the news that this Highway will be completed within the next five years or so cannot but be enthusiastically greeted by all.

Aside from the fact that this ambitious project represents the crystallisation of the Nepalese people's desire to be able to travel from one part of the country to another speedily and without having to cross over into a foreign country, it has in time come to symbolise also Nepal's successful foreign policy. The latter is borne out by the fact that apart from loans such as the two just mentioned, India, Britain the USSR and the US have all helped to construct various segments of the East-West Highway. Taken together with other major highways in the hill area — such as those, for example, constructed by India and China — and feeder roads — such as the British-assisted Dharan-Dhankuta highway — it will not be an exaggeration to say that nothing less than a transportation revolution has begun, especially



where eastern and central Nepal are concerned.

Given this encouraging background, it is easy to visualise the not so far off day when a similar situation will obtain where the comparatively more inaccessible portion of western Nepal is concerned when the remaining part of the Mahendra Highway is completed with the funds that have now been made available for the purpose. In this context, it is significant that not only will the westernmost segment of the national artery enable the people in that area to trade in the market towns that are expected to spring up along the Highway, or indeed to spur trading activities in western Nepal in general, but also that it will make accessible all year round a region of the Kingdom that is virtually isolated from the rest of the country during the rainy season.

The obvious importance of the East-West Highway should not, however, detract from recognising that for its maximum utilisation it is necessary to connect as many feeder (north-south) roads to it as possible. Since this has been vividly demonstrated in areas where there are precisely such linkages between the East-West Highway and North-South feeder roads, it is splendid that the recently announced IDA loan for the completion of the project is also to cover some 60 kms of feeder roads to link the agricultural areas around the Karnali river to the East-West Highway. In view of the possibility of the launching of the Karnali Hydel Project in the not too distant future, it is only befitting that such a road link, including a bridge over the Karnali at the Chisapani gorge, should now be earmarked for construction. However, exciting as the prospects of the completion of the East-West Highway now are, even more so would be the fulfilment of the next transportation dream: the construction of a rail way system on the East-West Highway powered by the yet-to-be tapped hydel energy of the mighty Karnali!

## BRIEFS

PLANNING MINISTRY LIKELY--The Planning Ministry is expected to be created in the near future. According to a source close to the Prime Minister, the new ministry will be headed by a cabinet rank minister. Political observers speculate that the Vice-Chairman of the National Planning Commission Dr. Moham Man Sainju will be promoted to the post of the minister of state. Creation of the Planning Ministry is the logical conclusion following the finalization of streamling of the Planning Commission and the National Development Council, the political observers said. The political speculation that Dr. Sainju might even take over the finance portfolio is given increasing currency in the capital. [Text] [Kathmandu THE MOTHERLAND in English 15 Sep 84 p 1]

CSO: 4600/24

SINCERITY OF U.S. PRESIDENT'S REMARKS QUESTIONED

GF041355 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 28 Sep 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Reagan in New Garb"]

[Text] President Reagan's recent conciliatory gestures towards the Soviet Union, which began with the invitation to the White House extended last month to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, constitute a far cry from the bellicosity he had continuously demonstrated towards the other Super Power almost from the day he rose to his country's presidency. And the offer of a new dialogue with Moscow for a 'fresh approach' to reduce world tension, made in the course of his address to the U.S. General Assembly earlier this week, may have confounded many who believe that the leopard cannot change his spots. Does it really indicate that there has been a change of heart in the White House and the unrelenting Reagan has suddenly mellowed beyond expectations? Or is it no more than a gambit on the political chessboard in the midst of his electoral campaign now fast moving towards its climax?

In his seemingly sincere speech in the General Assembly, Reagan has voiced three specific proposals--avoidance by both Super Powers to get involved in regional conflicts; initiation of a serious dialogue to slash nuclear stock-piles; and establishment of a close working climate to reduce world tensions. Lofty motives these, provided Super Power actions reflect their genuine faith in all three of them. So far as keeping clear of regional conflicts is concerned what is the record? Mr Reagan needs to be reminded of his country's involvement in the war in Lebanon where American forces actively participated in the fighting. Even during the earlier rampage of Lebanon by Israeli forces, which left half the country devastated, Mr Reagan, who talks of peace today, had fuelled the fires of war through his country's lavish military and financial assistance to the delinquent Zionist entity, with which, indeed, the United States has entered into a strategic alliance. And if the Soviet Union has intervened in Afghanistan, the United States undertook a similar misadventure in Grenada and is even now openly interfering in the internal affairs of Latin American countries, notably Nicaragua.

As for his concern to reduce the danger of a nuclear war, did he not at the very outset repudiate SALT II? And has he forgotten the mammoth antinuke demonstrations in Italy and West Germany, and the human chains witnessed around Greenham Common in Britain and elsewhere, against his decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe--a rash step that caused a deep freeze in its

relations with the Soviet Union? All this is still too fresh in the minds of millions of people to accept Reagan in his new garb as an apostle of peace, olive branch in hand and cooing like a dove.

President Reagan who had repeatedly reviled the Soviet Union, employing highly provocative diction and describing that Super Power and its political philosophy as "evil," is now suggesting high-level contacts that could lead to preparation for a U.S.-Soviet summit. After four long years of sterile sabre rattling, he now sees "no sane alternative to negotiations on arms control and other issues." But whether his meeting with Mr Gromyko, scheduled for today, would produce anything more than a photograph of the two leaders smiling and shaking hands, lies in the hazy pale of the days to come. However, even if their talks unfold any prospect of a meaningful follow-up dialogue at a later date, the possibility of a panacea for today's harried humanity lies beyond any immediate prospect of realisation. If Reagan wins the coming elections, the chances are that he will revert to his former militant rhetoric with an added zest.

CSO: 4600/14

WEST SAID PURSUING 'DOUBLE' MORAL, ECONOMIC STANDARDS

GF030726 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Sep 84 p 4

[Editorial: "West's Double Economic, Moral Standards"]

[Text] Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan has done well to spotlight the double moral standards or "selective morality" of the industrial nations at the joint conference of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Those rich states apply one set of economic standards to themselves and a contrary one to the developing states. Such duality could have only one excuse--the lenders have the prerogative to apply a different set of morals to themselves from the one they prescribe for the debtor nations. But the United States, which is described as the "mighty debtor" by the ECONOMIST of London because of the 100 billion dollars it would receive this year from all over the world alone to cover its 170 billion dollar budget deficit, could have standards all its own and act unilaterally in a manner which hurts friends and foes alike.

Mr Ghulam Ishaq, in his analytical approach to the contradictions in the policy of industrial states, has said that while they wanted developing countries to accept liberalisation of imports as an article of faith, they have themselves been raising nontariff walls or other impediments against imports from these countries. While the World Bank and IMF urge developing states to eschew budget deficits, the industrial states are free to have large budget deficits, with the United States attaining a peak. Agricultural subsidies are provided liberally in the industrial states to increase production for export, while the developing countries are urged to abandon subsidies as if they were an economic plague. And while the developing countries are advised to repay their loans, they are handicapped in doing so by the checks on their exports imposed by the industrial states, which prevent sufficient foreign exchange earnings to repay the loans.

The unilateral manner in which the strength of the dollar has been boosted and sustained by high interest rates by the United States despite its persistent and massive budget deficit, has disrupted the exchange rates of most currencies in the world. And they add to the debt burden, which they had found hard to bear even otherwise. Now even prices of their primary commodities have fallen very low, the exchange rate of the dollar keeps shooting up. The debtors therefore find it hard to repay the loans as agreed.



Mr Ghulam Ishaq has stressed the interdependence of the developing and developed countries, and called for a cooperative framework with mutually supporting policies. When 40 percent of the exports of industrial states go to the developing countries, it is in the interest of the rich nations to help the poor states or debtor countries to speed up their economic recovery. If they do not do that, the developing countries will import even less than they are doing now and that would hamper Western economic recovery. He has hence called for "careful engineering" in place of a total reliance on the trickle-down effect of Western economic recovery, and strengthening the positive linkage between trade, debt and capital flows.

The complexity of the world economy needs to be understood better by the industrial states. While a recession in the West hits the developing countries hard, the economic resurgence of the rich states has hardly any beneficial effect on the economies of the developing countries. If the principle of economic independence of the have and have-not nations of the world is accepted, the industrial states have to bring an approach to the developing states far different from the one seen painfully for a decade now. If the dialogue between the rich and poor states, which is to begin in spring next year, makes a constructive contribution in that direction it will be a happy development. If the rich fail again, there is every likelihood of greater economic and political cataclysms in the world.

CSO: 4600/14

## COMMENTARY ON SOVIET ARMS SUPPLY TO INDIA

GFO31324 Rawalpindi PAKISTAN TIMES in English 16 Sep 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Soviet Arms for India"]

[Text] The visit of a high-level Indian defence delegation to the Soviet Union has resulted in new agreements for the supply of sophisticated military hardware to India. In consequence of the talks held between the two sides to broaden defence collaboration, the Soviet Union has consented to expedite the supply of advanced aircraft, missiles and electronic warfare equipment to India, giving a new dimension to the military cooperation between the two countries. Delhi has already in use MIG-23 and MIG-25 aircraft, while assembly lines for MIG-27 have been set up at the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bangalore. Now arrangements have been finalised for the initial assembly of MIG-29 fighter aircraft which employ a highly advanced technology. The Soviet Union has also assured the early supply of the giant tactical transport aircraft IL-76 whose batch will arrive in India early next year. An accord has also been reached between the two sides for the supply of five squadrons of AN-32 medium tactical transport aircraft three of which are already in India's use. Moscow has now agreed to supply two AN-32 aircraft every month. Among other things, India will get military hardware with higher strike power for its army and the latest sensing system to increase the sight, surveillance and detection capabilities of its navy.

This formidable military equipment package being offered to India is the latest to go into the pipeline of defence supplies from the Soviet Union which has seen some heavy load passing through it in recent years. The INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVIEW disclosed last year that Moscow had agreed to enable Delhi to build MIG-31 aircraft, said to be far ahead of F-16 and Mirage 2000, and to supply an AWACS aircraft for long-range high-flying reconnaissance. Moscow has also expressed its willingness to transfer the technology used in the armour of T-72 tanks, which is classified information. India is also getting from the Soviets an advanced version of Foxtrot class submarines and an undisclosed number of destroyers with a more developed fire control system. One estimate has it that Moscow has so far supplied to Delhi armaments worth over 20 billion dollars, which represents the largest single transfer of military equipment between two countries in recent years. It is every country's right to acquire military hardware for defence purposes. No third party can have a say in the military sales agreements contracted between two sovereign states. This universal principle is equally applicable to all,

but it is a strange phenomenon that while India reserves for itself the freedom of choice in the matter, it raises a hue and cry whenever Pakistan buys new military hardware to replace its aging defence equipment. The Indian reaction to the acquisition of half a dozen F-16's by Pakistan is a case in point. Ever since Pakistan signed an agreement to buy the aircraft from the United States, Delhi has carried on a relentless media campaign about the so-called danger and threat of war from Pakistan.

Those who are in the know of the military balance between India and Pakistan and India's frenzied rearming of its forces which are the largest in the region, can only laugh at the Indian posturing. But this has not deterred India from carrying on its mendacious propaganda. If anything, it is India's neighbours who should talk of the threat to their security posed by its bulging arsenal. But they don't, while India objects to Pakistan doing even the barest minimum to keep its defences in trim. Needless to say, Delhi's stance in the matter is hardly conducive to the creation of a climate in which good neighbourly relations can thrive. Taking a long-range view of the situation, India's attitude in fact is tantamount to claiming the status of being more equal than the others which can be highly disruptive of regional peace and harmony.

CSO: 4600/14

## THREAT OF POSSIBLE INDIAN ATTACK EXAMINED

GF031312 Rawalpindi PAKISTAN TIMES in English 17 Sep 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Need for Vigilance"]

[Text] The ABC TV network of the United States has carried a report about a possible Indian pre-emptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear installations. Giving details of the story, which it has based on a U.S. Senate hearing, it said that briefing senators on potential troublespots in South Asia, intelligence experts had said that India might attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities triggering a big conflict in the region. The United States is said to be concerned over the intelligence reports which normally reach the highest level only after having been scrutinised, sifted, checked and rechecked for authenticity at various stages. American intelligence is said to be especially perturbed over its failure to find at their normal location two squadrons of Indian Air Force's Jaguar fighters which are viewed as a potential strike force against Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Although India has denied that it has any such plans, reports of this import have for some time come with a persistence that is sure to cause alarm. Senator Cranston, the arch-enemy of Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme, while spreading all kinds of fib about the state of Pakistan's nuclear know-how, has thrown broad hints about such a possibility. Two months back THE WALL STREET JOURNAL of America also made a reference to the subject. Sections of the world press have kept talking of the matter quoting intelligence sources, but this is the first time that American intelligence experts have alerted the U.S. administration showing their concern in the matter.

We in Pakistan would like to think that the leadership in India is sane enough to see what such a mad adventure could lead to. We would also like to believe that the denial issued by it is a true index of its intentions. Delhi surely could not be unaware of the horrendous consequences that could follow from any attempt to destroy Pakistan's nuclear facilities. In that case, its own nuclear installations could not be safe from outside attack. As Pakistan Government leaders have time and again said, Pakistan is competent and fully prepared to defend its nuclear plants from a sneak attack and teach the invaders a lesson. In any case, Pakistan must further beef up its defence of its nuclear installations, for in such strategic matters nothing should be left to chance. We cannot forget that the world looked on with equanimity as the Israelis attacked and destroyed Iraq's nuclear facility. It did not move a finger to punish the culprit. In the present instance the possibility

cannot be ruled out that the reports about a pre-emptive attack on our nuclear plants by India (Israel too has been named as a possible attacker) is part of the psy-war being carried on against Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme and is being used as a ploy to prepare world public opinion psychologically to take the adventure without much ado if and when it materialised. We know how, despite numerous denials, hostile quarters have persisted with then crazy propaganda about an "Islamic bomb." The idea about an attack on Pakistan's nuclear plan is equally crazy, but we know contemporary history that there is no threshold of craziness and anything can happen when hostility and misconception combine into a mad adventure. It is therefore essential that we take all possible steps to make the defences of our nuclear installations impregnable. Let it be made clear to any would-be aggressors that the people of Pakistan will rise to a man to repulse any attack on their sovereignty.

CSO: 4600/14



## PUNJAB BANS NEW INDUSTRIAL UNITS NEAR BORDERS

Karachi DAWN in English 29 Sep 84 pp 1, 10

## [Text]

LAHORE, Sept 28: The Punjab government has issued a notification explaining the rules and regulations for the establishment of various industries in the province in future.

The notification places a complete ban on setting up of industries with a total cost exceeding Rs. 30 million within ten miles of an international border. Over 20 kinds of industries, including ordnance factories, locomotive and railway carriage manufacturing plants, mint, large size machine tool factories, heavy foundry works, heavy electrical complexes, heavy mechanical complexes, major vehicle assembly plants, explosives, nitric and sulphuric acid plants nuclear/separation plants, large size oil store units, security printing press involved in wholetime printing of sensitive documents or currency notes, electronic industries and oil refineries, cannot be set up within 50 miles of an international border according to the new notification.

Also, no industrial unit shall be set up in areas affected by floods flowing transversely in the strip of one mile of either side across the Grand Trunk Road from Shahdara Town to Muridke, without prior permission of the government.

Similarly, no industrial unit shall be set up within the territorial

limits of a town committee and within three kilometres outside such limits, within the territorial limits of a municipal committee and within six kilometres of such limits, within the territorial limits of a municipal corporation and within eight kilometres of such limits, and within the territorial limits of the Lahore Municipal Corporation (LMC) and within 14 kilometres of such limits.

However, the industrial estates developed by the government or any other authority authorised in this behalf, the industrial zones and areas to be earmarked by a municipal committee, corporation, development authority, Industries and Mineral Development Department or any other authority empowered in this behalf within or outside the municipal limits and the industries as may be notified by the government from time to time have been exempted from the restrictions explained in the notification.

According to the notification, no industrial unit with a total cost of more than Rs 300 million or which includes imported machinery of the value of more than Rs 50 million or the one for which the machinery to be imported is banned or for which the imported raw material is more than 60 per cent of the total raw material require-

ments, provided the imported raw materials are more than 20 per cent of the total fixed assets, shall be set up anywhere in the province without prior permission from the provincial government.

Small industrial undertakings in which the total fixed assets, including the cost of land, do not exceed Rs 0.2 million would not be required to seek prior permission.

The industries for which prior permission from the government is a must are: arms and ammunitions, security printing, currency and mints, defence-oriented electronics, radioactive substances, alcohol and foreign brand concentrate-based synthetic beverages, high explosives, projects based on second-hand machinery, except under the non-repatriable investment (NRI) scheme, fertilisers, basic steel, basic metal and alloys, petrochemicals, public utilities, ships, aircraft and railway locomotives, TV, radio tape recorders, VCR cassettes and tapes, airconditioners, refrigerators and deep freezers, motorcycles, scooters and three-wheelers, automobile tractors and farm machinery, fertilisers, cements, drugs and pharmaceuticals, vegetable ghee, sugar, cotton spinning and ginning, flour milling and projects with foreign private investment.

## OFFICIAL TALKS ABOUT INVESTMENT BY OVERSEAS PAKISTANIS

Karachi DAWN in English 29 Sep 84 p 10

## [Text]

KARACHI, Sept 28: Investments to the tune of Rs 4 billion have been made by overseas Pakistanis under Non-repatriable Income (NRI) scheme in industrial projects in the country.

This was disclosed by Mr Reza H. Syed, Managing Director of the Investment Advisory Centre of Pakistan (IACP) while addressing a Radio Press conference here on Thursday.

Mr Reza Syed said that Pakistanis in the United Arab Emirates had set up "Expatriate Pakistan Club" which is ready to invest in industrial ventures in Pakistan on a joint basis. The Club has asked the IACP to identify projects for them.

The IACP chief said that they had identified projects for investment by overseas Pakistanis.

He said that an investment centre had been set up where four financial institutions of the country have formed a consortium.

Mr Reza Syed said that the IACP had prepared feasibility report for the establishment of an integrated textile mill in Nepal as joint venture where Pakistanis would be re-

sponsible for its management. The Rs 23 crore project will have 25,000 spindles and 450 looms.

He further said that another joint venture between Pakistan and Malaysia was in the offing for processing of palm oil into high valued table-butter and margarine. Raw palm oil would be imported from Malaysia and processed in a unit in Export Processing Zone. The entire products would be exported to Middle East. The IACP had already submitted the market report and Pakistan and Malaysia would jointly prepare the financial feasibility.

The Government has prepared an ambitious scheme for the production of industrial alcohol from molasses, a by-product of sugarcane. In this connection contact had already been established with Brazil which had offered to provide technology for this project, Mr Reza disclosed.

He said that it was a viable project and several private parties in Pakistan were actively considering to invest in it.

The IACP chief said that a foreign expert had identified 250

industries which could be set up from by-products of sugarcane namely baggasse and molasses, etc. He said that 33 million tons of sugarcane was produced in the country annually. He said that the entire six lakh tons of molasses produced in the country was exported. It could be fruitfully utilised in value-added product of industrial alcohol as in Brazil where it was considered as by-product of sugarcane.

He said that several paper factories could be set up based on baggasse as its raw material. Several factories in Pakistan were already partially using baggasse as raw material. Its technology was simple and readily available in the country. He added that there was surplus of four lakh tons of baggasse after the consumption as fuel in the country.

Answering a question, the IACP chief said the national consultancy policy had been framed under which services of foreign experts would be availed of only where it is unavoidable. Even in such cases, Pakistani consultants would have to be associated, he said. —APP.

# UPGRADING OF ORANGI PLANNED

Karachi DAWN in English 29 Sep 84 p 2

[Text]

KARACHI, Sept 28: The upgradation of Orangi, the largest unauthorised settlement in Asia, is expected to be completed by 1988.

This was stated by Mr. Abdul Sattar Afghani, Mayor, KMC, in his speech on "Urban re-development — a stupendous task," delivered recently at the eleventh World Congress of United Cities held in Montreal, Canada.

He said the upgradation will be completed with the provision of physical and social infrastructure facilities such as water supply, construction of roads, drains, schools and dispensaries. Mr. Afghani further said that the residents of Orangi have set an inspiring example of sharing the burden on development with the authorities.

Another unauthorised habitation salvaged through amelioration plan is Baldia, with a population of about 200,000, he added.

The Mayor said that the Government of Sind has transferred about 3,240 hectares of land under the Regulation of Squatter Settlement programme, to KMC. The nominal cost of land recovered from the residents will be ploughed back for upgrading these settlements under a revolving fund.

Giving a brief history of the provincial metropolis, Mr Afghani said, "once a fisherman's habitation with 14,000 population, Kalachi or Kolachi as it was then known, became Karachi, a promising city, under the process of history when the British conquered Sind in 1843."

Mr. Afghani said after the creation of Pakistan on Aug 14, 1947, history once again gave an honourable place to Karachi by making it the first Capital of the largest independent Muslim State in the world.—APP

CSO: 4600/16

## SEPARATE MINERAL EXPLORATION AGENCY PROPOSED

Karachi DAWN in English 29 Sep 84 p 2

## [Text]

LAHORE, Sept 28: The Chairman, Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation (PMDC), Mr A.A. Malik, has proposed establishment of a separate mineral exploration and evaluation agency.

At a function here, Mr Malik stressed the need for provision of a line of credit by the State Bank of Pakistan for the mineral sector. This line should operate through Mineral Development Bank, he added.

He put forward several other suggestions for mineral development in the country. They are:

- A national mineral policy should be formulated and enforced without further delay with clear-cut demarcation of functions and areas between provincial and federal agencies; national priorities should be redefined and strategic minerals identified for exploration and development by federal agencies;

- Fragmentation of mineral deposits should not be allowed and consolidated blocks of the deposits

be developed for mining operations on commercial scale;

- Import of mining machinery and mineral transport equipment should be exempted from customs duty and sales tax for all areas. A system of incentives, including depletion allowance, tax holidays, etc. should be produced;

- The private sector should be reorganised on scientific and commercial lines. The small lease holds under the control of private sector should be grouped together to form larger economic units;

- In view of the larger energy requirements, the quality and quantity of coal reserves should be firmed up and for this purpose an appropriate institutional framework should be created;

- Export-oriented minerals should be made a part of barter agreements and that to make mineral export viable export rebates should be provided; and

- Divergent mining laws and mineral concession rules of different provinces should be made uniform.

CSO: 4600/16

BRIEFS

FORMER COUNCILLOR SENTENCED--LAHORE, Sept 28: A summary military court awarded three years' rigorous imprisonment to former councillor of Lahore Municipal Corporation Dr. Ziaullah Khan Bagash on Thursday on charges of helping Al-Zulfiqar men. Dr Bangash, who was detained at the Kot Lakhpat Jail in December last for three months, was released in March 1984 but was rearrested after some time and again kept at the Kot Lakhpat Jail. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 29 Sep 84 p 10]

CSC: 4600/16

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